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ABSTRACT 
 This research explores and deepens our understanding of an element of arts 
infrastructure in the United States: the arts incubator, an organizational form or 
programmatic initiative that exists at the intersection of artistic production, 
entrepreneurship, and public policy. The study is a qualitative cross-case analysis of four 
arts incubators of different types: Arlington Arts Incubator, Intersection for the Arts, 
Center for Cultural Innovation, and Mighty Tieton, situated within the context of the 
literature of arts incubators, business incubator evaluation, and a theoretical framework 
for understanding entrepreneurship in the US arts and culture sector.  
 The research opens the black box of incubator operations to find that arts 
incubators create value for client artists and arts organizations both through direct service 
provision and indirect echo effects but that the provision of value to communities or 
systems is attenuated and largely undocumented. Arts incubators, like many small arts 
organizations, tend to look retrospectively at outputs rather than at the processes that 
convert inputs to tangible impacts, or means into ends. This is an issue not relegated only 
to the arts and culture sector; business incubators share some of these tendencies. Despite 
these issues, arts incubators remain a potentially impactful tool of cultural policy if their 
processes and activities align with their strategic goals and those processes and activities 
are assessed formatively and summatively. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Research motivation 
 When I began my research into arts incubators, there was very little research – 
either within the business discipline of entrepreneurship studies or across the disciplines 
of arts and cultural policy or community development -- on arts incubators, their strategic 
goals, their forms and funding models, or their evaluation methods. A review of what 
research exists suggests arts incubators play a role in early stage development of arts-
based enterprises and arts organizations as well as capacity building for individual artists. 
Arts incubators may also serve a community development function.   
 The last major study of arts incubators was published in 2000 by the National 
Business Incubator Association (NBIA) in the form of a best practices guide for 
establishing an incubation program (Gerl, 2000). The focus of the incubators profiled in 
that monograph, as well as an earlier whitepaper for the National Assembly of Local Arts 
Agencies (Kahn, 1995) was on nonprofit organizations and local arts agencies supporting 
the early stage development of other nonprofit arts and cultural organizations. In the 
intervening years, there has been a proliferation of arts incubators and incubator activities 
with a wider variety of claimant stakeholders (see Kaler, 2002). Although the goal of 
some self-described arts incubators fit within the National Business Incubator 
Association’s description of incubation, my research (Essig, 2014a) indicates that arts 
incubators are more likely to be supporting individual artist development (e.g. 
Springboard for the Arts) than start-up organizations Other arts incubators are designed to 
provide gallery space (e.g. Arts Incubator of North Carolina), or advocate for social 
change (e.g. Tacoma SpaceWorks). Some incubators focus on community development 
	  
2	  
or economic development via support for artists, arts organization, or creative industry 
enterprise growth and development. In this latter regard, policy initiatives such as the 
“Our Town” program and partnerships such as “ArtPlace” are indicators that there is 
currently vigorous policy interest in arts-based community development initiatives. 
Phillips’s (2004) typology of such development activities includes arts incubators as one 
of four arts-based approaches to community economic development. Recent initiatives 
such as Arts Incubator of the Rockies exemplify the implementation of this approach. 
 Further complicating the landscape for arts incubators is their diversity of 
organizational forms and funding models. While the NBIA (2013) asserts that 93 percent 
of North American business incubators are “non-profit organizations focused on 
economic development,” there are other business forms and strategic foci in the universe 
of arts incubators. These include independent nonprofit organizations, municipally 
controlled nonprofit auxiliaries, government agency programs, programs of larger 
nonprofit organizations, and several for-profit arts incubators. There are also a handful of 
university-based arts incubators that have been studied in a pilot for the current research 
(Essig, 2014b). Incubator programs deliver a variety of services to their different claimant 
stakeholders, reflecting a diversity of value propositions.  
Operational Definition1 
 The National Business Incubator Association describes business incubators as 
delivering programs that “nurture the development of entrepreneurial companies, helping 
them survive and grow during the start-up period, when they are most vulnerable” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The operational definition or arts incubators used here was published in Essig (2014a), 
“Arts Incubators: A Typology” during the course of this research.  
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(NBIA, 2013). Entrepreneur Magazine’s definition is complementary: “An organization 
designed to accelerate the growth and success of entrepreneurial companies through an 
array of business support resources and services that could include physical space, 
capital, coaching, common services, and networking connections” (Entrepreneur, 2013). 
Both emphasize the growth of young companies. “A business incubator’s main goal is to 
produce successful firms that will leave the program financially viable and freestanding” 
(NBIA 2013).  
 Mian (2014) explains, “In its business use incubation is considered as a unique 
and flexible mix of organized enterprise development processes that enable fledgling new 
and small businesses to develop by providing critical support to survive and grow in their 
early stages of development” (p. 335). Arts incubators are considered by NBIA to be a 
subset of business incubators that specifically target “arts and crafts” (NBIA, 2013) but 
that definition does little to explain the sector-specific services, goals, and structures of 
arts incubators. A more useful definition is adapted from the Polish Art_Inkubator: “an 
arts incubator is an organization that supports future entrepreneurs, non-governmental 
organizations and artists by helping them to enter the creative industries sector. Arts 
incubators are a platform that empowers artists and organizations to implement their 
business and artistic ideas” (Art_Inkubator, 2013). This definition is particularly useful 
for the current research because it is inclusive of for-profit, nonprofit and individual 
client stakeholders and because it implies early stage development and market entry, thus 
distinguishing arts incubators from other artist services and support organizations such as 
residency programs. It uses the word “platform” rather than “facility” to be inclusive of 
both physical and virtual incubators. “Platforms” can be understood to “provide 
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frameworks within which a range of activities can take place” (Wachhaus, 2011). 
Organizations or programs are thus considered to be “arts incubators” if they provide 
some form of developmental assistance (i.e. a “platform,” the scope of which varies) to 
artists, arts organizations, or creative enterprises in early stages of development or change 
and call themselves or are called by others in published materials “arts incubators.” 
Research Questions 
 This research seeks to explore and deepen our understanding of this important 
element of arts infrastructure in the United States: the arts incubator, an organizational 
form or programmatic initiative that exists at the intersection of artistic production, 
entrepreneurship, and public policy. The specific questions guiding the research are: 
Given observed differences across organizational forms and foci, how do arts incubators 
of various types create value for their stakeholder communities? How do arts incubators 
evaluate their success at creating that value? What is the relationship between their 
evaluation methods and their strategic priorities? 
 Through a comparative case study of four different types of arts incubators (Essig, 
2014a), I will show that arts incubation activities are similar to, but distinct from, 
business incubation activities undertaken in small business incubators in the Unites States 
since the 1950s. Literature suggests that arts incubators serve cultural, economic, and 
community development functions by supporting individual artists, nonprofit arts 
organizations, and creative industries entrepreneurs. The outputs of arts incubators 
include new arts-based businesses, showings of incubated artwork, individual artists with 
enhanced business planning capacity, and more. When arts incubators are used as policy 
tools, the desired outcomes include community economic development, increased 
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community vibrancy, community cultural development, and individual artist economic 
stability and sustainability. However, unlike small business incubators or tech incubators, 
the value created by arts incubators is often intended to be “extra-economic,” that is, 
beyond merely economic. Thus, there are challenges to evaluating arts incubator success 
not faced by small business incubators.   
Research Design 
 The research design implements Bergek and Norrman’s (2008) suggestion that to 
identify incubator best practice, the black box that is the incubator must be opened. Thus, 
the questions “How do arts incubators create value for their stakeholder communities” 
and “how do they evaluate their success at delivering that value” will be answered 
descriptively and qualitatively using a multiple case-study approach. The cross case 
analysis enables the development of a framework for evaluating arts incubators in 
relation to incubator goals. Data includes first person observations, interviews with 
incubator stakeholders (staff, clients, and supporters), existing published documents, 
evaluation plans and reports (where available), and a national survey of incubator 
directors. The mixed methods approach was piloted in my study of university-based arts 
venture incubators (2014b) and builds on my inventory and typology of US arts 
incubators (2014a).  
 The research is contextualized by a review of the extant literature on arts 
incubators and especially their use as policy tools as well as a review of the literature on 
the evaluation of small business incubators as no such literature exists on the evaluation 
of arts incubators beyond what I have recently published (Essig, 2014a and 2014b). 
Following the review of the literature, a discussion of entrepreneurship in the arts and 
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culture sector and the “creative industries” construct introduces some of the theoretical 
issues underlying the study. Arts incubator activity is explained in the context of theories 
entrepreneurship and theories of the firm as applied to and within the U.S. arts and 
culture sector. 
 Four arts incubators have been chosen for in-depth qualitative analysis using a 
comparative case study approach. These four represent the four “types” identified in my 
earlier paper (2014a): 1) Arlington Arts Incubator, a county agency program serving 
nonprofit arts organizations; 2) Intersection for the Arts, a nonprofit organization serving 
a community cultural development function; 3) Center for Cultural Innovation, a 
nonprofit arts services organization serving individual artists; 4) and Mighty Tieton, a 
for-profit incubator of creative enterprises. The cross-case analysis of these four 
incubators, along with analysis of national survey results, lead to a potential framework 
for the evaluation of arts incubators that aligns evaluation variables with incubator 
strategic priorities.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 An arts incubator may be a program of a local or state arts agency; it may be a 
nonprofit organization; it may be a facility from which creative enterprises are launched; 
or it might be a hybrid thereof. Most of the scant literature on arts incubators in the US 
focuses on nonprofit organizations supporting the development of nonprofit arts 
organizations. Literature on creative industries incubation in Europe and the 
Commonwealth countries add some additional context for our understanding of arts 
incubators. While this literature may express the aspirations of arts incubators to deliver 
value (cultural, economic, intellectual, or social value) to their community, none address 
the type of value created, whether or not the incubators actually create value, or how they 
measure their success at doing so. There is, however, some literature on the evaluation of 
small business incubators as well as extant literature reviews on business incubators 
generally (e.g., Hackett & Dilts, 2004; S. Mian, 2014; Tavoletti, 2012) that can be 
important for our later discussion. This literature review, therefore, focuses on two areas: 
the extant literature on arts incubator outputs, outcomes, and policy targets; and literature 
on business incubator evaluation. 
Arts Incubators as Policy Tools2 
 Tavoletti (2012) asserts, “The main expectation of policy makers that invest 
public money in business incubation is that incubator graduates have the potential to 
create jobs, revitalize cities and regions, diversify local economies, commercialize new 
technologies, transfer technology from universities and major corporations and strengthen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  A version of this section was presented at the Social Theory, Politics, and Arts 
conference in Ottawa in 2014. 
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local and national economies in general” (p. 424). Literature suggests that the policy 
outcomes for arts incubators are both more humble and more general. Arts incubators 
serve cultural, economic, and community development functions by supporting 
individual artists, nonprofit arts organizations, and creative industries entrepreneurs. The 
outputs of arts incubators include new arts-based businesses, showings of incubated 
artwork, individual artists with enhanced business planning capacity, and more. When 
arts incubators are used as policy tools, the desired outcomes include community 
economic development, increased community vibrancy, community cultural 
development, and individual artist economic stability and sustainability. Charting the 
targets of arts incubation enterprises provides insight into their past, current and potential 
use as policy tools.  
 As noted earlier, The National Business Incubator Association (NBIA) considers 
arts incubators to be a subset of business incubators that specifically target “arts and 
crafts” (NBIA, 2009). Business incubators as a whole can be understood to be designed 
to deliver programs that “nurture the development of entrepreneurial companies, helping 
them survive and grow during the start-up period, when they are most vulnerable” 
(NBIA, 2009). Incubators distinguish themselves from business consultants and research 
parks “through their particular competitive scope, strategic objective, and service 
package”  (Carayannis & Von Zedtwitz, 2005). Similarly, they are distinguished from co-
working or “maker” spaces by the services they provide.  
 As I write elsewhere (Essig, 2014b), early literature on business incubators (eg. 
Allen and Rahman, 1985) focused on the incubator as a facility, while more recent 
	  
9	  
literature focuses on the services an incubator provides (see Hackett and Dilts, 2004). 
Bergekk and Norman (2008) observe this shift:  
In the incubator literature, the relative emphasis on each component has varied 
over time, from an initial focus on facilities and administrative services to a more 
recent emphasis on the importance of business support (Peters et al., 2004). In our 
opinion the latter is the most important— without business support activities, the 
denomination ‘‘hotel’’ is a better description than incubator. (p. 21) 
Further, Perdomo and his colleagues note, “the role of business incubation has evolved 
from the originally expected facility and service provider into a consultant organization 
for knowledge, resources, and policy coordination for both enterprises and national 
innovation systems”  (Perdomo, Alvarez, & Urbano, 2014). Some incubator descriptions 
(e.g. Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005) include provision for linking capital to new ventures or, 
at least, the introduction of potential investors to emerging entrepreneurs, while others do 
not  (Peters, Rice, & Sundararajan, 2004). Because the target clients of arts incubators are 
more likely to be individual artists or nonprofit arts organizations (see Essig, 2014a), this 
business incubator output is not as relevant in the arts incubator universe as their 
nonprofit analogs of grant support and fiscal sponsorship.  
 Kahn’s (1995) monograph on arts incubators examined six organizations that “are 
concerned with nurturing arts organizations by facilitating their organizational growth 
and development” (p. 1). Kahn distinguishes this model of arts incubator from others that  
“provide artists with the business skills necessary to be successful in the marketplace” (p. 
2). Gerl (2000) explains that arts incubators “equip nonprofit cultural groups and arts 
entrepreneurs with the skills, tools, and business environment necessary to meet short- 
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and long-range objectives” (p. 2). The Polish Art_Inkubator provides the basis for the 
operational definition used in this research, adapted here from a verbatim translation: “an 
arts incubator is an organization that supports future entrepreneurs, non-governmental 
organizations and artists by helping them to enter the creative industries sector. Arts 
incubators are a platform that empowers artists and organizations to implement their 
business and artistic ideas” (2013). This definition is broadly inclusive of for-profit, 
nonprofit and individual client stakeholders and implies early stage development and 
market entry, thus distinguishing arts incubators from other artist services and support 
organizations such as residency programs.  
 In the following section, outputs and outcomes are distinguished in the same 
fashion as that articulated by Voisey et al (Voisey, Gornall, Jones, & Thomas, 2006). 
“‘Outcomes’ are differentiated from ‘outputs.’ An output is usually the tangible service 
that a project delivers, and an outcome is a wider ‘behavioural’ change that results from 
the output” (p. 457). 
Arts Incubator Outputs 
 Writing of business incubators (albeit with a focus on technology business 
development),  Grimaldi & Grandi (2005) note that “the existence of different incubators 
and the evolution of their business models over time have been driven by the evolution of 
company requirements and needs, which in turn has prompted incubators to diversify 
their offer of services” (p. 111). The needs of artists and arts incubators has similarly 
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evolved over time, especially since the onset of the fiscal crisis in 2007-2008, from which 
point over one third of the arts incubators currently operating have launched3.  
 In 2000, the most common outputs of arts incubators were training, technical 
assistance, and facilities, leading to outcomes both artistic (e.g., financially stable artists 
and arts organizations that are able to more effectively produce and distribute art) and 
economic (e.g., job growth) that together have the potential to build cultural capital, 
which Phillips (2010) argues is the central activity of arts entrepreneurship. The six 
organizations profiled by Kahn (1995) subsequently formed the Arts Incubator Alliance, 
which collaborated with the National Business Incubator Association on the publication 
of Gerl’s 2000 monograph, Incubating the Arts. The descriptions of these six incubators 
provide an overview of incubator outputs at that period in time. As arts incubators 
became both more prevalent and more diversified, their outputs also expanded to include 
shared business services, fiscal sponsorship, and, occasionally, direct funding. Thom 
(2014) includes coaching as a strategic output of arts incubators in the UK.  
 Training. In support of their capacity-building objectives, arts incubators often 
provide training, usually in the form of workshops on strategic planning, finance, and 
legal issues. Training is provided by all of the six incubators profiled by Kahn (1995) and 
Gerl (2000) as well as by 28 of 43 incubators examined in my later typology (Essig, 
2014a). Public investment in such training aligns with policies that implement economic 
New Growth Theory. “NGT treats advances in growth-enhancing technology as a result 
of the conscious, strategic decisions of individuals, firms, and governments to invest in 
the acquisition of skills and knowledge and in potential innovation” (Rushton, 2013, p. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Source: data collected by author for Essig (2014b).  
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4). In addition to workshops, some incubators also provide one-on-one mentorship 
(TeamSolve, 2014) and coaching (Thom, 2014).  
 Business assistance. Scillitoe and Chakrabarti (2010) list the array of business 
services available in small business incubators: “business planning, tax assistance, 
personnel recruiting, marketing, management, accounting, general legal expertise, 
accessing financial capital, and accessing business contacts”  (p. 157). Several arts 
incubators offer similar access to technical assistance such as legal advice, accounting, or 
marketing. The means of delivering such assistance varies. ArtServe in Fort Lauderdale 
and the now defunct Entergy in New Orleans, for example, connected arts organizations 
to legal services through a local chapter of Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts (Kahn, 1995) 
co-located within the incubator facility. More recently, Arts Incubator of the Rockies 
(2013) offered legal information via a web-based resource-sharing page. New York 
Designs Business Center and Corzo Creative Incubator offer “office hours” with CPAs 
and attorneys. The Pave Program in Arts Entrepreneurship, which I direct, offers short 
one-on-one sessions with lawyers or accountants as part of its professional sustainability 
workshops. 
 Facilities. As previously noted, facilities have been a focus of business 
incubators, as described in the early incubator literature. Gerl, too, focuses on facilities, 
including detailed descriptions of the facility features available to clients in the six 
incubators she profiles: offices, conference rooms, production space, programming 
venue, labs, retail space, and common areas (see pp. 37-50). The monograph even 
includes floor plans of three of the six incubators. Facility provision is still the most 
common output of arts incubators and is an output of all incubators with community 
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economic or business development outcomes (Essig, 2014b). Facilities, as an “output” 
require significant financial “input.” In his analysis of several European creative 
industries incubators, Montgomery notes “All of the examples referred to have been 
made possible by the injection of public sector funding to cover all or a large part of the 
capital costs associated with building purchase, refurbishment and fit-out…. In return, the 
government agencies involved can see their capital contributing to the reuse of old and 
redundant buildings” as well as several less tangible outcomes (2007, p. 651). An 
Australian arts incubator feasibility study confirms the need for government funding for 
incubator facilities, “Traditional incubator models offering a mix of facilities and services 
on the whole require on-going investment from government” (Positive Solutions, 2011, p. 
24). 
 Shared business services. Business assistance is generally provided to individual 
clients, but shared business services are also provided by some art incubators. Phillips 
(2004) explains that the provision of support services, combined with other incubator 
outputs noted previously, “make it feasible for artist entrepreneurs to start businesses” (p. 
115). Shared services might include cooperative marketing, financial management, 
technology support, event management, administrative support, and more (see Gerl, 
2000).  
 Funding. Grant funding is an output of several incubators sponsored by state or 
local arts agencies. Grimaldi and Grandi (2005) contend that an incubator links 
“technology, capital and know-how in order to leverage entrepreneurial talent” (p. 111).  
Connections to venture capital do not appear to be an output of many arts incubators, 
which are as often as not working with nonprofit arts organizations or individual artists.    
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 Fiscal sponsorship. Although fiscal sponsorship was not addressed in the earlier 
literature on arts incubations, there are several arts services organizations that now 
provide fiscal sponsorship to clients, most notably Fractured Atlas, based in New York 
City, with over 3000 members nationwide (see http://www.fracturedatlas.org/site/fiscal/). 
Three self-described arts incubators can be identified from their published materials as 
offering fiscal sponsorship services, Legion Arts (Cedar Rapids, IA), Springboard for the 
Arts (Minneapolis, MN) and Intersection Incubator (San Francisco, CA). The survey 
results discussed in later sections of this paper address the prevalence of this output. 
 Social networks. Grodach (2011) contends that arts incubators are particularly 
successful at creating “work-related advantages through the social networks that they 
enable artists to build and maintain” (p. 81). The membership-based structure of some 
incubators confers a relationship status upon its constituent artists or organizations. 
Hansen et al  (Hansen, Chesbrough, Nohria, & Sull, 2000) identify access to professional 
networks as one of three characteristics of good business incubator design. Other research  
(Scillitoe & Chakrabarti, 2010) indicates that networking supports faster learning of 
know-how skills. Thom (2014) notes that “arts incubators also provide network contacts 
and develop the artist’s networking skills by building collaborations and partnerships 
among the incubation clients as well as with external artists and art organisations [sic] or 
representatives of the community” (p. 12).  
 The outputs above are derived from information about arts incubators in the US as 
defined specifically for this study. Montgomery (2007) in his study of European creative 
industry incubators and managed workspaces provides a set of outputs that overlaps only 
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slightly with this list: space for work; space for cultural and community use; jobs; and 
visitor numbers (p. 616). 
Arts Incubator Policy Outcomes 
 Kahn’s (1995) whitepaper on arts incubators indicates that a primary outcome of 
business incubators is job growth; Montgomery (2007) considers jobs an output, and it is 
one of the targeted outcomes of publicly funded small business incubators articulated in 
the business literature (Allen & Weinberg, 1988). While jobs are a desired outcome for 
one of the six arts incubators Kahn studied, it is not a focus of the other five. (I also note 
that that particular incubator, Entergy, failed in 2004 having never achieved its 
objectives.)  Rather, an outcome of several incubators in the 1995 study is “graduated” 
firms. That is, arts organizations that are independent from the incubator financially and 
physically after completion of the incubation program. In some cases these incubated arts 
organizations are new firms and in others are existing nonprofit arts organizations 
seeking to improve their organizational capacity (e.g. Arts Bridge). In these early years of 
arts incubation, the latter seems to be more common. Montgomery (2007) includes 
enterprise development among the outcomes of European creative industry incubators. 
 Grodach (2011) identifies the problems presented when firms fail to “graduate” 
from an arts incubator:  “In becoming essentially dependent on the incubator, these de 
facto resident organizations restrict access for other arts groups, reduce the potential 
audience for an art space, and, therefore, limit the potential impact of this art space role” 
(p. 80). Several incubator directors have indicated that the professional sustainability of 
individual artists, rather than the sustainability of arts firms is a desired outcome 
(in.cu.bate., 2014). 
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 Arts Bridge, founded in 1986 and no longer in existence, is credited as being the 
first arts incubator (Gerl, 2000). Its founding was incentivized by a feasibility study 
conducted by the Chicago Department of Economic Development and other research 
conduced by the Chicago Department of Cultural Affairs. Although it sprouted from 
public policy research, Arts Bridge was initially founded and governed by private 
management consultants. The founding principles of Arts Bridge, “to strengthen the 
economic viability of the arts; second, to promote artistic and cultural diversity; and third, 
to enhance the role of the arts in the community” (Kahn, 1995, p. 3) are typical of 
incubators whose desired outcomes are arts oriented as opposed to economically oriented.  
 Grodach (2011) identifies two strands of literature related to economic 
development outcomes of support for artists generally. The first strand focuses on the 
direct economic benefits (skilled labor, specialized services, business attraction) of public 
investment in arts infrastructure and the second on the indirect effects of such investment 
“by enhancing interaction within and between communities, which in turn generates 
businesses, jobs, and tourism dollars” (p. 74). Montgomery, too, points to these less 
tangible outcomes: “the growth of the creative industries, wealth creation and the general 
benefits of image where cities come to be associated with creativity, innovation and style. 
Not all of these benefits are immediately tangible” (2007, p. 615).   
 Phillips (2004) asserts that arts incubators are one of four types of programs that 
are used to support arts-based community economic development, the others being 
artists’ cooperatives, development of tourism, and comprehensive approaches. Grodach 
(2011) includes arts incubators as one of five types of arts spaces that can be used toward 
achieving economic and community development outcomes. I note, however, that his 
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definition of arts incubators, “an art space that offers low-cost technical, administrative, 
and professional assistance and exhibition, rehearsal, and/or office space for arts 
organizations, arts-related business, or artists” (p. 77) differs from that employed here for 
its emphasis on physical facility (the subject of his study) and lack of emphasis on 
supporting early- or next-stage development of artists and arts organizations in favor of 
those that have already launched.  
 Montgomery (2007) identifies the potentially dichotomous axis to describe the 
policy outcomes of arts incubators: 
In developing appropriate models locally, local authorities and agencies will need 
to be clear whether any proposed new facility is primarily an economic 
development initiative, that is a means of stimulating the growth of the mainly 
commercial creative industries, or whether the objective is more to do with artistic 
development. (p. 616) 
In summary, when arts incubators are deployed as policy tools, the desired outcomes may 
be direct (e.g., jobs, business growth, re-use of abandoned buildings), or indirect (e.g., 
image, community vitality). Phillips (2004) delineates these: 
Indirect effects of arts-based community development approaches are inherently 
acceptable: amenities and aesthetics of a community are increased to enhance its 
overall image and, consequently, attract additional growth and development 
(Phillips, 1998, p. 5). The more evident direct effects include increased economic 
activity in terms of jobs, sales and public revenues. (p. 112) 
Grodach  (2011) explains the limitations on achieving indirect outcomes: “The primary 
contribution of art spaces [of which arts incubators are one type] is that they serve as a 
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conduit for building the social networks and social capital that contribute to both 
community revitalization and artistic development” but that their community and 
economic development potential is limited (p. 75). Whether direct or indirect, desired 
outcomes may be focused on economic development or artistic development as 
delineated in Table 1. Strong interest in the indirect or “ripple” effects of arts incubators 
in the policy environment is derived, at least partially, from the immense popularity of 
Florida’s (2002) Rise of the Creative Class. Although his methodology, results, and the 
logic of his argument are widely disputed (see, for example, Richards & Wilson, 2006; 
Stern & Siefert, 2010), there is no doubt that Florida’s book has had a powerful impact on 
policy actors, who to this day employ his circular creative class argument to advocate for 
support for community economic development based on the arts and creative industries.  
 
Direct Outcomes Indirect Outcomes 
Jobs 
New enterprises 
Tourism dollars 
Creative image 
In-migration of other new businesses 
Tourist and visitor traffic 
 
Stable arts organizations 
Artists with sustainable careers 
Increased cultural production 
 
Community vitality 
 
 
Table 1. Desirable policy outcomes of arts incubators as described in the literature 
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Incubator Policy Targets 
 Schneider and Ingram (1997) assert, “different kinds of target populations usually 
will be associated with particular kinds of goals, rules, tools, rationales, and assumptions” 
(p. 104). They delineate a typology of four families of socially constructed policy targets: 
advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants (p. 102). See Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Social construction of policy target groups adapted from Schneider & Ingram 
1997, p. 109. 
 The later 1980s to early 1990s marks a period when several of the first arts 
incubators were developed, as well as a major shift in federal arts and culture policy away 
from individual artist funding as a result of the “culture wars” of the late 1980s.  
Individual artists, who had previously been supported by the National Endowment for the 
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Arts funding were seen by some policy makers, most famously Jesse Helms, as being in 
the deviant category. The NEA, no longer allowed to provide individual artist support, 
instead  provided support for organizations that targeted both artistic excellence and 
underserved populations, who are seen in Schneider and Ingram’s construct as 
“dependents,” that is lacking political power, but positively constructed. Some indirect 
policy tools, such as the tax exemption for contributions to nonprofit arts organizations 
target – or benefit – the “advantaged,” that is the politically powerfully, positively 
constructed cultural elite.   
 The initiation of the first arts incubators in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
coincident with the NEA’s shift away from individual support toward support for 
“dependent” organizations; arts incubators can themselves be seen in that light. In a 
general sense, one can view the arts incubator as a means for shifting the policy burden 
out of the deviant category and into the dependent category where the politic risks are 
lighter. As Schneider and Ingram (1997) note, however, benefits in this category are 
costly, but burdens (e.g. poor working conditions, below-market salaries) are largely 
invisible. Thus, there is little political gain to be had by supporting the now dependent 
arts organizations (including incubators). 
 To cite one example of how this played out in the early arts incubator 
environment, one sees that it is in the context of the historical shift away from funding 
the “deviant” toward funding the “dependent” that San Jose’s Multicultural Arts 
Incubation Program was founded with a significant grant from the NEA “to assist leading 
San Jose-based multicultural arts organizations with their administrative and 
organizational development and fundraising ability” (Kahn, 1995 p. 6). While a small 
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business incubator might target “start-ups,” the policy targets in San Jose were existing 
organizations (organizations had to have presented work in San Jose for at least two 
seasons prior to entering the incubation program) seeking increased organizational 
capacity.  
 More recently, arts incubators are viewed as a policy tool to improve 
communities. As noted earlier, Phillips (2004) includes arts incubators in a typology of 
four arts-based community development techniques. Although Phillips saw incubators as 
“an economic development tool designed to foster a community’s business development 
efforts,” (2004, p. 114) incubators have been used more recently in “creative 
placemaking” efforts that seek to “involve arts organizations, artists or designers working 
with national and local partners to drive increases in vibrancy and diversity in a place” 
(ArtPlace, 2013). Phillips, in a later paper, acknowledges this broader potential for arts 
incubation programs: “The arts incubators also often play a pivotal role in attracting other 
types of activity and changing perceptions in the area. Though this was initially viewed 
with some skepticism by many policy makers, it is now recognized as a key to the 
development of creative industry clusters” (Phillips, 2010, p. 285). Phillips and Shockley 
(2010) differentiate such endogenous asset-based community development initiatives 
from the exogenous flow of cultural capital described by Throsby (2010).  
 Creative placemaking, as described above, became a focus of public policy in 
2011 with the National Endowment of the Arts “Our Town” initiative and its partnership 
with the ArtPlace funding consortium, as well as the Departments of Transportation and 
Housing and Urban Development. One highly publicized grant from these combined 
programs went to Arts Incubator of the Rockies. An NEA publication (Beete, 2013) 
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seems to indicate that the community development outcomes of the incubator had not yet 
been met – or perhaps measured -- two years after initiation. These outcomes include 
“strengthening the local economy by supporting and encouraging creative business to add 
to the economic engine of the region and employing the creative industry’s ability to 
attract business and improve quality of life” (Beete, 2013). Policy outcome measurement 
remains a challenge for arts incubators (as well as for creative placemaking more 
generally, (see Moss, 2012). Phillips explains that arts incubation, “results in a number of 
quantitatively measured benefits in terms of jobs and visitors. Other benefits from arts 
incubators may be more difficult to quantify such as the “buzz” or sense of excitement 
and place and indirect jobs and work opportunities that may arise” (2010, p. 285). My 
research will show, however, that few arts incubators measure this indirect outcome. 
 There is scant literature that addresses the impact of individuals as the target of 
arts incubation policy. Ann Markusen, however, notes that artists’ centers sometimes 
function as incubators, “artists’ centers are dedicated spaces for artists to convene, share 
equipment and space, and learn from each other, often in formal classroom settings that 
simultaneously generate income…They operate as inexpensive incubators of 
entrepreneurship, launching successful small firms and viable artist proprietorships” 
(2013, p. 5). 
Incubator Evaluation4 
 Although there has been some recent research testing various methods for 
measuring the impact of arts participation (e.g. Lord 2012), there is little literature on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This section includes and significantly expands upon the literature review conducted for 
the pilot for the current research (Essig, 2014b). Some overlap is inevitable.  
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measuring the impact of arts incubators. There is a similar lacuna in the business 
incubation literature with regard to evaluation. Tavoletti (2012) points out that business 
incubators have been generally under-theorized. Mian’s (2014) literature review of 
business incubation mechanisms indicates that most major studies of incubator evaluation 
focus on the assessments of firms in incubators rather than on the incubators themselves, 
despite Bearse’s (1998) impassioned call for incubator evaluation that includes both an 
impact assessment and incubator performance assessment. Of the 31 studies evaluated by 
Mian (2014), only 5 explicitly focus on incubator success and benchmarking.  
 Bergekk and Norman (2008) point out, “no single evaluation framework [for 
business incubators] has been developed” (p. 20). Subsequently, however, Mian (2011) 
articulates just such a framework for at least one type of incubator, the university 
technology incubator, describing three families of variables that can be used in the 
evaluation of incubators: performance outcomes; management policies and their 
effectiveness; and services and value-added. Vanderstraeten, Matthyssens, and Van 
Witteloostuijn (2012) advocate for employing Kaplan and Norton’s “balanced scorecard” 
to evaluate both financial and operational efficacy of business incubators.  
 Performance outcome measurement is prevalent in the literature and is the focus 
of the NBIA guidelines for incubator evaluation. The NBIA’s guide to measuring 
economic impact (Erlewine, 2007) suggests that the following performance outcomes are 
a measure of incubator impact: jobs created, salaries paid, and revenues earned. The 
survey of graduated firms attendant to this guide adds equity capital attracted and grants 
received, indicating that these are also indicators of economic impact. Allen and 
McCloskey’s (1990) influential study identified several other performance measures, 
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including graduation of incubated firms and local retention of graduated firms. More 
recently, Vanderstraeten et al  (Vanderstraeten, Matthyssens, & Van Witteloostuijn, 
2012) point to the development of innovative products and services as a performance 
indicator. This last is analogous in the arts incubator domain to the production of art 
itself.  
 Because most literature on business incubator evaluation focuses on impact 
evaluation rather than process evaluation, knowledge about incubator process evaluation 
is inferential or even mysterious. Hackett and Dilts (2008) describe incubator operations 
as a “black box.”  
 Allen and McCloskey (1990) focus on the third variable. They describe a “value-
added” continuum, anchored on one end by the incubator’s real estate development 
function and on the other end by its enterprise-development program (p. 64). University 
based incubators, although included by Allen and McCloskey near the enterprise 
development end, do not fit neatly there because the educational components of a 
university-based incubator are not considered on their continuum. Instead, they consider 
three criteria that delineate the ends and middle of the value-added continuum: occupancy 
rates in the facility, jobs created, and firms graduated, all of which could also be 
considered as performance metrics, creating a kind of Mobius strip, rather than a clear 
framework for evaluation.  
Business incubator evaluation frameworks 
 Most literature focuses on output and outcome measures with little attention to 
organizational performance of the incubator itself or to incubator goals and objectives. 
Policy objectives, which generally relate to economic development, are largely left to 
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short-term measures with little or no longitudinal analysis. What consensus there is on 
incubator evaluation is that incubator goals should be considered. In his pointed critique 
of the NBIA report on incubator evaluation (Tomatzky et al, 1996), Bearse (1998) notes, 
“The definition of a business incubator in terms of its goals and objectives provides the 
essential starting point for an evaluation” (p. 327). 
 Although the criteria employed by Allen and McCluskey (1990) are statistically 
measurable, Voisey, Jones, and Thomas (2006), in their case study of a single incubator, 
conclude, “the measurement of success needs to be broader than a set of statistical 
outputs” (p. 464). Bergekk and Norman (2008) identify the failure of controlling for 
incubator goals in previous studies so that evaluation has been outcome-based rather than 
performance-based. They add, “few studies have put these outcome indicators in relation 
to goals” (p.22).  
 Vanderstraeten et al  (Vanderstraeten, Matthyssens, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2012), 
consider four potential evaluation frameworks comparatively, using Tangen’s (2004) 
prerequisites for a performance measurement system. Tangen’s prerequisites for an 
effective performance measurement system are: 
• Support strategic objectives; 
• Have an appropriate balance [between financial and other factors]; 
• Guard against sub-optimization [the act of measuring should not negatively affect 
performance]; 
• Have a limited number of performance measures; 
• Be easily accessible; and 
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• Consist of performance measures that have comprehensible specifications. (2004, 
pp. 727-728) 
Tangen (2004) is important to the current research because of his directive to creative 
evaluative frameworks that extend beyond financial performance. 
Conclusion 
 Arts incubators have the potential to be used as policy tools, especially, perhaps in 
the implementation of creative placemaking efforts. They may provide, through facilities, 
training, fiscal sponsorship, and other services, all means by which individual artists and 
start-up arts enterprises can sustain their creative practices. The services that incubators 
provide can lower the barriers faced by such individuals and organizations as they begin 
their practice or enter new markets. Positive community development efforts may result 
from such efforts, although those results are often indirect. By focusing artist support on 
the (arts) entrepreneurial process rather than artistic production itself, the targets of 
incubators as a policy intervention shift from being constructed as deviant to dependent 
and, potentially, advantaged. 
 Policy outcome measurement remains a challenge for arts incubators, even more 
so than for business incubators. Policy actors may look toward incubated arts enterprises 
as drivers of community vitality and economic sustainability, but the measurement of 
their success at doing so is a subject of both discussion and controversy. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMING5 
 This chapter provides context for the conceptualization of arts entrepreneurship in 
the US, and by extension arts incubation activity, by exploring several areas of theory 
pertaining to entrepreneurial activity. In the absence of a body of theory about arts 
entrepreneurship specifically, the chapter explores the means/end relationship in general 
theories of entrepreneurship and applies them to the arts and culture sector in the US 
context and especially to the formation of arts enterprises, both firms and projects. The 
ability to recognize new means-end relationships is, according to Shane and 
Ventkataraman (2000), a prerequisite to entrepreneurial action. Schumpeter (1934, 1942) 
posited that the “means” of entrepreneurship are “new combinations” (1934, p. 72) that 
result in “creative destruction” that in turn throws a market into disequilibrium. The 
Austrian School economists, most especially Kirzner (1997), articulate a theory of 
entrepreneurship in which discovery is the means of entrepreneurship and profit 
maximization is the only possible “end.” Sarasvathy (2001) articulates a theory of 
entrepreneurial decision-making she calls “effectuation,” in which the ends are 
determined by the means as the process of entrepreneurship unfolds. Entrepreneurial 
“bricolage” connects means and ends in a resource-poor environment, making it a 
particularly useful construct for the arts entrepreneurship domain. 
 These general theories serve as context for discussion of entrepreneurial activity 
in the arts and culture sector, which sector has unique properties that distinguish it from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A version of this chapter was presented at the 2015 biennial conference of AIMAC in 
Aix-en-Provence under the title “Means and Ends: A Theory Framework for 
Understanding Entrepreneurship in the US Arts and Culture Sector” and subsequently 
revised and accepted for publication in the Journal of Arts Management, Law and 
Society. 
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what Caves (2000) calls “humdrum” business activities. He notes that “creative goods 
and services, the processes of their production, and the preferences or tastes of creative 
artists differ in substantial and systematic (if not universal) ways from their counterparts 
in the rest of the economy where creativity place a lesser (if seldom negligible) role” (p. 
2). Some of these properties, most especially “Creative workers care about their 
products” (p. 3) and “differentiated” (or “unique”) products (p. 6), lead to economic 
choices that, while still rational, may not be rent-seeking. Abbing, too, notes that “the 
willingness to work for low incomes” in the arts and culture sector is high (2002, p. 113).  
Or, as Caves writes, “motivational factors depress wages relative to ‘humdrum’ 
occupations requiring similar amounts of training and skill” (2002, p. 78). This tendency 
at the individual level to forgo profit maximization translates upward to the 
organizational level where firms form “not to recoup our investment, but to recoup some 
corner of the universe for our understanding and enlargement” (Fichandler, 1959, qtd in 
Dower and Carl, 2011, p. 1). Preece echoes this sentiment, “In the absence of profits, 
entrepreneurs in the not-for-profit performing arts are necessarily motivated by self-
fulfillment within the execution of an artistic organizational mission”  (2011, p. 108). 
Thus, arts entrepreneurship may occur in extra-economic circumstances; arts incubators, 
likewise, may have extra-economic goals and objectives. Nevertheless, Schumpeter’s 
theory of entrepreneurship, because of its focus on the creation of something new and 
unique in the world, aligns with the activities - if not the motives - of arts entrepreneurs in 
the nonprofit and for-profit arts and culture sector in the US.  
 After examining a range of perspectives on the boundaries of “arts and culture 
sector” in the US, this chapter explores theories of entrepreneurial process and firm 
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formation generally and as potentially applied to the arts and culture sector. It then 
synthesizes an approach to arts entrepreneurship based on the relationship between means 
and ends in the sector.   
The Arts and Culture Sector 
 Unlike in Europe and the Commonwealth countries where the “creative 
industries” are commonly understood to mean those economic sectors mapped originally 
by the UK Department of Media, Culture, and Sport in 1998, there is no such common 
understanding in the United States  (Galloway & Dunlop, 2007; Wyszomirski, 2004). A 
number of scholars look to the creative process itself as the core of the creative industries 
construct, as its “input,” and intellectual property as its output (see e.g., Potts & 
Cunningham, 2008). Caves, however, notes that there is more than just creativity 
involved, “Artists of all types engage in creative processes and tasks that come to 
completion only through the collaboration of ‘humdrum’ (or ‘ordinary’) partners” (2000, 
p. 1). Galloway and Dunlop point to the problem of defining the sector solely based on 
creativity, “Any innovation – including scientific and technical innovations – of any sort 
in any industry is creative, and, in such terms, any industry is, therefore, potentially a 
‘creative industry’” (p. 19). Critiques of Florida’s “creative class” construct also point to 
the problem of basing a sectoral definition on a universal action such as creativity. Stern 
and Siefert, for example, point to the in-migration of these broadly defined “creative 
class” workers as “exacerbating inequality and exclusion” (2008, p. 1). 
 In contrast, McCarthy, Ondaatje, and Novak (2007, p. 15) take a different 
approach, describing the sector as an “ecology” inclusive of arts, culture, and 
entertainment. For the purposes of this research, “arts and culture sector” are seen not a 
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set of NAICS industry codes, as might be the case in defining “creative industries,” but 
rather that sector of economic and social activity that places artistic production at its 
center and from which culture results. Galloway and Dunlop (2007) distinguish cultural 
industries from creative industries across five criteria: creativity, intellectual property, 
symbolic meaning, use value, and methods of production. It is the latter three that are 
particularly distinctive to the sector. Products of the arts and culture sector convey 
symbolic meaning, have a use value first in the communication of ideas and only 
secondarily in their functional capacity (see Bilton & Leary 2004, and Martin, 2004), and 
may be produced by industrial or artisan means. However, drawing on Caves (2000) list 
of economic properties, regardless of the method of production, the creative products are 
differentiated by what he calls the “infinite variety property” (p. 6). Thus, the arts and 
culture sector is distinguished from the larger “creative economy” as defined by Howkins 
(2002), which he defines as inclusive of the copyright, patent, trademark, and design 
industries. An important distinction, for the purposes of this essay, is made by Williams 
(1981) “between the corporate ownership of the means of cultural production associated 
with the development of mass reproductive technologies, and the survival of older 
artisanal methods of production, typically the non-market area of cultural production 
supported by public subsidy” (Galloway and Dunlop 2007, p. 24). The control of the 
means of production by the artist and/or artistic producer is, as we will see, a desirable 
intermediary for arts and culture entrepreneurs. 
 In the following sections, various theories of entrepreneurial process and firm 
formation are discussed to provide context for an analysis of several examples of 
entrepreneurial activity in the arts and culture sector. The question that arises from this 
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research is “Why do artists undertake entrepreneurial action?” While the empirical 
evidence is scant, one theory that emerges from the examples provided is a simple one: 
that artists form firms or otherwise undertake entrepreneurial action as means toward the 
end of creating art sustainably. 
Theories of Entrepreneurship 
 Two seemingly contradictory economic theories of entrepreneurial process are 
those of Joseph Schumpeter (e.g. 1934), who espouses a theory of “creative destruction” 
of a market in equilibrium as the underlying condition for entrepreneurial activity, and 
Austrian School economist Ira Kirzner (e.g. 1969, 1973) who sees entrepreneurship as a 
reaction to conditions of market disequilibrium (Kirzner, 1999). Both theories, explained 
following, have implications for and examples within the nonprofit or for-profit arts 
sector. (I note, tangentially, that although Schumpeter is himself Austrian, he and others 
disassociate his theories from those of the neoclassical “Austrian School” economists 
such as Kirzner, Hayek and von Mises.). As companions to these, two additional theories 
of entrepreneurial process, “effectual entrepreneurship” (Sarasvathy 2001; Gartner, 1990; 
Sarasvathy, 2008) and bricolage (e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005), have implications for both 
individual artists and arts organizations.  
 With a nod to Gartner (1990), what do we mean when we talk about 
entrepreneurial process? All of the theorists mentioned above and following explain 
entrepreneurship as an action, although Schumpeter and Kirzner explain that action 
within the context of the larger economic system while theorists of effectuation and 
bricolage look at the economic actions of individuals  (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006).   
Many people consider new venture creation, the application of resources to opportunities, 
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and innovation, to be at the core of entrepreneurial activity (see Gartner, 1990, p. 20).  
Koppl and Minniti (2008) argue, however, that entrepreneurship is a “universal form of 
human action” in which entrepreneurs “can act, and their actions are aimed precisely at 
changing the future” (p. 17). While they derive this statement from Kirzner’s writings as 
explained following, the concept of impactful action, that is, action that changes the 
future, is fundamental to all theories of entrepreneurship, including entrepreneurship in 
the arts and culture sector. Scherdin and Zander (2011) characterize this particular form 
of entrepreneurship, what they term “art entrepreneurship,” as having “a particularly 
pronounced focus on creativity and the production of novelty…is concerned with the 
introduction of novel ideas and concepts de-coupled from immediate utility or profit 
motives…and efforts must rest on other means than proof of practical usefulness or profit 
potential” (p. 4). Thus, the success (or failure) of actions in the arena of arts 
entrepreneurship is not necessarily measured by wealth creation, but rather by the 
exercise of creativity to develop, implement, and ““sell” the novel idea and make it 
accessible to the intended audience” (p. 1).  
Schumpeter: Equilibrium and Creative Destruction 
 Parallels can be drawn between the entrepreneur as described in business 
literature and the artist: “The entrepreneur has the capacity to trigger a series of 
phenomena ex nihilo or, in other words, to be at the origin of a complete series of events. 
This is also true of the artist” (Bonnafous-Boucher, Cuir, and Partouche, 2011, p. 31). 
This notion of entrepreneurial action triggering a series of phenomena seems to derive 
from, or at least align with, one of the major economic theories of entrepreneurship, 
Schumpeter’s theory of “creative destruction.”  Schumpeter most famously articulated 
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the “process of creative destruction” in his 1942 book Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy. However, to understand the cyclical process of destruction he describes as 
the essence of capitalism, one must go back to his 1934 Theory of Economic 
Development. Schumpeter described stable economic life as a “circular flow” such that  
…somewhere in the economic system a demand is, so to say, ready awaiting 
every supply, and nowhere in the system are there commodities without 
complements, that is other commodities in the possession of people who will 
exchange tem under empirically determined conditions for the former goods. It 
follows, again from the fact that all goods find a market, that the circular flow of 
economic life is closed… 
(p. 8) 
 
 For economic development to occur,  “new combinations” (p. 72) must be 
created. “The carrying out of new combinations we call ‘enterprise’; the individuals 
whose function it is to carry them out we call ‘entrepreneurs’” (p. 74). Schumpeter calls 
the entrepreneurial creation of these new combinations “creative destruction” 
(1942/1950, p. 81). Schumpeter notes that the “fundamental impulse that sets and keeps 
the capitalist engine in motion” is derived from five possible cases, delineated in slightly 
different wording in both the 1934 (p. 66) and 1942/1950 (pp. 81-83) volumes: 
1. Introduction of a new good 
2. Introduction of a new method of production 
3. Opening of a new market 
4. Conquest of a new source of raw materials6 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The term “conquest of a new source of supply” was left out of the 1942 list of sources 
of creative destruction, perhaps (and I only speculate) because of the coincident attempt 
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5. New forms of industrial organization 
Each type of these creatively destructive new combinations have applicability to and 
examples to be drawn from the nonprofit or for-profit arts and culture sectors.  
Schumpeter himself likened entrepreneurs to artists (painters) both of whom are dynamic 
agents of change (Swedberg, 2006). Some examples of the forces of creative destruction 
originating in the arts or enabling the forces of creative destruction there are: 
1. Introduction of a new good. Schumpeter himself draws on an example from the 
arts to illustrate this concept: “The creation of a new good which more adequately 
satisfies existing and previously satisfied needs is a somewhat different case. The 
production of an improved musical instrument is an example. In this case the 
possibility of profit rests upon the fact that the higher price received for the better 
commodity surpasses its costs, which are likewise higher in most cases” (1934, p. 
135). 
2. Introduction of a new method of production. Digital music production is an 
example of a new method of production (in this case, a technology) that caused 
the destruction of the circular flow from artist, through recording label, to 
wholesaler and retailer, to consumer back to artist via the record label and 
licensing. Digital music production enabled digital distribution and a disruption of 
the previously existing industry structure. However, the digital mass production of 
music is problematic for our definition of the arts and culture sector. To maintain 
its position therein, as opposed to the larger, the music must maintain its purpose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
at the conquest of Europe by a non-capitalist state. Instead, in the later treatise 
Schumpeter includes “new methods … of transportation” (1942/1950, p 83).	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as the conveyance of symbolic meaning and its means of production in the hands 
of the artist, rather than the marketer. 
3. Opening of a new market. The regional (nonprofit) theatre movement of the 
1940s and 1950s, incentivized in part by McNeil Lowry at the Ford Foundation 
and exemplified by the opening of professional theatres in Houston, Minneapolis, 
Washington, Milwaukee, and elsewhere is credited with opening the market for 
professional theatre beyond the confines of New York City (see, for example, 
Ziegler, 1973). 
4. New methods of transportation. While new methods of transportation may not 
originate within the arts and culture sector (although there have been some very 
clever designs for road cases), such changes do enable entrepreneurial action 
there. With the market for professional theatrical production opened by the 
nonprofit theatre movement, improved methods of transportation, including an 
improved interstate highway system and declining costs of air travel, tours of 
commercial theatrical production beyond the radius of New York City where such 
productions originated also became a possibility.  
5. New forms of industrial organization. The inclusion of much arts activity as a 
charitable purpose under the education clause of 26 USC § 501 (c ) 3 incentivized 
the organization of nonprofit arts organizations, leading to many new enterprises, 
new artworks, and new funding mechanisms for the arts. 
 Phillips  (R. J. Phillips, 2010) describes the potential for motives other than 
entrepreneurial profit to be ascribed to the entrepreneur in the arts sector. She 
differentiates “arts entrepreneurship” from entrepreneurship more generally as “the 
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process whereby tangible cultural capital is created” (p. 259, emphasis mine). The 
possibility to focus on art’s symbolic meanings over profit is articulated by Zelda 
Fichandler, founder of Arena Stage in Washington DC, “We made the choice not to 
recoup our investment, but to recoup some corner of the universe for our understanding 
and enlargement” (Fichandler, 1959, qtd in Dower and Carl, 2011, p. 1). Preece points to 
another non-economic motivation, “In the absence of profits, entrepreneurs in the not-for-
profit performing arts are necessarily motivated by self-fulfillment within the execution 
of an artistic organizational mission”  (2011, p. 108). Thus, arts entrepreneurship may 
occur in extra-economic circumstances. Nevertheless, Schumpeter’s theory, because of 
its focus on the creation of something new and unique in the world, aligns with the 
activities, if not the motives, of entrepreneurial activity in the nonprofit and for-profit arts 
and culture sectors. For some economists, however, profit seeking is the only motive for 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Kirzner: A System in Disequilibrium 
 Schumpeter viewed entrepreneurship as occurring within and disrupting a system 
in equilibrium – the “circular flow of economic life.” Kirzner (1979, 1997, 1999) offers 
an opposing perspective. Kirzner, along with his colleagues from the school of Austrian 
economics, contend that entrepreneurship is an act of “discovery” that takes place in an 
economy in an inherent state of disequilibrium in which there are always unknown (but 
discoverable) opportunities for gain. He himself articulates the key difference between 
his theory of entrepreneurship and Schumpeter’s,  “Schumpeter's entrepreneur, I pointed 
out, was essentially disruptive, destroying the pre-existing state of equilibrium. My 
entrepreneur, on the other hand, was responsible for the tendency through which initial 
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conditions of disequilibrium come systematically to be displaced by equilibrative market 
competition” (1999, p. 5). As part of a larger critique of neoclassical market equilibrium 
theory, Kirzner notes, “in equilibrium there is no scope for pure profit: there is simply 
nothing for the entrepreneur to do” (1997, p. 69). For Kirzner and his colleagues, the 
motive for undertaking an entrepreneurial process is wealth creation via entrepreneurial 
profit: “The Austrian concept of the entrepreneurial role emphasizes profit as being the 
prime objective of the market process….[E]ntrepreneurial alertness is stimulated by the 
lure of profits” (1979, p. 11; see also 1982, p. 150). Koppl and Minniti (2011) offer a 
more universal application of Kirzner’s theory, arguing that each act of entrepreneurship 
creates the possibility of more entrepreneurship: “the entrepreneur is a catalyst for 
activity for the community as a whole” (p. 17).    
 Kirzner derives his theory of entrepreneurship largely from his senior colleague 
von Mises’ theory of freedom and individual action. “Misesian theory of human action 
conceives of the individual as having his eyes and ears open to opportunities ‘that are just 
around the corner’” (Kirzner, 1979, p. 7). Entrepreneurial discovery is seen as “gradually 
but systematically pushing back the boundaries of sheer ignorance, in this way increasing 
mutual awareness among market participants and thus, in turn, driving prices, output and 
input quantities and qualities, toward the values consistent with equilibrium” (1997, p. 
62) 
 One could view the discovery or unearthing of latent demand as one way to enact 
Kirzner’s approach to entrepreneurship. Frumkin explains “that the creation of new 
enterprises of any kind, far from occurring in a vacuum, actually creates new markets and 
demand for new services…entrepreneurs create projects for which there may be only 
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latent demand” (2002, p. 143). Frumkin attributes this supply side perspective to J.B. 
Say, the nineteenth century French economist widely credited with first coining the term 
“entrepreneur.” Say’s conception of the entrepreneur as one who “shifts economic 
resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and greater 
yield” is also descriptive of the entrepreneur’s prerequisite state of disequilibrium that 
Kirzner asserts is necessary (n.d. quoted in Dees 1998, p. 2).   
 There are multiple examples of arts and culture organizations exploiting (or 
attempting to exploit) latent demand that is “discovered” in the Kirznerian sense. In the 
arts services sector, for example, Brown Paper Tickets was founded when William Jordan 
realized that a basic ticketing application on his website was of use to many small event 
producers; he “discovered” the demand for this service in a market that had not reached 
an equilibrium point (Lang Jones, 2012). On an individual level, Jim Henson offers an 
interesting case of alertness to opportunity leading to entrepreneurial action that netted 
substantial profit, although he seemingly was not motivated by that profit. Throughout his 
career, Henson needed a steady source of revenue to finance what he considered to be his 
creative art. Early in his career, this revenue stream was provided by work in commercial 
advertising. Henson was alert to the opportunities for merchandising as an alternative 
revenue stream shortly after Sesame Street debuted. His agent, Bernie Brillstein, 
motivated Henson to exploit that opportunity not through the profit itself but by what it 
would provide, “you will make enough money to have artistic freedom for the rest of 
your life” (in Stevens, 2013, p. 19).  
 The uncertainty of demand is one of the basic economic properties of creative 
activity as articulated by Caves. He notes, “research and pretesting are largely ineffective, 
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however, because a creative product’s success can seldom be explained even ex post by 
the satisfaction of some pre-existing need” (2000, p. 3). Willingness to produce a cultural 
product in the absence of an identified market is antithetical, however, to Steve Blank’s 
proscription for entrepreneurs to “get out of the building” (Blank, 2012). On the contrary, 
engagement with potential audience during the development phase of a firm or a project 
can excite the inchoate demand in a community of potential audience members. Nytch, in 
his case study of the Pittsburgh New Music Ensemble explains,   
[Artistic] directors used their own knowledge and experience in the field of 
contemporary music to guide the redefining of its artistic product in such a way as 
to satisfy the desire of their audiences for a more compelling and engaging 
experience … It is important to note that the entrepreneurial impulse was not a 
new venture; rather, the entrepreneurial impulse was the art itself, a new artistic 
product (and a new organizational identity) designed to better connect with its 
market/audience. (Nytch, 2012) 
Something from Nothing: Bricolage 
 Entrepreneurial bricolage can be defined as  “making do by applying 
combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and opportunities”  (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005). Bricolage bears some distinct similarities to effectuation described 
following, but it differes in two fundamental ways. First, it is a theory based on an 
economic state of resource constraint. Entrepreneurial bricolage occurs in a resource-poor 
environment and is, in that sense, a process of last resort. Effectuation, as a process of 
decision-making, may happen in resource environments of scarcity or richness. Further, 
entrepreneurial bricolage begins with an end in mind and thus is more similar to 
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Kirznerian entrepreneurship than to effectuation. The constrained resource environment 
is mined for “whatever is at hand” (see Levi-Strauss, 1967) to achieve a forecasted end 
product. “Bricolage capabilities may help firms explore and exploit new opportunities 
that might appear too expensive to pursue through other means” (Baker and Nelson, p. 
357). Entrepreneurial bricolage also bears some relationship to Schumpeter’s concept of 
entrepreneurship as “new combinations,” for its theme of combining resources for new 
purposes. Schumpeter, however, viewed “new combinations” as the product of the 
entrepreneurial action rather than its means. 
 Garud and Karnoe (2003) look at entrepreneurial bricolage through a sociological 
rather than economic lens. “We use the term bricolage to connote resourcefulness and 
improvisation on the part of involved actors” (p. 278). Because artists and arts 
entrepreneurs often work in environments of severely constrained resources and are 
acculturated to improvisational activity (sometimes through formal training), it is not 
surprising that there are multiple examples of entrepreneurial bricolage in both the for-
profit and nonprofit arts sectors. Preece (2013) describes how he employed a process of 
bricolage to found the Grand River Jazz Society (GRJS), explaining how the 
entrepreneurial activity of launching the GRJS illustrates each of the three elements of 
bricolage delineated by Di Dimenico et al. (2010): making do, a refusal to be constrained 
by limitations, and improvisation. I can cite several additional examples from my 
experience with the Pave Program in Arts Entrepreneurship. Perhaps most apt for an 
example of bricolage is the launch of Rising Youth Theatre, an Arizona nonprofit tax-
exempt corporation started by two ASU alumnae. One recently explained the launch of 
the company to an arts entrepreneurship class in this way, “We knew while we were still 
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students that we wanted to start a theatre company for young people in the community 
but we really started from nothing.”  They subsequently put together their first season of 
programming by scrounging (begging, borrowing) both physical and human resources 
from among their network of collaborators as well as other small arts organizations. 
Currently in its fourth season, RYT still operates on a shoestring, but they have 
seemingly created something from nothing more than the founders’ passion and 
community interest.  
Neither Equilibrium nor Disequilibrium: Effectuation 
 Both Kirzner’s and Schumpeter’s theories of entrepreneurship are conceived of 
for a market economy already in existence. The theory of effectual entrepreneurship, or 
effectual thinking more generally, begins not from market equilibrium or market 
disequilibrium, but from market non-existence. Effectuation or effectual entrepreneurship 
“involves understanding how to make decisions in the absence of preexistent goals” 
(Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 244). Sarasvathy’s definition is clear: 
Causation processes take a particular effect as given and focus on selecting 
between means to create that effect. Effectuation processes take a set of means as 
given and focus on selecting between possible effects that can be created with that 
set of means. (2001, p. 245) 
 
 Although at first reading the theory of effectuation could be interpreted to be, like 
Kirzner’s, a theory focused on opportunity discovery, it is better understood as an up-
ending of his concept of means and ends.  (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) contend that 
the means-end relationship is central to Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship in that 
entrepreneurship is the discovery of new means-end relationships. Sarasvathy’s (2001) 
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concept of effectuation differs from Kirzner’s theory in that the means are known and the 
ends unknown. Kirzner’s theory is that the entrepreneur “discovers” previously unknown 
means for achieving a known end (profit maximization). Conversely, the means for 
effectual entrepreneurship originate with the entrepreneur herself: who she is, what she 
knows, and whom she knows, rather than with opportunities. To her credit, Sarasvathy 
does not view effectuation as the one right way to do entrepreneurship but rather one of 
two toolboxes at the disposal of the entrepreneur: the causal and the effectual 
(Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2008). 
 There are many examples of effectual entrepreneurship in the arts and culture 
sector. In some ways, effectuation is the modus operandi of much art practice. Devised 
theatre offers a clear example of effectuation applied to the creative process:  
Devised theatre can start from anything…A devised theatrical performance 
originates with the grop while making the performance, rather than starting from a 
play text that someone else has written to be interpreted. A devised theatre 
product is work that has emerged from and been generated by a group of people 
working in collaboration. (Oddey, 2013) 
 
 An effectual process can be applied in an arts entrepreneurial context as well, as 
exemplified by a recent graduate student project. After inventorying who they are, what 
they know, and who they know, five graduate students in theatre and dance generated 
ideas for approximately 40 arts enterprises. Multiple iterations later, the group launched 
SAM: Student Art Market, capitalizing on their knowledge of marketing, organizational 
skills, and partnerships with both student artists and a host venue. Faced “with a wall of 
post-it notes and endless possibilities,” the group “agreed upon a set of criteria that would 
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be used to help narrow the plethora of ideas” from 40 to 4 (Maticic, 2014). The decision 
calculus applied means criteria around the notion of “do-ability,” rather than adherence to 
a path leading to a specific (arts entrepreneurial) goal. 
 In her essay “Please Don’t Start a Theatre Company,” Rebecca Nowick (2011), 
without ever citing theories of entrepreneurial process, drives home the distinction 
between the causation model of entrepreneurship that begins with the end in mind and the 
effectual model that keeps open all possible outcomes from a given set of means. She 
notes that upon arriving in San Francisco at 23, “I founded Crowded Fire Theater 
Company, full of plans for it to quickly become the next major regional theater” (p. 65), 
but after struggling to keep the company (or “artifact,” to use Sarasvathy’s term) afloat, 
the company failed and she joined many of her contemporaries, whom she interviews for 
the article, in “experimenting with hybrid art forms and hybrid income models, with new 
methods for community engagement, and a new balance between money for the art and 
money for administration” (p. 67). In a clear example of effectual entrepreneurship, she 
quotes Aaron Landsman of the experimental theatre troupe Elevator Repair Service, “We 
looked around and saw that the artists in the work had [administrative] skills already. So 
we worked with people who already had committed to ERS artistically. That keeps us all 
more employed, and keeps the integrity of the work front and center” (p. 68). This 
approach, of building organizational structure from existing resources without a fixed end 
in mind goes to the heart of the definition of effectuation. 
 Fisher (2012) provides a very useful comparison between effectuation, bricolage, 
and traditional approaches to entrepreneurship such as Kirzner’s that focus on 
entrepreneurship as the recognition or exploitation of (economic) opportunity (see also  
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Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Using an alternate template research design to explain the 
process of entrepreneurship, Fisher examined six tech start-ups using 2006 data. In all 
cases, some combination of effectuation and bricolage were used to start the businesses. 
Two also used some causation processes. Although it is not mentioned in the article, I 
observe that only the two firms that employed actions explained by all three theories of 
entrepreneurial process are still in existence. As mentioned previously, Sarasvathy (2008) 
values the “toolboxes” of both effectuation and causation. And Kirzner himself 
reconsidered the supremacy of his theory over others, writing, “The reconsideration here 
undertaken indeed permits us to see how both the Schumpeterian view of the 
entrepreneurial role and my own view can both be simultaneously accepted” (1999, p. 
16). 
Firms and Individuals 
 Entrepreneurship is a field of action that can be explained by several different 
theories; a state of affairs that Bull and Willard (1993) contend has inhibited academic 
study of it. The end result or “artifact”  (Sarasvathy, 2001) of entrepreneurship as it is 
understood in the business context is the formation of a firm. Firms are a mediating 
structure that connect the means of the entrepreneur with their desired ends. Scherdin and 
Zander explain: “In the context of art, entrepreneurship is about the discovery and pursuit 
of new ideas, using a multitude of artistic expressions and organizational forms as 
vehicles by which to express and convey these ideas to the public” (2011, p. 3). The firm 
is one vehicle, one organizational form, through which the artist conveys meaning to the 
public. In the US arts and culture sector in which public funding for individual artists is 
scant, the individual artist must behave as a firm in order to do make that connection. 
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Thus, theories of the firm inform our understanding of such mediating structures. The US 
arts and culture sector is inclusive of nonprofit organizations, for-profit creative 
enterprises, and artists working sustainably as sole proprietors, each of which may 
organize to reduce transaction costs, make more effective decisions, share knowledge, or 
convert capital from one form to another. 
Firm Formation 
 Coase (1937) asserts that firms exist to coordinate production within a market 
economy that is not centrally coordinated but rather coordinated by the price mechanism. 
His theory contends that firms form when the costs of transactions and contracts are 
reduced by coordination of production within firms rather than directly in the 
marketplace. In essence, Coase articulates a transaction cost theory of the firm, “the 
operation of a market costs something and by forming an organization, and allowing 
some authority (an ‘entrepreneur’) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are 
saved” (p. 392). Although this is not the sole reason Coase uses to explain firm 
formation, it is foundational to the concept of transaction cost economics (as further 
developed by Oliver Williamson and others), a concept that did not receive much traction 
in economics until 30 years after Coase’s essay was first published (Coase, 1988). 
Examples of arts and culture firms forming for this reason, transaction cost savings, 
abound. In the for-profit sector, firms that offer tours of commercial productions such as 
“Broadway Across America” form to most efficiently bring individual productions to 
national markets, the cost of which would be prohibitive to individual producers. 
Nonprofit arts organizations similarly exist to connect art with its audience in ways that 
would be cost prohibitive for individual artists or independent producers (see Chong, 
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2011). By entering an arts venture incubator, a client firm’s transaction costs – and the 
cost of doing business more generally – are reduced. Shared space, centralized office 
operations such as photocopying, and participation in joint marketing efforts are services 
offered by arts incubators to reduce the start-up transaction costs of the emerging arts 
organizations (see Kahn, 1995; Gerl, 2000).  
 These resident firms are small; indeed, in half of the arts incubators in the US, the 
“firm” is an artist operating as a sole proprietorship or individual  (Essig, 2014a). In such 
cases, the entrepreneur (the founder) and manager are one and the same. As firms 
develop and the systems of contracts that defines them is established (Fama, 1980), the 
functions of the creator/innovator and the manager may become more separate. Gartner 
(Gartner, 1990) argues that the action of entrepreneurship ends with firm formation when 
management evolves to take precedence. This perspective aligns with Schumpeter’s, who 
views entrepreneurship and management as two opposing “types of conduct” (1934, p. 
83). The arts incubator (or small business incubators more generally) may provide both 
shared business services and “management guidance” (NBIA, 2009a). 
 Cyert and March (1963) offer a behavioral theory of the firm that builds on 
Simon’s (1945) foundational work on bounded rationality. In asserting that firms are 
decision-making networks, they argue against two core assumptions of the classical 
theory of the firm (that which pre-dates Coase): that firms exist solely to maximize profit 
and that they exist in an environment of perfect knowledge (see the discussion of 
knowledge-based theory of the firm following). They make a simple attack on the profit 
maximization theory stating, “We can argue that entrepreneurs, like anyone else, have a 
host of personal motives” and that organizational behavior results from the interaction of 
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its individual members (p. 9). They substitute “satisfactory” profits for maximum profits. 
Denhardt effectively summarizes the behavioral approach: 
This view sees the organization as less interested in attaining specific goals or 
objectives than in operating within the framework of a set of constraints 
negotiated through the various components of the organization. Operating with 
these constraints, the organization attempts to reduce uncertainty in its 
environment and to seek out those alternatives that are immediate, available, and 
related to the problem at hand. (2008, p. 82) 
  
 In this description we see a clear contrast between a model of a firm based on goal 
attainment, and one based on behavior in reaction to constraint. Such a distinction is 
helpful in understanding the differences between small business incubators and arts 
incubators. The National Business Incubator Association (NBIA) notes that a small 
business incubator “aspires to have a positive impact on its community's economic health 
by maximizing the success of emerging companies” (2009b, emphasis mine). The success 
of such incubators is measured by jobs created and capital attracted, reflecting the 
specific incubator goals. The goals of arts incubators are both more diverse and less 
concrete, ranging from support for individual artists through the more quantifiable 
economic growth maximization goals of the small business incubator  (Essig, 2014a). 
This distinction parallels that between for-profit and nonprofit enterprises generally. 
 This range or continuum of objectives is analogous to Dees’s (1996) social 
enterprise spectrum, at one end of which “money is not the primary medium of exchange 
nor the primary measure of value creation” and at the other end of which is a profit-
maximizing commercial enterprise. Dees notes that the two extremes are theoretical and 
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rarely exist in their pure form. Nevertheless, the spectrum is a useful analog to the range 
both of arts incubator types and client types within the arts incubators. Incubators, when 
viewed as firms, range from the commercial, returning profit to an owner who invests in 
client companies, to firms that are organized not only as nonprofit organizations, but 
whose aims are solely to produce art, absent any explicit profit motive. Arts and culture 
organizations resident in incubators can be placed on a similar continuum from 
commercial enterprises such as a graphic design firm to nonprofit organizations with 
exclusively charitable social purposes (e.g. a company that provides arts education 
programs to foster children).  
 Grant (1996) develops a theory of the firm based on coordination of knowledge 
rather than minimization of costs or decision-making structures, which theory also has 
applicability to entrepreneurial action in the arts and culture sector and specifically to the 
activities of arts incubators. He divides knowledge into two broad categories, “knowing 
how” (tacit knowledge) and “knowing about” (explicit knowledge) (p. 111). Grant argues 
that firms exist “because they can create conditions under which individuals can integrate 
their specialist knowledge” (p. 112). This statement can be used to explain both firm 
formation within incubators (e.g. a dance company forms so that specialized knowledge 
of choreographer, dancer, designer, and stage manager can be shared) and the 
organization of arts incubators themselves, which are often designed to facilitate the 
transfer of specialist knowledge (e.g. knowledge of budgeting and accounting practices) 
to client firms. Further, firms can be understood “as a social community specializing in 
the speed and efficiency in the creation and transfer of knowledge” (Kogut & Zander, 
1996). The firm is the locus for tacit knowledge, which Grant notes is not easily 
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transferrable, “it can be appropriated only through its application to productive activity” 
(1996, p. 111). Emergent arts organizations may be resident in an incubator where they 
can practice the application of tacit knowledge in an environment in which some of the 
inherent risks of the open market are reduced. Raffo et al contend that business 
knowledge is most effectively gained in a situated context and by doing, “Cultural 
entrepreneurs seemed more concerned with concentrating on the doing: on developing 
grounded ‘authentic’ experience, rather than talking about doing”  (Raffo, O'Connor, 
Lovatt, & Banks, 2000, p. 227). In other words, in a somewhat tautological relationship 
between firm formation and knowledge, cultural entrepreneurs gain knowledge by 
launching firms so that they can effectively launch their firms. 
 DiMaggio (1991) traces the emergence of firm formation in the US arts and 
culture sector to the second half of the nineteenth century, “out of the efforts of urban 
elites to build organizational forms that, first, isolated high culture and, second, 
differentiated it from popular culture” (p. 374). This returns us to the definitional problem 
at the beginning of the chapter, that of “creative industries” versus “arts and culture 
sector.”  If one defines an entrepreneur in terms of investment of capital, these Boston 
Brahmin captains of industry fit that bill, but their “creative destruction” in the arts and 
culture sector was organizational rather than production-oriented. “The form that the 
distribution of high culture would take was the non-profit corporation, governed by a 
self-perpetuating board of trustees who, eventually, would delegate most artistic 
decisions to professional artists or art historians” (p. 380-381). During the period 
DiMaggio describes, there was a market opening in the Kirznerian sense because “The 
lines dividing non-profit, co-operative, for-profit and public enterprise were not as strong 
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in the nineteenth century as they would become in the twentieth” (DiMaggio, 1991 p. 
379). One could argue that such investment by the “cultural capitalists” described by 
DiMaggio reached its apogee in McNeil Lowry’s stewardship of the Ford Foundation’s 
arts program, which culminated in the establishment of so many of the nonprofit arts and 
culture organizations that are his legacy today. Yet, there is nothing Kirznerian about the 
end result of such investment; investment was made in nonprofit arts and culture 
organization, perhaps to maximize culture capital, but most assuredly not to facilitate 
financial return on investment.  
Means and Ends: Understanding Arts and Culture Entrepreneurship 
 Although DiMaggio (1991) identified the earliest US cultural entrepreneurs as the 
cultural elite, contemporary arts and culture entrepreneurs are often doing just the 
opposite, forming firms or establishing individual creative practices outside of the now-
established system of nonprofit legacy arts organizations that began with the 
establishment of the Boston Symphony and Boston Museum of Art. The 
conceptualization of entrepreneurship in the arts and culture sector aligns with Shane and 
Venkataraman's construction of entrepreneurial action in which an opportunity must be 
recognized or created, evaluated, and exploited to create new (i.e. “future”) goods, either 
in a new firm, within an existing firm, or through individual market entry. In the arts and 
culture sector, those goods or services are “aesthetic goods” and/or “cultural goods,” 
where such are understood to meet criteria discussed earlier for their conveyance of 
symbolic meaning (cf. Galloway & Dunlop, 2007) and differentiation (per Caves, 2000) 
or that express of “cultural uniqueness and foster cultural diversity” (Hogeschool voor de 
Kunsten Utrecht, 2010, p. 26). Shane and Venkataraman’s contention that entrepreneurial 
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opportunities arise from disequlibrium may, according to (Bonin-Rodriguez, 2014) 
“resonate with many artists accustomed to fickle audiences” (p. 103). They further 
contend, “An entrepreneurial discovery occurs when someone makes the conjecture that a 
set of resources is not [yet] put to its ‘best use’” (p. 220). What then are the resources – 
the means – exploited by the arts and culture entrepreneur to create new goods? 
 Based on theories of entrepreneurial process and firm formation discussed 
previously, the “means” of arts and culture entrepreneurship are: -­‐ alertness to opportunity (Kirzner) -­‐ financial capital (Kirzner, Schumpeter) -­‐ new combinations, also known as “creativity” (Schumpeter) -­‐ specialized knowledge (Sarasvathy; Grant) -­‐ social capital (Sarasvathy; Preece) 
And its ends, potentially, are: -­‐ wealth creation -­‐ value creation through creative destruction -­‐ cultural capital via the production of aesthetic and cultural product/service -­‐ sustained creative practice 
 If entrepreneurial opportunity differs from other types of opportunity because 
they “require the discovery of new means-ends relationships” (Shane and Venkataraman, 
2000, p. 220), then what are the mediating channels that the arts and culture entrepreneur 
can exploit to connect the former with the latter? The “creative industries” construct, 
inclusive of advertising, fashion, architecture, and the like, may support the formation of 
a for-profit firm as the most effective way to exploit specialized knowledge and financial 
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capital to generate wealth; the cultural elite profiled by Dimaggio  (1991) created – and 
continue to create - new opportunities to convert financial capital into cultural capital 
through nonprofit corporations; groups of artists may discover opportunity to gather 
specialized knowledge through an artists collective to produce value; and individual 
artists, by controlling their own means of production may be able to combine specialized 
knowledge with social capital to “create something out of nothing” through a bricolage 
process. The boundaries between each of these types of entrepreneurial activity in the arts 
and culture sector may be diffuse, but their relationship, as illustrated in Figure 1 
provides a framing logic for consideration of the field.  
 
Figure 1. Framing an understanding of entrepreneurial action in the US arts and culture 
sector. 
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 In a recent review of the definitions of arts entrepreneurship in the literature of 
arts and culture management and cultural policy studies, Chang and Wyszomirski 
suggest, “‘arts entrepreneurship’ is a management process through which cultural 
workers seek to support their creativity and autonomy, advance their capacity for 
adaptability, and create artistic as well as economic and social value” (2015, p. 24). A 
different definition may result from a review of literature generated from within the 
disciplines of artistic practice, as does the one that arises here. While arts 
entrepreneurship is indeed a process, it would seem from the theories and exemplars 
previously discussed (as well as the earlier writings of Schumpeter (1942) and Gartner 
(e.g. 1990)), that arts entrepreneurship in the U.S. arts and culture sector is a process of 
discovery and creation rather than management. While the means available and the 
desirable ends may differ from artist to artist, arts entrepreneurship can be understood to 
be the process of connecting those means with those ends through an appropriate 
mediating structure. That structure requires “management,” and perhaps it is management 
of these constructs (individual practices, collectives, and firms of different types) to 
which Chang and Wyszomirski allude. Their definitional work is groundbreaking and 
opens up important avenues of research around five categories of managerial concepts 
that they identify from the literature as strategies, tactics, competencies, mindset, and 
context. I suggest, however, that the start of the process of arts entrepreneurship precedes 
these categories in the act of creation and/or discovery of ways to connect means with 
ends.  
 I have earlier written that arts entrepreneurship exists on a continuum from 
individual artists enacting entrepreneurial habits of mind in their creative practice at one 
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end to new venture creation at the other (Beckman & Essig, 2012). The means and ends 
framework described here expands that continuum into the three-dimensional space of 
the arts and culture sector. As a growing number of scholars interrogate the activities of 
arts entrepreneurs, broadly understood as people who undertake entrepreneurial action 
within the arts and culture sector, the means-end framework can be employed to 
understand the process of intermediation – the entrepreneurial action – that connects 
them.    
 What the intermediating structures have in common is that they can empower the 
artist, artist collective, or arts and culture organization to continue to produce work 
sustainably (when combined with sound management practices). The artist takes the 
creative risk to make significant unique work of symbolic meaning. The arts entrepreneur 
minimizes risk by surrounding that work with a structure that enables them to connect 
their means (who they are, what they know, who they know, and what they have) with 
the end product of a repeatable, and potentially scalable, creative enterprise. 
	  
55	  
 
4. METHODS FOR DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS 
 This research design implements Bergek and Norman’s (2008) suggestion that to 
identify incubator best practice, the “black box” of the incubator must be opened. Thus, 
the questions, “How do arts incubators of various types create value for their stakeholder 
communities? How do arts incubators evaluate their success at creating that value? What 
is the relationship between their evaluation methods and their strategic priorities?” are 
explored descriptively and qualitatively using a multiple case-study approach. This 
mixed-methods approach to surveying and analyzing arts incubators was successfully 
piloted in my 2014 study of university-based arts venture incubators (Essig, 2014b). The 
case studies and analysis that follow are both instrumental (per Stake, 2010) and 
interpretive (per Merriam, 1988). These case studies provide practical models for arts 
incubation activity and result in a framework for arts incubator evaluation. Data includes 
interviews with incubator stakeholders (staff, clients, and supporters), existing published 
documents, evaluation plans and reports where available, and a national survey of 
incubator directors. 
 The multicase method itself was chosen for this project because case study 
research is interested in “insight, discovery, and interpretation” (Merriman, 2009, p. 42). 
As Stake describes, “Previously unknown relationships and variables can be expected to 
emerge from case studies leading to a rethinking of the phenomenon being studied. 
Insights into how things get to be the way they are can be expected to result from the case 
studies” (1981, p. 47, qtd in Merriam). Multicase analysis will provide the means to 
generalize and theorize on the broader topic, or what Stake (2006) refers to as a 
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“quintain,” a metaphorical post around which the broadly construed question of interest 
(“How do arts incubators work?”) revolves.  
Sampling: The arts incubator universe 
 The universe of incubators consists of the inventory of arts incubators developed 
for my earlier typology research  (Essig, 2014a) and five additional incubators that were 
subsequently brought to my attention by scholars and practitioners in the field. To 
develop the initial inventory, I gathered the names of as many incubators as possible from 
multiple sources over a period of months and then researched each incubator 
individually. The inventory is therefore a snapshot of arts incubator activity taken during 
May-August 2013 that was developed in several stages. A preliminary list was developed 
from a key word search on Google and on LexisNexis using the terms “art incubator” and 
“arts incubator.” This was followed by a database search of scholarly literature. Arts 
incubators cited by the 1995 National Association of Local Arts Agencies descriptive 
study on the topic (Kahn 1995), the Gerl (2000) monograph, and others were added to the 
list. I made direct inquiries of the research directors of the National Business Incubation 
Association, Americans for the Arts, and National Association of State Arts Agencies, 
none of which organizations have or maintain lists of arts incubators. Finally, an open 
call went out to the Cultural Research Network (CRN) for the names of arts incubators 
that may have been missed in the other searches.   
 This initial search yielded a list of sixty-five entities. Five incubators were outside 
of the US and eliminated from the study. Nine more were eliminated because they were 
in the planning stages only, had been planned or never opened, or otherwise had ceased 
operations. Another eight were eliminated because they did not “provide developmental 
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assistance to artists, arts organizations, or creative enterprises.” Among those eliminated, 
for example, are programs such as “Flourish Studios,” which is a counseling center, or a 
local arts agency that does not provide incubation beyond the granting programs one 
normally expects from such entities, and small business incubators that do not 
specifically target the arts or creative industries. Programs or organizations that only 
provide space without the training, mentoring, and business services of an incubator (eg, 
the Greenpoint Manfuacturing and Design Center in Brooklyn, NY suggested for 
inclusion by a CRN member) are likewise not included. Such facilities are considered to 
be a “hotel.” Similarly, I excluded co-working spaces that do not provide services or do 
not focus on the arts, even though I acknowledge that all of these are important 
components of the arts development infrastructure.   
 Subsequent to the presentation of the typology research and its publication in the 
Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society, five additional incubators were added to 
create an inventory of 48 incubators whose directors were surveyed.  
Survey and selection of case study subjects 
 The directors of 48 arts incubators were surveyed to confirm and clarify 
organizational mission, value proposition, and willingness to participate in the case study 
research. Of the 48 programs surveyed, 27 responses were received, a return rate of over 
56 percent. Of those 27 respondents, 15 explicitly indicated a willingness to be contacted 
for further research; 2 of these had participated in the pilot study of university-based arts 
incubators, leaving 13 from which to choose for in-depth analysis.  
 The survey consisted of 8 questions (see Appendix) including ‘What is the 
organizational form of the incubator?’ ‘What type of client does the incubator serve most 
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frequently?’ and ‘The incubator provides which of the following services?’ each of which 
was to be answered through a drop-down menu of choices. The survey also included the 
open-ended question ‘What is the arts incubator’s value proposition?’ Twenty-one of the 
27 respondents answered the open-ended question. Responses were coded and themed. 
The survey was delivered via a Survey Monkey link emailed to the directors of each of 
arts incubators. A reminder email was sent two weeks following the initial inquiry to 
those directors who had not responded and a final reminder email sent a week thereafter. 
Given the small number of organizations in the arts incubator universe, anonymity was 
not guaranteed.  
Sampling the case study subjects 
 The earlier research posits a typology of arts incubators based on stakeholder 
theory, identifying six claimant stakeholder groups (see Kaler, 2002) that serve as proxies 
for strategic objectives: individual artists, nonprofit arts organizations, creative industries 
entrepreneurs, communities, owners, and students. The six stakeholder groups are 
condensed into four incubator types characterized by their shared objectives:  
• art incubators (incubators that focus on the development of art by individual 
artists and/or organizations) 
• community development incubators (incubators that use the development of art 
toward community development ends) 
• creative industry entrepreneur incubators (small business incubators focused on 
the creative industries) 
• student incubators (incubators that exist primarily to educate students) (Essig, 
2014b).  
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 The four case study subject organizations are Center for Cultural Innovation, 
Mighty Tieton, Arlington Arts Incubator, and Intersection for the Arts. The subjects were 
chosen based on their fit with one of the four instances delineated in the research design 
(an artist serving incubator, a creative entrepreneur serving incubator, an arts 
organization serving incubator, and a community serving incubator), willingness to 
participate, and articulation of value proposition. Sites were also chosen so that when 
taken together, the four organizations would represent a variety of both incubator types 
and business forms. Geographic diversity was also a desirable characteristic. 
Convenience factors such as scheduling availability for onsite interviews were also 
considered, but only secondarily. Thus, the sample was chosen purposively. There was 
only one of the 13 eligible respondents that could be considered a “creative entrepreneur 
incubator” type (Mighty Tieton) and one other that, based on its published materials and 
survey responses could be considered a “community development incubator” 
(Intersection for the Arts). The Arlington Arts Incubator was selected as an “art 
incubator” (organization serving) from among 3 incubators that serve only arts 
organizations for two reasons: it is a county government agency program and thus would 
diversify the organizational forms being considered and second, it had surfaced in my 
research early on because of its awards for innovation. There are four options for “art 
incubator” that serve only individual artists. Center for Cultural Innovation was chosen 
from this group based on convenience sampling in order to minimize travel costs 
associated with the on-site interviews and observations. 
 Primary data collection was conducted May-December 2014 with the support of a 
grant from the Herberger Institute for Design and the Arts. Multi-day site visits and in-
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person interviews with stakeholders were conducted at each of the four sites. For each 
site, a minimum of executive director, one staff member, one client, and one supporter 
were conducted7. Multiple staff members were interviewed at most sites; representatives 
of partnering organizations were also interviewed. Several interviews were conducted via 
phone rather than onsite due to scheduling exigencies. In all cases, on-site interviews 
were conducted first and phone interviews conducted as follow-ups. Observational notes 
taken while on site are also included in this primary data. The interviews are transcribed 
verbatim by Landmark Associates Inc. and such transcriptions comprise a significant 
source of data for the study. Secondary data sources include materials such as 
organizational websites, media coverage, and annual reports.   
Data Coding and Analysis 
 Analysis of primary data (interview transcripts) and existing documents began 
with a two-pronged approach to coding the qualitative data. The dual coding 
methodology was employed successfully in the pilot project (Essig, 2014b). MaxQDA 
software was used to track and cross-reference different sources and code types. In order 
to facilitate the storytelling at the core of the case studies, Labovian narrative coding was 
employed. By highlighting the abstract, orientation, complicating action, evaluation, and 
result segments of the stories told to me by the interview subjects and found in the other 
documents, I am able to triangulate the information included therein and “retell” their 
stories in a way that is both truthful and reflective of the subjects own responses.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  With the exception of Intersection for the Arts, for which a funder or supporter was not 
interviewed. 	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 To address the specific questions of interest related to value creation and 
evaluation, I began first with a short list of categorical codes derived from the interview 
questions and prior research on incubators, both general and arts-specific. This initial list 
of categories included value proposition, stakeholders, and evaluation, with several 
subcodes of each. Other initial categories were organizational form, strategic priorities, 
and organizational values. During the coding process, many additional codes were added 
to the code system, mostly in vivo. Examples of such in vivo codes include “seal of 
approval” and “safe place to take risks” as sub-codes of value proposition. The final 
coding system can be found in the appendix. 
 Material related to these initially categorical codes were used to theme the data 
around value proposition, evaluation, and claimant and influencer stakeholders. The 
narratives thus include both the story of how the incubator started and developed, and 
how each incubator has evolved to deliver value to their stakeholders. By analyzing 
interview transcripts from leaders, staff, funders, and clients, I am able to convey a 360 
degree perspective on each incubator. Published materials are used to verify information 
in the interviews. 
 The cross-case analysis that follows the descriptive case studies addresses the 
similarities and differences across each incubator and resulting themes. This analysis of 
the data seeks to find commonalities across all four case subjects that, by inference (see 
Stake, 1995), may be attributed to the universe of incubators writ large. Differences 
between incubators are also noted and potential explanations for those differences mined 
from the interview transcripts. For example, Center for Cultural Innovation and 
Intersection for the Arts both provide value to individuals – and are even partially co-
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located -- but the former provides that value through re-granting and education and the 
latter through space and services. The analysis looks across the categories, such as 
organizational values, stakeholder groups, and strategic priorities, to assess why the 
organizations deliver value in different ways and how their differing value propositions 
are manifest in their evaluation processes.  
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5. CASES STUDIES 
 Case 1: Arlington County Arts Incubator 
 In 1996, The Arlington County Arts Incubator won the Ford Foundation’s 
“Innovations in American Government Award” for “nurturing its arts community without 
a significant increase in funding” (Arlington Cultural Affairs, 1996). A program of 
Arlington Cultural Affairs, Arts Incubator was officially launched in 1990 through the 
adoption of a new county policy for the support of arts organizations and artists. 
Arlington Cultural Affairs is not a discreet department of county government. It was 
originally an office in the Parks and Recreation Department that resides now in the 
Department of Economic Development. 
The Incubator’s Beginnings 
 Norma Kaplan joined Arlington County government in the mid 1980s. Shortly 
thereafter, she observed the closing of several schools due to demographic decline in the 
student population. One of them, Gunston Middle School, was converted to a 
performance venue for use by Arlington performing arts groups. “The main auditorium, 
which we now call Theatre I, was upgraded with professional level sound and lighting” 
(Staff 2). While it continues to serve that function to this day, the building reopened as a 
school after several years and another demographic shift. The performance facilities of 
Gunston School are a constituent part of the Arts Incubator’s value proposition as 
described following. Kaplan and the current staff of the Arts Incubator all had theatre and 
performing arts backgrounds. In the intervening years the office also had staff and 
programming with specialties in folklore and heritage preservation but the programs 
related to heritage preservation did not survive the economic downturn of 2008. 
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Likewise, the office’s cultural programming at The Rosslyn Spectrum Theatre renovated 
for use for both Cultural Affairs programming and incubated arts groups did note survive 
the recession. What did was the granting of space and services described in the 1990 
policy document and for which the Arts Incubator received the Ford Foundation 
Innovation Award. 
 The goals of that policy are articulated as follows: 
1. To create a climate within the County that is conducive to the growth and 
development of Arlington’s artists and arts organizations through public and 
private support 
2. To foster development of excellence and diversity in the arts insuring that a 
varied program of cultural activities is available to satisfy the interests of 
Arlington’s citizens. 
3. To guarantee to all artists and arts organizations an open and fair policy which 
assures equal access to County arts resources 
4. To encourage development of public/private partnership in support of the arts. 
(Arlington County, 1990)  
 Since 1990, there have been upgrades to the performance facilities at Gunston 
Middle School, including a 2001 renovation of Theatre II, what was once the school 
library, to make the performance spaces more isolated from school operations (Pressley, 
2001). 
 Arlington Cultural Affairs moved from the Parks and Recreation Department to 
Economic Development in 2012. The staff seems to feel this is a better fit: “I won’t say 
that we have the most comfortable relationship in Parks and Recreation, in that I don’t 
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think when they started Cultural Affairs there was the expectation that it was going to be 
this, at one point, internationally successful model that it turned into; that really had a life 
of its own” (Staff 2). Another staff member described the transition as a “period of 
shifting” during which “Economic Development got to understand the arts more. We got 
to understand them more” (Staff 1). 
Value Proposition 
 In its response to the initial survey of incubators, the Arlington Arts Incubator 
described its value position thus: “To provide free space and services to arts 
organizations so that they can focus on organizational development and programming 
excellence.” While the space isn’t exactly “free” (client organizations return a portion of 
their ticket sales back to the incubator and pay rent on the office space) the stakeholders I 
interviewed were consistent in their description of the value proposition of Arlington Arts 
Incubator as “space and services.” “Space and services” is the mantra – or as one staff 
member called it, the “golden ticket” -- of the incubator.  
 As a local arts agency, Arlington Cultural Affairs also provides grants of money, 
but their grant pool has been decreasing and is now only $200,000 per year. The granting 
of space and services is the primary activity of the incubator and the means by which the 
program delivers value to its client organizations and the wider community of Arlington. 
In the whole, “Arlington Cultural Affairs provides programs and services that build 
community and transform lives by enhancing enjoyment and understanding of, and 
participation in, the arts” (Arlington Cultural Affairs, 2014). 
 Essentially, the Arts Incubator provides performing space for small arts 
organizations as well as production support. The latter support is somewhat unique: 
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costume shop facilities, scene shop facilities, and technical support staff are provided as 
part of the space use grant afforded the organizations. “…there’s a full scene shop with 
all sorts of tools that are granted to the arts groups to build their sets in; a wonderful 
facility with top-grade equipment that they would have to find, rent, buy, do something in 
order to make happen” (Staff 2). Another staff member described the value to 
organizations: “we probably shaved about five years off of the trajectory, because … 
groups like this, they didn’t have to scrounge around for $5,000 to pay for a theater for 
eight weeks or whatever” (Staff 1). A staff member describes the impact of costume shop 
and construction services: 
We have a huge costume collection. And also, they would apply for myself and the 
manager of the costume shop to make costumes for their different programs. So, it 
would’ve been that they made the costumes. They also did the wardrobe for the 
shows. So, it really was an incredible amount of help for newer groups coming in. 
And leaving that part to professionals. And then, being able to concentrate on the 
rest of the production. (Staff 2) 
 One client noted that the space and services are more important than the general 
operating support received from the county: “we also receive the cash grant from 
Arlington County… around $10,000.00. But I'll trade that gladly to have access to 
amazing facilities—you know, way beyond what the scope … budget size of our 
organization” (Client 1). Another, however, expressed the importance of small county 
grants of $4000-$5000 in the life of a young arts organization: “But, you know, for a 
company that’s making just over 50 [thousand], that’s 10 percent. I mean, that’s a great 
start” (Client 2). The use of the scene shop reduces opportunity costs for the client 
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organizations, enabling them to focus on core mission: “I know the shop is going to be 
there and I can sign up for a time and that works out and we can build our sets. So it 
definitely allows us to use our time and our resources on the kids” (Client 1). Another 
client notes, “The idea that a young organization looking to get up and running doesn’t 
have to commit to a rent for performance space is utterly revolutionary” (Client 2). A 
staff member likewise noted that money grants are not the primary value provided: “it’s 
not really all about money. I mean, it’s really about being able to be there; and to bring 
the community together” (Staff 1). Thus, community cohesion is impacted by the 
incubator space-and-services program. 
 There is a value “echo effect” for the client organizations that occurs as a result of 
being affiliated with the incubator program. One client referred to this as a “seal of 
approval,” a kind of reputational capital, that could be used to approach other potential 
funders such as foundations and corporations. The director of another arts organization in 
Arlington also noted the value of providing this seal of approval, noting that membership 
is, “also kind of legitimizing the work that they’re doing; saying that we really want to 
make a space for you here in our county” (Ally 1).  
 Another invisible value provided through the granting of space and services is that 
with space and services secured, small organizations have a safe place to take artistic 
risks and focus on programming. A staff member described a particularly memorable 
production of a stage version of Moby Dick by one incubator client: “I think the value to 
both the artist and the community is the ability to allow for taking chances.” A client 
feels that due to the provision of space and services “I'm able to focus on, you know, the-
the people I'm programming for more.” She continues: “I really appreciate that because if 
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my show tanks, say it doesn't sell that well, I'm not on the hook for thousands and 
thousands of dollars” (Client 1). The risk minimization of being under the Arts Incubator 
umbrella is not only financial. The 1990 policy assures that support would not be granted 
based on the artistic content of the work produced. This policy is very important to Client 
2: “We feel like we have the ability to take a lot more risk because we know that the 
county has a very forward-thinking position on issues of censorship.” A staff member 
also described the importance of the censorship policy: “Arlington had and has a ‘no 
censorship’ clause. So it wasn’t that companies could only do very pedestrian work. They 
could stretch out, and it allowed for the reputation to grow for Arlington as a very 
innovative, chance-taking place to be for the arts in the region.” At its inception, the Arts 
Incubator not only made efficient use of underutilized public facilities, it was also 
“recruiting [professional performing arts organizations] to come to Arlington so that our 
spaces could be better utilized with the idea that the community theatre scene itself would 
benefit from some interaction with professional theatre troupes” (Staff 3). The intention, 
then was that the “echo effect” extend beyond the client organizations to the community 
as a whole. 
 Although not articulated as a primary value provided by the incubator, the 
program also provides support for development of early stage organizations. As described 
later, however, these organizations do not necessarily leave the incubator program even 
after organizational development goals are achieved. Some of this organizational 
development training is delivered through the Department of Economic Development, 
which runs a business launch program. Access to this resource was enabled by the move 
from Parks and Recreation to Economic Development. 
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Incubator form and funding 
 The move from Parks and Recreation to Economic Development is viewed 
positively by all involved, but the transition has not been easy. One staff member 
described the program as “being in a period of upheaval for a while” but that “things are 
kind of now coming full circle. And we’re able to much more concentrate on the groups 
and on the program” (Staff 1).  
 As a program in an office of a county department, the lion’s share of the Arts 
Incubator’s funding comes directly from county government. There was discussion in 
2003 and then again in 2011 of making Cultural Affairs its own independent agency. 
Concerns over the reliability of funding and the prohibitive cost of infrastructure led that 
option to be discarded. However, the program also earns some revenue from the 
incubator resident clients. Ten percent of box office proceeds are returned to the county’s 
general fund (not the Arts Incubator directly). One client characterized the space and 
services her organization receives for that ten percent as “an amazing deal.” The 
organizations that have office space in the Arlington Cultural Affairs facility (a county 
building shared with the Department of Parks and Recreation) pay rent to the county for 
those offices, albeit at below market subsidized rates. 
What is success? 
 Repeatedly, in interviews and published materials, two evidences of success were 
widely proclaimed: the Ford Foundation Innovations in American Government Award in 
1996 and the launch of Signature Theatre. Signature Theatre began in the Gunston 
Middle School space and moved to its own space in 1993. Today, Signature has an 
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operating budget approaching $8 million and assets, including a new theatre building 
over $10 million. The Innovations award was received in 1996. 
 Some arts groups have remained resident in the incubator program throughout the 
entirety of the intervening decades. In a traditional business incubator, one measure of 
incubator success is the number of graduated firms. A staff member commented that 
graduation was a goal initially, stating:  “the hope would be that with some financial help, 
they could start. It would be a general operating. And then they would be able to graduate 
out.” Another views the length of time some organizations remain in the program as 
problematic: “I think one of the holes that was identified long ago with the incubator was 
a system of attrition or time limits. I think that is one way in which at least the incubator 
as it was practiced here did not succeed as well as it could have” (Staff 2). The staff 
recognizes that the lack of a graduation or time limit policy requires examination during 
the current period of transition: 
We have yet to get to the point of graduating people out. That was kind of a plan 
that…many things happened over the years. And the money started to build as far 
as the grant program. And more groups started to come in. Now, we’re going into 
kind of incubator 201. And trying to figure out how we’re going to start graduating 
people.   
 Yet, some clients see the very longevity of the resident organizations as a 
hallmark of success: “The Washington Shakespeare has been around for 20 years. I 
would venture to say that they wouldn’t be around without the Incubator Program” 
(Client 2). Another client expressed her satisfaction with the program despite not ever 
leaving it: “I mean, our goal would be …we want to be the top Northern Virginia 
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children's theater. You know, that's what we aspire to be. So I think Arlington has set us 
up to do that” (Client 1). In the sense that the Arts Incubator has helped the client 
organization achieve their strategic goals, it is has been successful, as has been the client 
organization itself. 
 Now that they are under the supervision of Department of Economic 
Development, the program communicates their successes in those terms: 
We always speak about their [the resident organization’s] success in terms the 
economic benefits: the draw in terms of restaurant spending, and transportation and 
all that kind of stuff. And we talk about it in terms of community amenities and 
with development and stuff. It is sort of taking out that whole other realm of 
programming, and community involvement and participation in the arts. So, I’m 
understanding it as a way to sort of circumvent maybe more … meaningful 
programming. (Staff 3) 
 
 One of the incubator clients also takes a county-wide view of success, but focuses 
on aesthetic value rather than economic value: “I do see the value of creating an arts 
environment where small, interesting things happen. And that’s what I think should be 
the metric of success for the county. It’s not just the super success stories, but the whole 
picture” (Client 2). 
Evaluation 
 If Arlington Arts Incubator does not measure its success based on graduated arts 
organizations, what are its metrics for evaluation? And what form does evaluation take? 
The staff, while acknowledging the importance of evaluation (“evaluation and assessment 
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is so key”) also admitted, “we have not evaluated in a long time…we’re doing it 
piecemeal. But an overall evaluation has not been done.” Despite the lack of overall 
incubator program assessment, the staff have a good sense from their data of how each of 
the arts organizations is doing in terms of attendance and finances and how well they 
weathered the financial downturn. The staff member responsible for tracing financial 
transactions shared: 
I do all the money transactions. So, with being part of the supported groups, all 
the tickets that are sold and any income that comes in from classes, Arlington 
County government gets ten percent. So, I can show graphs and all of the other 
things about how much money we have made throughout the years…and it has 
been incredible. So, with that [evaluation], we - we do it by tickets sales. We do 
final reports every year on exactly what the groups did. How many audience 
members came. You know, it breaks down into seniors, children. You know, just 
what their whole structure is and how they base it with subscriptions, ticket sales, 
class sales, whatever the case may be. There’s just a lot of data like that. So, 
whether that is necessarily compared year-to-year, it is, but not as much as it 
could be. I have all the data.  It’s a matter of pulling all that data together.  And 
we have done it. We’ve done different studies. We’ve looked at it, because we do 
a bit of a show for the county board once a year to, push to try to get more money 
for the grant program. So, in that regard, there is some way of kind of seeing 
whether we have grown. One thing that - that did happen is everybody seemed to 
be doing really well. There seemed to be a lot of growth. Not only financially, but 
as far as their proposals were much better written. They were going out and 
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getting other grants from other funding areas. … then, we had the downturn. 
(Staff 1) 
 
 There are several metrics in addition to ticket sales that the staff examine in their 
review of the client organizations:  
have they filled the theatre seats?  Are they—have they gotten some critical 
acclaim?  I think that’s pretty good: getting some notice. And, whether or not 
they’re being successful in their fundraising. So I think that the criteria for 
evaluating is a little bit loose. And I don’t think it’s very well aligned right now 
with our stated or unstated goals for the incubator program. (Staff 3) 
The alignment, or lack thereof, between evaluation criteria and programmatic goals will 
be discussed in more depth in the next chapter but appears at the client level as well. 
“Artistic excellence,” for example, has been a contested topic in the review of arts 
organizations for grants for years. How is artistic “excellence” measured and who 
decides? In establishing the National Endowment for the Arts:  
Congress believed that any government control over the content of art outside the 
criteria of artistic excellence would result in the production of mediocre art. 
Admitting that artistic excellence was "an abstract and subjective standard, the 
Senate, through its statutory language, made clear its intent that artistic excellence 
should not, however nebulous, be defined by government officials outside the 
agency. (DeGrazia, 1994, p. 137-138) 
The panel review process used by federal, state, and local agencies, including Arlington, 
is designed to let experts and, in some cases, a member of the general public, decide the 
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“excellence” criteria. However, the application of the excellence criteria is viewed by 
Arlington Arts Incubator clients who work with children as problematic. Client 1 
explains the problem in this way: 
I have heard the commissioners, you know, wonder where does children's 
programming… how does children's programming reflect the idea of artistic 
excellence. And, you know, that's a tough question for—you know, that's 
something we struggle with. Like, I think what we do is really great, but I don't 
know that you could hold it up next to a professional theater production and say, 
… rank us equally. But you don't want to ghettoize children's programming 
either— 
 
Client 2 shares this concern: 
The commission as a whole does not see arts education on par with… performance. 
So in my eligible income calculation, one of the reasons my grants shrunk was… 
I’m not allowed to count any tuition in my eligible income. You have—it’s income 
that’s only produced in Arlington, and it has to be non-tuition. So they’re basically 
looking at box office. 
 
 The process of formal evaluation, when it occurs, occurs at the client level as part 
of the grant-making process. This formal evaluation of the client organization is 
undertaken by the arts commission rather than the staff of the incubator. One staff 
member indicated that the commission “is a whole new crew of people; there’s great 
energy there now.” Informal input into the grant review process regarding client space 
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use is provided by “staff who interact with companies day-to-day, staff who may know 
that X company is amazingly professional in how they deal with space, versus X 
company who is sloppy and leaves thousands of dollars of damage each season, or 
something like that” (Staff 2). Another staff member articulated what could or even 
should be done in the future to evaluate the impact of the space and services grants on the 
client groups: 
I think we should—really need to introduce some things like why—how will office 
space help your group?  And at the end of the year, let’s see if you give us some 
specifics and at the end of the year let’s see how that really happened; or what 
happened. And I think that we need to use this information ourselves to put it back 
into the incubator program so we can continually revamp it and tweak it so that it’s 
better—so that we’re providing the kind of support that’s actually needed by the 
groups. (Staff 3) 
The future 
 Arlington Cultural Affairs, including the Arlington Arts Incubator, is in a period 
of transition at the time of this writing. Shortly after the site visit, Economic 
Development hired a new director of Cultural Affairs who is leading the office through a 
period of self-examination and planning. As the office and its programs move forward, 
there will be more of an emphasis on individual artists than in the past and on breaking 
down the barriers between nonprofit and for-profit work in the arts. The new director 
indicated that the incubator will continue to deliver space and services, as “those have 
become really ingrained in the culture here of how we support the arts.” However, she 
speaks adamantly of the need to have time limits on incubator residencies. Long term 
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residencies have negative effects on the existing organization and the potential for 
development of new organizations: 
You need to have a limited time in an incubator. It’s called an incubator for a 
reason. What has happened here with a vacuum of leadership is—it’s really 
interesting phenomenon, actually -- with the groups, the six organizations that are 
located at the space on Four Mile Run8. It’s almost like they feel ownership of the 
space, and that, I feel, is very dangerous. It’s dangerous to them as organizations for 
their own growth and also for other organizations that have a need for this type of 
space. 
 Due in part to her own background in creative industries (the new director headed 
a county film office in another state) and the strategic priorities of the Department of 
Economic Development, “growth” will be both a goal and an evaluation metric moving 
forward along the axes of revenue and funding, audience, and artistic practice. Incubator 
clients, whether organizations or individuals will need to have growth oriented goals: 
“when you come into an incubator, you should have an idea. What is your goal for this 
year?  What is your long-term goal?” 
 As the Arlington Arts Incubator undergoes a process of redesigning, it will be 
challenged to change. There are some indications that members of the arts commissions 
are a bit recalcitrant to change or, conveyed more positively, are committed to sustaining 
relationships with existing incubator clients. To achieve economic development 
outcomes, echoing Schumpeter, the Arlington Arts Incubator will need to support the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Four Mile Run is the road on which the shared Parks and Recreation/Cultural Affairs 
building is located. 
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development of new combinations, rather than merely keeping the existing flow of the 
Arlington cultural economy circulating. 
Case 2: Intersection for the Arts 
 Like Arlington Cultural Affairs, Intersection for the Arts is in a period of 
organizational transition. Also like Arlington, it is Intersection’s incubation program that 
is anchoring the transition of the larger entity of which it is part. Intersection for the Arts 
is, according to its website, “a pioneering arts and community development organization 
that brings people together across boundaries to instigate break-through change” 
(Intersection, 2014a). Because of the weight in its published materials given to its role in 
community development (“our work has always kept ever-evolving notions of 
‘community’ at its core” (Intersection, 2015a)) the incubator program was classified in 
my typology research (Essig, 2014a) as a community-serving incubator. The community 
that Intersection’s incubator serves most directly is the arts and culture community of San 
Francisco. However, one criterion for being accepted into the current incubator program 
is that the artists be working in or with a specific community so Intersection’s community 
impact, like arguably that of any incubator, is delivered indirectly. In its reorganization 
(see “The Future,” following), such organizations are considered part of the “Intersection 
CORE” program. 
 Intersection for the Arts is a resident partner in the 5M (5th and Mission) Project. 
It relocated to the 5M Project’s San Francisco Chronicle Building in 2009 along with 
Impact Hub (“The Hub”), a co-working space for social venture and tech start-ups. 
Visitors enter through the Impact Hub space to find Intersection’s meeting, performance, 
and gallery spaces. The current executive director of Intersection is Randy Rollison. 
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Originally the head of the incubator program, Rollison had been serving as interim 
director since the departure of long-serving director Deborah Cullinan in 2013. This 
departure caused organizational instability that some see as the catalyst for a 2014 fiscal 
crisis in the organization that almost forced its closure (Spaner, 2015). At the time, much 
of Intersection’s assets were in restricted funds. A crisis ensued when the organization 
almost ran out of cash just a few weeks after Cullinan’s departure. Several local 
foundations provided bridge support and funded a consultant’s report that was used to 
help Intersection through this difficult period and strategize for the future. The incubator 
program continues to operate as both a fiscal sponsor and, in the organization’s re-design, 
an expanded accelerator. The case focuses on the incubator program as it existed in 2014, 
the period of the site visit.  
The incubator’s beginnings 
 Intersection for the Arts was founded in 1965 as an offshoot of a program of 
Glide, a liberal church in San Francisco’s Tenderloin District. The original program was 
for artists who were conscientious objectors to do community service as an alternative to 
serving in the Vietnam War. The organization’s 50th anniversary website describes the 
program’s inception: 
Intersection began as a merger of several faith-based experiments in the Tenderloin. 
The arts were used as an alternative approach to reach disenfranchised 
neighborhood youth while also providing artists who were conscientious objectors 
an alternative to serving in the Vietnam War. From the beginning, Intersection’s 
founders understood how powerful a tool art could be in providing alternative 
solutions to immediate community and larger world concerns. (Intersection, 2015) 
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 Twelve years after its inception in 1965 as an arts-based community service 
organization, the fiscal sponsorship program, the core of Intersection’s incubation 
activities, was launched. Since 1977, it has been a self-sustaining project of Intersection, 
which grew to include performance and gallery space, the latter of which was closed as 
part of the 2014-15 restructuring.  
Value proposition 
 According to its own description, “Intersection’s programs emphasize 
relationships, collaboration, and process. Intersection works with hundreds of artists 
through residencies, commissions, fellowships, fiscal sponsorship and incubation, 
performances, exhibitions, workshops and public art projects” (Intersection, 2014a). The 
director describes the incubator program as “a platform with many planks” (ED). These 
“planks,” the services offered by the incubator program from its inception in 1977 
through 2014, include: space for the development and production of artistic/creative 
products; space for the exhibition, performance, or sale of artistic products; cooperative 
marketing; centralized business services (eg. shipping, reception, billing, accounting); 
business classes or business training; arts business informational resources; and, most 
significantly, fiscal sponsorship (Survey response). Intersection creates value “By 
investing the organization's resources - fiscal, physical and human - we create a vibrant, 
sustainable local arts community” (Survey response).  
 Rather than “clients,” Intersection has “members,” who receive a resource 
package of space, technical equipment and a technical director for nominal annual fee 
plus a share of box office revenue. A subset of members participate in the incubation 
program, which includes fiscal sponsorship, coaching, and mentoring (and for which 
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members pay back eight percent of total revenue). One client described the value of the 
incubation program primarily through the lens of reducing transaction costs through 
fiscal sponsorship: 
It’s a bigger umbrella organization that brings in smaller projects or programs that 
don’t want or need, for whatever reasons, to go through the whole bureaucratic 
rigmarole of getting your own 501(c)3 number, but they serve as that organization, 
where we use their 501(c)3 number, and we’re able to operate pretty independently 
but use some of the resources like access to e-mails and their banking, and, you 
know, they do our bookkeeping for the most part. (Client 1) 
Another client also noted that the bookkeeping service is the primary value delivered by 
the incubator program and that the eight percent fee paid back to Intersection for the 
fiscal sponsorship and bookkeeping is fair. By taking the bookkeeping out of the scope of 
duties of the organization itself, “it really helps us focus more on building the 
organization than worrying about that part of it” (Client 2). The business services extend 
to payroll, with Intersection processing payment to staff, vendors, and artists on behalf of 
the member organizations. Intersection receives donations of its member organizations 
and can provide donor reports back to them. 
 The executive director classifies the value provided by fiscal sponsorship and 
bookkeeping services as transactional but notes that there is also transformative value 
created for their members through coaching:  
It provides that empowerment; like I said, if you understand that underlying any of 
the practices, the artistic practices, if you’re going to be sustainable, it’s a 
business…It’s providing a level of empowerment that artists don’t necessarily feel 
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that they have, or don’t know how to acquire And if you own that, then you can find 
some empowerment, and you’re not a victim (ED).  
In a focus group facilitated by Emerging Arts Leaders Bay Area coincident with my own 
research, the director emphasized the need the programs meet in the arts community: 
A lot of the artists have buried their heads in the sand about things like finance and 
anything to do with numbers, so really kind of working with them through all of the 
basic tools you need in order to be able to have a practice that will serve the 
community, which all of our projects are focused on, and create a life for yourself 
that is sustainable.  
This “double bottom line” of community service and artist sustainability drives mission 
delivery throughout the organization. The coaching services, primarily provided by the 
executive director are especially valued as organizations plan for growth. One topic that 
arises with member groups is when it necessary to hire an administrator, “we help them 
through the anxiety of that” (ED). A member described how Intersection helps “sort 
things out that don’t work” (Client 2). 
 Entrepreneurship involves an inherent amount of risk. By providing space and 
technical services for experimental or potentially controversial performance work and 
then sharing in the revenue after the fact, Intersection cushions the risk for some of its 
artist members. Artists are able to use their contributed revenue to “activate the project” 
(ED) rather than rent space. “They gain the money on the backend and we take the risk 
with them” (ED). 
 In addition to the direct effects, both the members and staff spoke of the sense of 
“validation” or the “seal of approval” that comes with membership in Intersection. One 
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member relayed that this validation or “credibility” was of great value to his 
organization: 
I would say other things would be being affiliated with them—and having pretty 
much their stamp of approval. That's helped us, I know. I can remember talking to 
people in different nonprofits in the city. For instance, we did a collaborative effort 
with the East Bay Center for Performing Arts and I said, "Well, we're a member 
of…Intersection for the Arts is our fiscal sponsor."  And they were saying, "Oh. Oh, 
great. You know, we know them. They've been around." So it gave some 
credibility. (Client 2) 
The “seal of approval” has a networking effect as well, which the members find 
beneficial: “I feel connected in a different way with the arts community, getting 
notification about shows or being a part of events that happen here, and you’re just 
around creative people as-is very exciting and a huge, huge benefit” (Client 1).  
 Networking is facilitated formally at several meetings per year for the fiscally 
sponsored projects. These are primarily social events, but ones that the ED feels are an 
important part of Intersection’s value proposition: “Having started my own organizations, 
I felt very much alone, and bringing people together in community, knowing that there’s 
someone else they can talk to, is a really valuable part of what we offer. To be able to 
provide that social networking for them so that they don’t feel so alone” (ED). One 
member commented on the value of informal networking opportunities provided by 
Intersection: “I make it a point of taking my requests for payments and deposits and stuff 
into Intersection and just kind of hanging out a little bit and talking. I think you get more 
out of something when you do it that way” (Client 2). Although this client finds value in 
	  
83	  
the accidental meetings in the Intersection space, the executive director has not observed 
this effect: “The colocation space thing didn’t really take off. Artists don’t value things 
the way that Hub members do” (ED). 
 In the interviews and my own observations, the two-pronged value proposition of 
positive social impact for communities and sustainable artistic production was 
paramount. The social impact imperative required of member organizations is a 
differentiating characteristic of Intersection’s incubator program and each of its member 
organizations from arts incubators and arts organizations more generally. 
Incubator form and funding 
 Intersection for the Arts is a small organization with one full time executive 
director, a half-time program manager, a part-time bookkeeper, and a technical director to 
support its 110 members. The board of directors is likewise small, with nine members 
plus the executive director. The most recent IRS 990 form available, from 2012, indicates 
an overall budget of approximately $2M, inclusive of the funds that pass through the 
organization to its members through fiscal sponsorship. These figures predate Cullinan’s 
departure. A recent media report (Hurwitt, 2015) indicates that the operating budget is 
currently $540,000, down from $800,000 in 2013. 
 Unlike Intersection’s gallery and performance space, the incubator program is 
self-sustaining, primarily through the fees it charges to its members: eight percent of total 
revenue. Members pay a modest $50 annual fee. Revenue is also generated through rental 
of the central performance/meeting space to members of the adjacent Hub co-working 
space and other community members. The space rentals generate approximately $80,000 
annually, which almost covers the cost of the space itself according to the executive 
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director. Local foundations provide the bulk of Intersection’s contributed income, which 
normally would go to support the non-incubator programming (the incubator itself being 
self-sustaining) but during the 2014-15 fiscal year was earmarked for bailout and 
planning for the future. 
 Member clients indicate that they receive good value for their eight percent fee 
although one indicated that as her organization has grown, she has reservations:  
“As we’ve grown incrementally over the years and now the lump—that eight percent is 
way bigger than it was, you know, nine years ago” (Client 1). 
What is success? 
 The success of the incubator is made visible through the work of its member 
organizations and through the longevity of the program itself. The number of people 
impacted by member organizations is one quantitative measure of success, according to 
the executive director: 
I look at how much are we impacting the Bay Area, and other places, in terms of 
people we reach. You look at the range of projects working all over the Bay Area, 
some outside in places like Haiti and El Salvador, we’re impacting through the 
projects, around ½ million people a year. That’s pretty substantial. So that’s a 
success. 
 Because each of the members have different goals, their own measurements of 
success differ. For some, incorporating as a 501(c)3 organization is a benchmark of the 
success of both the member organization and the incubator program, but for others, 
incorporating is not necessarily appropriate. The ED explains, “So I know when a project 
is ready to go for a 501c3 and that’s great when they graduate…You have to define 
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success individually. The program as a whole is going to be made up of the sum of its 
parts, in terms of evaluating success.” 
Evaluation 
 As was the case with several of the programs in the pilot study of university arts 
incubators (Essig, 2014b), evaluation currently occurs at the client level and begins with 
application to the program; there are no evaluation metrics for Intersection itself: “It’s 
tended just to be a machine that just is self-perpetuated, with never any analysis of the 
parts” (ED). Criteria for acceptance into the program include, “artistic excellence, ability 
to partner with Intersection and help us live out our mission, and fiscal solvency” 
(Emerging Arts Leaders). Once accepted, the individual organizations are evaluated on 
“whether or not a project achieves the goals stated in their application; progress toward 
goals; [and] productivity” (Emerging Arts Leaders). As is the case with the Arlington 
Arts Incubator, once accepted, organizations can remain in the program for decades: 
“They’re just functioning, and they do their thing, and, you know, we take in the money” 
(ED). 
 As Intersection undertakes a period of re-organization and self-reflection, it is 
beginning to look at the meta-level metrics that will enable it to measure its own success 
and not just that of its client orgs. For example, as part of the re-organization process, the 
executive director was asked to look at annual rates of income generated by the incubator 
clients through fiscal sponsorship. This analysis found that in the 2013-14 fiscal year, 
there was $394,000 generated. Another developing metric is geographic scope of 
services: “we need to start tracking…we should be doing a mapping of all the 
communities in the Bay Area that are served through the work of these projects, because 
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it’s not just San Francisco; it’s Oakland; it’s Richmond; it’s all around the Bay Area” 
(ED). 
 With no formal evaluation plan in place, much of the evaluation that occurred 
prior to 2015 relied on the intuition of the skilled and experience executive director: “I 
really look at it as: when I’m sitting in the room with each of those project directors, and 
we’re talking through what’s going on with them, I can feel the success project by 
project” (Emerging Arts Leaders). 
The Future 
 The ongoing reorganization by Intersection is described in detail in the media: 
This is a smaller Intersection, with a budget of about $540,000 for this year, down 
from about $800,000 before its fiscal crisis, and a four-person staff, only two of 
whom are full time: Rollison and technical director/facility manager Alejandro 
Acosta. Artist resources manager Emma Spertus and new finance director Yesenio 
Sanchez are part time. The organization’s enhanced stability is reflected in having 
doubled its earned income percentage from 24 to 49 percent. 
 Though it will continue to present some performances and exhibitions, as it has 
sporadically since May, “we are shifting our focus so it is less on the product and 
more on the producer,” Rollison says. Based on its many meetings and discussions 
through the fall, he explains, Intersection’s most vital roles are its longstanding 
work as a fiscal sponsor and “helping artists to have sustainable careers. So we want 
to provide them the necessary professional development and the technical 
assistance and training they need on the business side in a changing environment.” 
(Hurwitt, 2015) 
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 The incubator program specifically, while maintaining its fiscal sponsorship 
services, is building out its training program on a business accelerator model. Doing so 
will address an unmet need articulated by one of the core fiscal sponsorship clients 
(“there can be more training and workshops” (Client 1)). The ED described the 
developing accelerator program as “based on what they do in the Hub, with social 
entrepreneurs and everything, where you give the projects a certain amount of 
professional development and a learning suite that’s very intensive” (ED). 
  According to a February 2015 announcement, Intersection’s re-designed business 
model will be based on this more focused platform consisting of three planks:  
• The Incubator: Fiscal sponsorship open to all artists and arts organizations 
who may not meet Intersections’ Core Tenets, but whose work is not-for-
profit in nature and is of artistic merit. 
• The Intersection CORE: Fiscal sponsorship plus hands-on coaching, 
mentorship and access to technical assistance and professional learning 
opportunities. 
• The Accelerator: Access to an organized suite of education and tools to 
create viable business plans, and provide support over the course of one-
year. A new pilot Accelerator program is launching this month with $15,000 
funding from the Sam Mazza Foundation. (Intersection 2015b) 
These planks appear to be so named to provide some continuity for Intersection and its 
members. The term “incubation” has referred to the fiscal sponsorship services. By 
defining it as such publicly, and limiting it to fiscal sponsorship only, Intersection will be 
able to generate income from a broader range of artists and arts organizations. The 
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“Core” program is reserved for those arts organizations that help Intersection fulfill the 
mission of community development and positive social impact central in its long history 
of service to the Bay Area and thus includes those organizations that had been part of the 
incubator program previously. Finally, the accelerator program, which is time-bound like 
business accelerator programs, will provide needed training in a more formal setting than 
was available to clients previously while generating a new stream of earned revenue.  
Case 3: Center for Cultural Innovation 
 The Center for Cultural Innovation (CCI) serves individual artists throughout 
California from their offices in Los Angeles and San Francisco. The current CEO 
describes it as “a California-based knowledge and financial services incubator for 
individual artists” (CCI, 2015a). In addition to its individual artist incubation activities, 
CCI runs a “project incubator,” a research and development unit to commission research 
and design new programs to support artists based on empirical research of artists’ needs 
within the arts ecology as described in an influential Urban Institute report that 
incentivized CCI’s founding.  
 The mission of CCI is to “ promote knowledge sharing, networking and financial 
independence for individual artists and creative entrepreneurs by providing business 
training, grants, and incubating innovative projects that create new program knowledge, 
tools and practices for artists in the field” (CCI, 2015b). 
The incubator’s beginnings 
 According to its own website, “The Center for Cultural Innovation (CCI) was 
founded in 2001 as a California 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation” (CCI, 2015b). The 
founding of the organization was incentivized, in part, by an influential study from the 
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Urban Institute conducted 2000-2003 (Jackson et al., 2003). Investing in Creativity: A 
Study of the Support Structure for U.S. Artists provided a framework for understanding 
the needs of individual artists that has six dimensions: validation, demand/market, 
material support, training and professional development, communities and networks, and 
information. Although the final report was not published until two years after CCI’s 
incorporation, its findings were disseminated to funders and other stakeholders 
throughout the research period. Interest grew among funders to implement the policy 
recommendations in the report, which include among its eight recommendations 
“strengthen artist-focused organizations…. establish broad-based networks of 
stakeholders…. strengthen the capacity of artists to advocate on their own behalf…. 
encourage changes in artists' training and professional development…. strengthen the 
awards and grants system” (Jackson, 2003, pp. 85-87). One of those funders, Cora 
Mirikitani, served as senior program director at The James Irvine Foundation in charge of 
the arts and left the foundation to become the CEO of Center for Cultural Innovation. 
Another funder remarked that “it was a big deal to have Cora say, ‘Okay, out of 
everything that I could possibly want to do for arts organizations, of which she knew 
pretty much the whole landscape as a statewide funder of the arts, she was really 
choosing to make this the focus area” (CCI Funder). 
 In response to the Urban Institute recommendations, CCI launched its first 
product in 2002, with support from the Small Business Administration. This was a 
professional development workshop descriptively titled, “Only For Artists Who Are 
Serious About The Business of Art.” As described below, CCI continues to provide arts 
business training, including publication of a book, The Business of Art, and has added to 
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its programming based on research results from the original Urban Institute report and 
more recent research commissioned by CCI and others. 
Value proposition 
 The Center for Cultural Innovation delivers its mission to individual artists in 
ways that create value systemically: “training, financial support and networking tools for 
artists throughout California, and nationally, that we believe enhance their self-
sufficiency and, collectively, address a real market need” (CCI, 2015b). But CCI also 
creates value directly for its funders by partnering with them to deliver their missions: 
“one of the major value propositions of CCI's very existence is [they] are a conduit for 
foundations to flow their resources directly to artists” (CCI Funder).   
 Beyond these transactional relationships, CCI is unique among the incubators in 
this study (and rare among them more generally) in its commitment to creating value for 
the arts ecosystem as whole both by supporting artist self sufficiency and through bi-
directional partnerships with funders: 
So we give them an outlet and we also give them innovation capital in terms of 
being a thought partner and figuring how could something like a CCI not only just 
funnel resources directly to artists, but also be a partner with funders in thinking 
about, “Well, let's look at the entirety of that ecosystem. How could support for 
artists really bolster the entirety of that system?”  So that's one proposition. 
(Funder) 
 CCI’s ecosystem support and funder mission delivery is accomplished not only 
through the direct support of artists but also through commissioned research. The purpose 
of this research is “in really evaluating and analyzing the field and identifying need” 
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(Program Director). As noted in the “Evaluation” section following, CCI uses their 
research reports in the same way they use program evaluation, to build more effective 
and efficient programs for their funding partners and the artists they serve. The research 
program is officially branded as the “CCI Project Incubator” and is described as follows: 
 The CCI Project Incubator is designed to serve as the “staging ground” to 
investigate, test or build early-phase project ideas in California that could yield 
information, tools and practices that address gaps in the current support system for 
individual artists, and may also have broader applicability to address the needs of 
artists nationally. (CCI, 2007) 
 CCI’s philosophy toward helping artists build self-sufficiency is not unlike the 
successful and highly publicized efforts of Muhummad Yunus in its support for small 
business. The organization treats each artist client as a small business. They “apply a 
micro-enterprise lens to every artist that comes in the door” (Funder). An artist client 
explains, “I think a lot of graduate programs in the past have been designed around a 
focus on crafts, and haven’t really provided the tools or the knowledge for artists to 
become successful in their careers in terms of the business side of things.” 
 Training, therefore, is an important component in supporting artist self-
sufficiency: “training was also very important because there is this idea of self-
empowerment, self-sufficiency really is about your own empowerment” (ED). The 
training was originally modeled on that provided by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA). Although CCI considers the artist clients to be small businesses, that SBA 
training “does not track well with the needs of artists because artists have the sort of 
crossover portfolio career in a way of working” (ED). After that initial foray, CCI set out 
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to build training materials from scratch that would specifically meet the needs of artists. 
An artist client explained why it is important to make available business training that is 
specifically for artists:  
I think it’s less intimidating. I think when you’re—at least for me walking in and 
not having a background in with numbers—walking into an accounting class, I was 
a little bit behind and it was a bit intimidating. And so an incubator like CCI knows 
who its audience is going to be and designed programs that they know will be able 
to learn in a better or more conducive environment. (Client) 
The training programs include the “Business of Art” series of seven workshops “that 
provides business training to individual artists covering topics such as legal issues, 
marketing and promotion, business planning” (Program Director) and the “Business of 
Art Bootcamp,” which compresses that program into an intensive two-day weekend. CCI 
also offers stand-alone workshops on topics such as negotiating contracts and time 
management. These workshops serve many more individual artists than do the full series. 
They also publish a book, Business of Art: Artist’s Guide to Profitable Self-Employment. 
 Training is one direct service to artists: re-granting is another. CCI offers a variety 
of grant programs, most of which are quite small ($500-$1000) in dollar amount. The 
grant programs include: Investing in Arts, which provides direct grants to support artistic 
production or for the purchase of equipment or tools; Next Gen Arts, which provides 
“professional development funding to emerging arts leaders in California to enroll in 
workshops, attend conferences, to work with consultants or coaches, or pursue alternative 
career enrichment activities in order to enhance the administrative skills and program 
experience needed to lead the nonprofit arts sector of tomorrow” (CCI, 2013); and Quick 
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Grants, which are small dollar grants to Los Angeles and Bay Area artists for 
professional development. The program director noted that “by providing these small 
grant programs, $500 to $1,000 to individuals, a small investment has very long legs.” 
She added that these programs were developed in part in response to the economic 
downturn of 2008. 
Incubator form and funding 
 The Center for Cultural Innovation is a 501c3 nonprofit organization governed by 
a small board of directors and with a staff of six in two offices. Unlike most other 
incubators, CCI’s business model is not membership or facility based. Rather, the “whole 
business model is predominately by being supported through private foundations…with a 
very little bit coming from earned income from our trainings, workshops, those kinds of 
contracts with schools… sales from our book, Business of Art” (Funder). Because of its 
role as a re-grantor, some refer to CCI as an “intermediary organization.” The executive 
director explained the benefits of CCI’s structure: “I think because we're not a union, 
we're not discipline-[specific], that allows us to be a little bit more nimble and more 
responsive in a way that artists recognize and benefit from more - more quickly and more 
directly” (ED). However, requirements of the grant makers, primarily geographic, have, 
according to the perceptions of one client, limited the reach of the organization’s 
services. 
 CCI has both a governing board of directors and an advisory board. The 
governing board includes people from the philanthropic community, social venture 
investing, business development, and commercial broadcasting. The larger advisory 
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board includes several well-known artists (e.g., Bill Viola, Peter Sellars), presidents of 
arts conservatories, and arts consultants. 
What is success? 
 Success, for CCI, is viewed at a program and project level, believing that if 
individual programs are successful, artists as a group will be more successful: 
CCI believes that by linking the natural creativity and tolerance for risk of artists 
and creative entrepreneurs to the latest business tools and practices, and by helping 
to connect them to new financial resources and to one another, CCI can give artists 
the knowledge and economic independence needed to bring their work and ideas 
into the marketplace, and establish a new voice for artists based on their collective 
clout. (CCI, 2013b) 
 For the project incubator, success is more clearly defined as having found an 
appropriate “long term home or ‘owner-operator’” for the experimental program or 
incubated product (CCI, 2007). 
Evaluation 
 Given its commitment to evidence-based program development, it is not 
surprising the CCI adopts a rigorous approach to evaluation. They regularly commission 
third party evaluation of their programs based on the theory of change at the program’s 
core. CCI staff use the evaluation reports for both program improvement and overall 
organizational learning. As one staff member put it, “it’s always interesting to read 
through them, because you realize how much something that may seem very obvious to 
you is, is not very obvious to some people” (Program Director). In addition to the formal 
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reporting done by evaluation consultants, CCI also invites its advisory committee 
members to provide feedback on an informal, but regular, basis (Survey response).  
 Internal evaluations as well as those commissioned from third parties look beyond 
outputs to regional outcomes and national impact. A funder praised the reporting of the 
executive director: “[her] reporting was always that, which is that output level, but also 
framing it within a larger context of what's going on in the field, both in California, both 
in the region and in California, as well as contextualize with what she knew nationally” 
(Funder). 
 It is often difficult for arts service organizations of any type to get past the output 
level of numbers of artists served to really look for positive outcomes in their clients or 
the larger community. CCI attempts to assess beyond the output level to the outcome and 
impact levels. For example, in evaluating the professional development programs, the 
evaluation measures the numbers of artists served (output), knowledge gained (outcome), 
and the tangible consequences or changed behaviors of the artists (impact). The program 
director provides examples: “some of the tangible impacts were people securing book 
deals; somebody got a solo show in New York; another got a distribution deal for their 
film.” 
 For the training programs produced by CCI itself, an onsite survey is used: 
We provide evaluations to all of the students at the end of each class. They’re 
written evaluations; pretty brief. They should take ten minutes, and we ask the 
students to basically evaluate the trainer’s presentation, the usefulness of the 
information, and then tell us any holes, or gaps, or strengths of the program so that 
we can kind of focus on those. (Program Director) 
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 CCI uses participant surveys, grant reports, focus groups, and convenings in their 
evaluations, combining quantitative data with qualitative feedback. The program director 
described the data gathering method used in the NextGen and CCI’s other professional 
development grant programs: 
We are fastidious about tracking and capturing data of our applicants in a very 
robust, rich backend that was custom built for CCI. So, we have an online 
application, and that application allows us to track and report the discipline, the 
geography, the types of activities people are applying for. We categorize the topics 
and the types of activities their price, location, things like that. And so we’re able to 
fairly quickly and accurately report on that data to our funders, which has been a 
great, useful tool. 
Consultant Harder and Company used this data to produce an extremely thorough 
evaluation for the Irvine and Hewlett foundations, which funded the “Next Generation 
Leadership Initiative” of which two of CCI’s re-granting programs are part. The goal of 
the umbrella program, which includes a networking initiative in addition to the two grant 
programs facilitated by CCI, is “to promote the leadership development of younger arts 
professionals (aged 20 to 35) in California’s arts community” (Harder & Co, 2011). The 
theory of change exemplifies the sector-wide perspective taken by CCI and its funding 
partners: 
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Figure 2. Next Gen Theory of Change. (Harder & Co, 2011, p. 4) 
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The future 
 Despite the recent retirement of its founding executive director, CCI maintains 
strong and stable relationships with its funding partners. This is due, in part, to the fact 
that a former funder and board chair has stepped into the role of interim executive 
director to provide continuity of programming. Thus, there are no wholesale 
organizational changes on the horizon for CCI. Given its organizational focus on research 
and evaluation, changes to the organization and its programs are likely to be research-
driven and evidence-based. As the program director noted, “because research is such an 
important part of our practice, I’m sure it [data] will be utilized in the future in some way 
that benefits the fields.” 
Case 4: Mighty Tieton 
 Mighty Tieton is a loose affiliation of business entities located in the small rural 
community of Tieton, Washington each of which is connected through Mighty Tieton 
LLC, owner of a renovated fruit warehouse that is home to several creative businesses 
and gallery space. It is one of the few commercial (that is, for-profit) incubator 
enterprises identified in the original typology research although it is aligned with at least 
two non-profit entities, one of which has received significant support from the National 
Endowment for the Arts.  
 The City of Tieton is located in the Yakima Valley of Washington where fruit, 
both picking and packing, is the major economic driver. In a 2009 planning meeting, one 
community member described Tieton’s location as “the end of the line; it’s not on the 
way to anywhere” (USDA, 2009, p. 8). Tieton is a community of approximately 1100 
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people, two thirds of whom identify as Hispanic/Latino.9 Twenty percent have incomes 
that fall below the poverty line, higher than the national rate of 14.5% during the same 
period. With a total of only 340 households and 20 miles from the nearest population 
center (Yakima, WA), Tieton seems an unlikely place to launch an arts incubation effort. 
The Incubator’s Beginnings  
 The story of Mighty Tieton’s beginning has been recounted many times by its 
founder, Ed Marquand, and others in both published materials and the interviews I 
conducted. Marquand and his partner, attorney Michael Longyear, consider their “main 
business and home” to be in Seattle where Marquand is an art book publisher. For some 
time they also owned a cabin within a long bike’s ride of Tieton, a detail that impacts the 
location of the Mighty Tieton Warehouse and attendant programs. Marquand was on such 
a long bike ride when he followed a road sign to Tieton. Behind what is now Tieton 
Lofts, Marquand got entangled in some goathead thorns behind one of two unused fruit 
warehouses and spent the afternoon in Tieton repairing the damage. He recounts what 
happened next: 
I just thought, “Gee, I wonder what artisan designer friends could do with this 
space.” . . . . My designer and artist friends who came over with me would sit in the 
park. We’d look at the spaces. We’d try to imagine the possibilities. Essentially we 
played like a little game of monopoly every time we got together, if we could buy 
this storefront and that warehouse or that church and this former grocery store, what 
could be done with those properties. By the end of the summer of 2005 we had 
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  Descriptive statistics in this section are sourced from American Community Survey 
2013, accessed from census.gov	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decided, okay, let’s actually make a move on some of these properties, with the idea 
that we would create an incubator for artisan businesses. So, 2005 we bought two of 
the warehouses. We [also] bought this space, which is now my studio, Paper 
Hammer Studio. We then decided that we would take one of the—one of the two 
warehouses and convert it into condominium lofts. (Founder) 
 
 From this excerpt, the impetus for founding Mighty Tieton as a real estate 
enterprise rather than an arts incubator emerges; the impetus is Kirznerian in both its 
motivations and materialization as an act of discovery. Marquand and Longyear bought a 
total of nine properties in the City of Tieton. Kerry Quint, who had attended art school 
with Marquand, was recruited to manage the renovation and construction of what would 
become Tieton Lofts. He eventually permanently relocated from Seattle to Tieton with 
his wife, Karen Quint, founder of Goat Head Press, now one of the Mighty Tieton 
Warehouse (the “incubator”) resident enterprises. Kerry Quint went on to chair the Tieton 
Economic Development Commission.  
 The second warehouse was more lightly renovated and is the home of several 
artisan businesses (including at least two owned by Marquand and Longyear). If “Mighty 
Tieton Arts Incubator” has a physical locus, it is in this second building, the Mighty 
Tieton Warehouse. However, several businesses that are not located there, including El 
Nido Cabins and Tieton Ciderworks, are considered to have been “birthed” in part 
through their Mighty Tieton affiliation.  
 My observation during a two-day visit to the City of Tieton is that there are two 
separate and distinct “cultures.” The first, which existed before 2005, is grounded in the 
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largely Hispanic working class population. The second was largely imported from Seattle 
by the incubator founder who shared his rationale: “my idea of coming here was in a way 
similar to the way that artisan designers move into distressed neighborhoods in urban 
areas, revitalize them and turn them around so they become more viable economic… 
neighborhoods” (Founder).  
 On my second night in Tieton, after spending a full day with the founder and 
several loft and incubator residents, attending an opening in the gallery space, and eating 
a communal meal with the mostly Seattle-based artists who were visiting for the opening, 
I heard Mariachi music playing as I walked back to my cabin. Half a block away, there 
was a large party in the backyard of a home. A fully costumed Mariachi band was 
playing and people were dancing. I later asked the city’s mayor to comment on the 
contrast between the two parties and whether or not there was a connection between the 
cultural events I observed at the warehouse and the backyard. “Not really,” he responded. 
He continued, “No, they have their own culture; they’re big on family.” Mighty Tieton 
produces a couple of events that its staff say are intended to bridge the two cultures, 
specifically “Community Days” and a poetry festival but the mayor’s comments affirmed 
my own observation, that the Hispanic and non-Hispanic cultures do not mix, except 
during the Community Days event: 
There are locals that are pretty well off, so they – they go to a lot of these events 
[art events at the Mighty Tieton Warehouse]. You know, because you have a lot of 
orchard owners and some of the older citizens. They enjoy these events. 
Do you see the more the working class population, the significantly Latino 
population attending these events? 
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Not too much. You do get a few, but not all that many. So it’s most of them are 
working class and they have12 hour days, so…Seven days a week. So they just 
don’t get that involved in what’s going on. Because they’re big on family, and 
that’s where free time – that’s pretty much where they spend their free time. 
(Mayor) 
It would be too much of a digression here to address the inherent inequity implied by the 
mayor’s comments between the value placed on the imported urban cultural events and 
the endogenous cultural events exemplified by the Mariachi performance, but I could not 
let it go unnoted. 
 The cultural division is noteworthy for the current research because it provides 
some context for establishment of Tieton Mosaic, a subsidiary of the nonprofit Tieton 
Arts and Humanities, affiliated with Mighty Tieton through its founder, Michael 
Longyear (Ed Marquand’s partner and co-owner of Mighty Tieton Warehouse). Tieton 
Mosaic was the recipient of a creative placemaking grant from the National Endowment 
for the Arts “Our Town” program. Through this program, “Local residents will be 
selected and trained as apprentices to produce and install mosaic signs and designs on 
public buildings and civic spaces. The project will establish a bold visual identity for the 
city and an artisan training program for residents to acquire skills in mosaic making” 
(NEA, 2013). While not part of the commercial Mighty Tieton Warehouse, the founding 
of Tieton Arts and Humanities and Tieton Mosaic illustrate the complex, multi-entity 
presence that Marquand and Longyear have established in this small rural community. 
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Value Proposition 
 Mighty Tieton’s value proposition may be best expressed by the founder’s own 
summary: “They would not have started without Mighty Tieton.” Mighty Tieton does not 
provide business services, formal training, or subsidized rent in the warehouse space to 
new ventures but has provided the opportunity for artisan enterprises (e.g., Goat Head 
Press) or artist-owned businesses (e.g., El Nido Cabins) to locate in Tieton.  
 Although delivered informally, Mighty Tieton’s founders do provide business-
planning advice to the other entities in the town. Using Osterwalder, Pigneur and Clark’s 
(2010) business model canvas, the founder works with the artisan entrepreneurs to “suss 
out whether something is going to make sense or not.” They also use business planning as 
a means to screen potential enterprise partners:  
The filter that we have applied to other entrepreneurs isn’t formal or rigorous, but 
it’s the most effective way that we’ve screened out people who have come to us 
with business ideas that just didn’t work out: asking them to write a one-page 
description of their business plan. Too high a barrier. If they can’t do that,  
I’m not gonna have coffee with them. 
 
 Another element of the value proposition is “Mighty Tieton” as a brand. The 
founder indicated that his endorsement under the “Mighty Tieton” label has had some 
weight and subsequently a positive impact on enterprises such as Tieton Ciderworks. The 
founder likened the work he does through Mighty Tieton to a Chamber of Commerce, 
connecting businesses to other businesses for the benefit of all. An affiliated enterprise 
owner characterized this activity as “they are just really good at talking to all different 
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kinds of people” (Enterprise partner). The economic development chair also mentioned 
the founder’s marketing communication skills as being of value across the network of 
affiliated entitities: “Ed's a salesman. He sells. That’s what he does, and so he sells this 
idea to people” (EDC chair). That idea, according to the founder is “that here are 
successful businesses that have established themselves here collectively in the most 
informal way” (Founder).  
 Despite the observed demographic divisions in the community, Mighty Tieton 
does provide some value to the community as a whole. Several of the people involved 
with Mighty Tieton used “symbiotic” or “symbiosis” to describe the relationship between 
the business entities as well as between Mighty Tieton and the larger community. These 
relationships have yielded some measurable economic development impacts: “by creating 
new businesses in the area and employing local people, they improve the economy. And 
they create these income sources for local people” (MT Staff). Among these new jobs are 
employees of Paper Hammer Studio (owned by Marquand), employees of the production 
and fulfillment company housed in the warehouse, Tieton Productions (owned by 
Marquand and Longyear), and employees of Tieton Ciderworks, one of the loosely 
affiliated entities. Paper Hammer and the production company together employ eight to 
ten people full time. As the production facility grows, Marquand anticipates being able to 
employ one or two more local residents. 
 The Economic Development Committee chair, an incubator tenant, and an 
affiliated enterprise owner all discussed the way in which the events sponsored by 
Mighty Tieton create value by bringing people and potential customers to the small town: 
“People come from all over the place” (tenant); “They send business to us” (partner). The 
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EDC chair considers such customer development to be a goal of the enterprise: “their 
main goal was to get people over here doing things so that this idea would catch on and 
more people would invest themselves into coming over here and doing things, creative 
things.” The founder denies that community economic development is or was a goal of 
their endeavors, but acknowledges that it is a byproduct of them: 
We did not set out, and we still to this day are not setting out to be community 
developers. This is about helping creative entrepreneurs realize their dreams. 
However, it’s also… totally evident that community development grows out of that 
activity. But I don’t want it to drive that activity. I want it to be a natural byproduct 
of that activity, because I think it’s more sustainable. You know, it’s-it is-it’s jobs, 
you know, this is jobs. (Founder) 
 Ultimately, as is the case with all four of the incubators under study, the incubator 
realizes those dreams of creative entrepreneurs by lowering barriers, whether through the 
chamber-of-commerce-like networking, or a perception of reduced risk: 
Just encouraging the leaders of the city to take risks that they had neglected to take 
for 80 years. So, really huge, huge changes in - in what people were willing to do, 
because they had this leadership that stepped in and offered them kinds of support 
and said, “Hey, this could work,” or, “This is a risk that we want to take. This is a 
smart risk to take.” Whereas I think that Tieton’s general understanding of the 
world is, “Don’t take risks. Just stay where you’re at. And at least tomorrow will be 
okay.” (Staff) 
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Incubator Form and Funding 
 As noted earlier, Mighty Tieton is a “loose affiliation” of entities. Many of the 
enterprises are owned by Ed Marquand and Michael Longyear (separately or together). 
These include Might Tieton Warehouse, which can be considered the incubator space, 
Paper Hammer Studios, Mighty Tieton Construction, and Might Tieton Production, the 
fulfillment service. Mighty Tieton Lofts is the residential condominium facility adjacent 
to the warehouse/incubator.  
 Mighty Tieton Production is the main financial driver of the network. The 
company provides production services (i.e., light manufacturing) for start-up creative 
enterprises based in Seattle. At the time of my visit, the company was producing hand-
made luminaires for Graypants10, a product design firm. The founder described the 
business idea thus: 
The Seattle maker spaces are full of people who are coming up with really 
interesting products; some of them are going to catch. Those are the ones who are 
going to run out of production space. Transfer that production here. We’ll set it up. 
You can spend as much time—you can set it up or we can set it up. But let’s do 
that. And bang….After much thrashing around, the formula that is snapping into 
place now is clearly our future: Which is reaching out to these production 
companies that really can’t grow as fast as they could grow without our support. 
And to the core I believe there are many of those businesses out there, and through 
Gray Pants and through some of the other entities, they’re accessible. (Founder) 
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 Although most arts incubators – most business incubators – are nonprofit 
organizations or government or university affiliates, Mighty Tieton’s founder had no 
intention of setting up a nonprofit arts organization: 
We wanted to be for-profit, as much as anything because we didn’t have a very 
clear mission of the end result. We needed to be very nimble. We were outsiders 
and we wanted people in the area to feel that we were business colleagues, not 
carpet-bagging, nonprofit, arty types from Seattle. We wanted to be seen as 
colleagues rather than be viewed as people who are trying to take money away from 
the cultural institutions that were already here. (Founder) 
 In addition to the revenue generated by Mighty Tieton Production, the warehouse 
tenants, most notably Goat Head Press, pay rent to Mighty Tieton Warehouse and 
contribute to the upkeep and maintenance of the facility. Theirs is not below-market 
subsidized rent that one might find in a nonprofit arts or business incubator, but market-
value rent that generates revenue for the facility. In turn, the tenant provides artistic 
opportunities for printmakers throughout the region, operating on a business model of 
membership and program fees. Mighty Tieton Events is another separate for-profit entity 
that generates revenue back to its owners, Marquand and Longyear. Founder Marquand 
was quick to point out that none of the Tieton enterprises were his main source of 
income, however: “it’s not what I depend on for my main income. Fortunately, you 
know, I have the other business, but it is generating revenue for me to gradually fix up 
and turn that building into an even better facility and an even more attractive space for 
light manufacturing.” 
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What is Success? 
 The for-profit model understandably shifts the goals and the success metrics of 
the incubator away from artistic production and toward capital production or wealth 
generation. Success markers include breaking even (if not making a profit), longevity of 
the enterprises and, seemingly, the ability for everyone to get along amicably – including 
the two “halves” of Tieton: the influx of creative enterprisers and the long-term farm 
worker residents. A staff member indicated that the enterprise(s) have been very 
successful, but not in a traditional way: “I think that they’re very successful in everything 
that they create. But what they create doesn’t have a focus that a normal business model 
would. You know, it [a singular goal] would just be a given in a normal business model” 
(MT Staff).  
 The mayor feels that the influx of new people is a marker of a kind of success, 
especially as there has also been an increase in involvement by local community 
members. He noted that an echo effect is starting to be felt with several new businesses 
moving into the town (Nolan and Sons, a fruit packing equipment manufacturer, and 
Bootleggers, a café). My observation, however, is that there are still many vacant 
buildings along the town’s main square. 
Evaluation 
 Given Mighty Tieton’s structure as a loose affiliation of enterprises, it is not 
surprising that there is no formal means of evaluation in place. A staff member noted that 
tax filing requirements have created a de facto evaluation of the fiscal health of the 
enterprises. The founder described the fiscal review in less formal terms: “It really comes 
down to do we squirm when we get the bills at the end of the month?  How much do we 
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have to defer payment or kind of fiddle faddle the money around to pay everybody on 
time and to keep the insurance bills paid and the water bill paid and all that stuff” 
(Founder). Marquand and Longyear hired a consultant in 2011 to assess the business 
strengths and weaknesses of the various entities. This assessment was not shared with me 
or with the staff or enterprise partners, but it was shortly thereafter that Might Tieton 
Production began its current growth trajectory. 
 Both the Mayor and the EDC chair look at job growth as a means of evaluating 
the success of the various endeavors. That too is done informally, a method made 
possible by the small size of the town.  
 The last informal evaluation metric that seems to be notable to the key incubator 
stakeholders is recognition. A former staff member noted, “we’re generating so much 
interest and participation in the few short years that we’ve been running our events, it’s 
pretty remarkable” (MT staff). She went on to explain, “other ways that Mighty Tieton 
more broadly assesses itself would be sort of the glitz and glamour. Like, how many - 
how many Seattle-based arts groups are interested in working with us?  How many 
national groups are coming to visit us?” 
 Overall, the stakeholders implied that if the books are balanced on the various 
entities, people show up for the community events, and a handful of new jobs are created 
then a more formal evaluation is unnecessary. In the absence of over-arching economic, 
artistic, or community development goals, formal evaluation of the overall endeavor 
would be difficult, although evaluation of its various pieces and programs would be 
possible. 
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The Future 
 Mighty Tieton Production is continuing to grow. Marquand expressed an interest 
in attracting an artisan culinary business (restaurant or shop) to the town that would help 
make it more attractive as a destination. The nonprofit Tieton Arts and Humanities was 
slated to spinoff Tieton Mosaic as a for-profit enterprise, and that may still happen. At the 
time of this writing, Tieton Mosaic was still operating on a workforce development 
model in which a small number of people could receive on-the-job training in artisan 
mosaic sign production. Since my site visit, one new enterprise, Tieton Works11, has been 
added to the Mighty Tieton affiliates.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  According to its website, Tieton Works “creates t-shirts, posters and other products to 
promote a connection between art and the outdoors,” with production facilities at the 
Mighty Tieton Warehouse.	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6. CROSS CASE ANALYSIS 
 Arts incubators provide services to artists, arts organizations, and creative 
enterprises. The value the incubators create is not in the services delivered per se, but 
rather in the effect such services have to lower barriers, convey legitimacy, cushion 
risk, and, in some cases, enhance self-sufficiency. Given the range of their client and 
community stakeholders, organizational structures, geography, and strategic 
priorities, the four incubators under consideration typify such organizations and 
programs nationwide. These incubators share some common characteristics. In all 
cases, incubators play some part in lowering barriers to entrepreneurial action, 
helping their clients directly or indirectly to connect their means with desirable ends.  
Differences are observed in strategic priorities and organizational culture. These 
differences are evidenced in the ways the organizations evaluate their success and that 
of their clients, although there are also similarities there, especially in that, for the 
most part, evaluation occurs at the client level, rather than the program or 
organization level.  
 Themes and characteristics that arise from a look across all four cases include: 
arts incubators are in a state of change; arts incubator affiliation provides a “stamp of 
approval”; arts incubators provide a risk safety net; arts incubators strive to support 
self-sufficiency of artists or client groups; success is defined and measured locally; 
and evaluation is considered to be important but implemented inconsistently. This 
chapter looks across these four cases to draw conclusions about arts incubators as 
organizations, how they create value, and whether and how they evaluate their 
success at doing so. 
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Organizational implications 
Strategic priorities 
Table 3 provides a snapshot of strategic priorities across the four organizations drawn 
verbatim from the interviews conducted and other primary documents, organized 
thematically. The three nonprofit organizations share several priorities: positive 
community impact; a commitment to artists living and working in the community; 
and a focus on their programming, whether the core programming be space and 
services, fiscal sponsorship, or program development. Mighty Tieton is somewhat of 
an outlier for its focus on job creation and business development, but it is an outlier in 
the universe of arts incubators generally for being a for-profit hybrid enterprise in an 
overwhelmingly nonprofit area of activity. I note that Arlington’s incoming director 
shares some of Mighty Tieton’s economic development and job creation priorities. 
Her view is prospective and will drive the organization’s decision making in the 
future; such priorities did not influence program activities significantly up until this 
time. Securing funding is a priority for all of the organizations, but even for the for-
profit Mighty Tieton, it is a means to the organization’s larger ends, not an end in 
itself.  
 The three nonprofit incubators share an interest in supporting the arts “ecology” in 
their communities, an interest in creating an environment where artists will want to 
both work and live. Mighty Tieton’s goals are less altruistic, but it is still interested in 
building a community where creative small businesses (which may or may not be 
artist-owned) may want to locate. The three facility-oriented incubators (Arlington, 
Intersection, and Mighty Tieton) share an interest in the production and/or exhibition 
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Table 3. Strategic priorities of four arts incubators as articulated by stakeholders. 
1. Arlington 2. Intersection 3. CCI 4. Mighty Tieton 
Community impact Give back to the 
community 
Focus our efforts 
on getting to know 
the community we 
serve and 
responding to their 
needs 
We did not set out, 
and we still to this 
day are not setting 
out to be 
community 
developers 
Performance 
[artistic 
production] 
Hub for all sorts of 
exciting, different 
types of arts-
focused w 
 More programming 
and much less 
administrative 
work  
Keep artists living 
and working in our 
community, 
A sustainable arts 
community in the 
Bay Area. 
How the city and 
Silicon Valley 
might become 
more artist talent-
friendly 
attract other people 
who could look at 
some of the other 
available spaces in 
town and replicate 
our model, creating 
businesses 
Give people the 
opportunity for 
artistic expression 
 Make artists more 
sustainable and 
self-sufficient 
 
Create a vibrant 
place to where 
people want to live, 
that feels full and 
engaging and 
exciting 
   
Space and services 
ingrained in the 
culture 
Fiscal sponsorship  Incubator is where 
the standing 
programs have 
developed 
 
 Organizational 
stability / incubator 
program itself as a 
revenue generator 
Increase available 
sources of - of 
funding 
Once the numbers 
make sense then 
you can achieve 
more faster; it’s not 
about making a 
bunch of money  
Economic 
development 
  Make the 
warehouses and the 
spaces that we have 
totally sustainable, 
financially healthy, 
productive... 
Job creation   This is jobs 
Enterprise 
creation/world 
class arts 
institutions 
Program growth  This is about 
helping creative 
entrepreneurs 
realize their dreams 
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of work and such is core to their missions. Table 3 provides a summary of these 
strategic priorities. 
Leadership and organizational change 
 Three of the four incubators are in the midst of a leadership transition and period 
of organizational change at the time of this writing. An examination of the launch of 
the four programs indicates that having a strong visionary leader at the helm 
supported the early success of the programs and their sustainability, but a leadership 
vacuum can result in tumult within the organization, as both Arlington and 
Intersection experience differing negative consequences following the departure of a 
long-serving leader. In Arlington’s case, Norma Caplan’s departure left the program 
in a static situation in which the dedicated staff maintained programs but did not grow 
or evolve them. This led to what the new agency director described as a “leadership 
vacuum” in which the six resident client organizations began to feel “ownership” over 
the space, making change even more challenging than it might otherwise be. In the 
case of Intersection for the Arts, the long-time leader’s departure led to the 
company’s fiscal crisis because she had seemingly prioritized restricted endowment 
funding over funding for operations. The new ED (and former program director for 
the incubator program) explained the situation: “there was one point … where I went 
into the bookkeeper, and there was only $50.00 operating cash.  We had millions in 
the bank, none of which we could touch.” 
 The lose affiliation that is Mighty Tieton has a strong visionary leader at its 
center. While much of the incubation and business development activities of Mighty 
Tieton are accomplished informally, they all circulate around founder Ed Marquand 
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and, to a lesser extent, his partner Michael Longyear. If Marquand were to depart the 
area, the enterprises in the affiliation may not choose to remain affiliated with one 
another, as the value created for them flows through the one specific person without 
an organizational structure or organizational culture to sustain their relationship.  
 Center for Cultural Innovation serves as a counter example to the other three 
programs both for its execution of a smooth leadership transition and the development 
of an organizational culture built on organizational learning. Cora Mirakitani was the 
founding director of CCI, an organization launched in response to evidence-based 
policy recommendations and perceived need. When she decided to step down 13 
years later, a member of the organization’s board of directors, who herself has a long 
resume of arts funding experience, stepped in as interim director. There was no period 
during which CCI was without leadership; the interim leader, having been a long-
serving board member and intimately familiar with the California arts ecology, was 
able to ease into the position. She has subsequently accepted the position on a 
permanent rather than interim basis.  
Organizational learning culture 
 As described in the individual case, CCI designs its programs based on evidence 
of current need and past impact. The organization is responsive to evaluation 
undertaken internally, by consultants, and by its funders in a process of ongoing 
organizational learning. In their classic work on the subject, Levitt and March assert, 
“organizations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history into routines 
that guide behavior.” They go on to explain, “Routines are independent of the 
individual actors who execute them and are capable of surviving considerable 
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turnover in individual actors” (1988,	  p.	  320). What is routine at CCI is the use not 
only of the “inferences” of history, but the formal evaluation of that history being 
used to inform new routines. At Arlington, conversely, the routines themselves have 
become embedded, but those routines have not “adapt[ed] to experience 
incrementally in response to feedback about outcomes,” (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 
320) at least not yet in a substantive way.  
 Mighty Tieton seems to possess a culture of organizational learning, although it is 
learning derived from a different source: direct experience. The strategic decision to 
focus on production services for small creative businesses exemplifies a way in which 
the organization adapted its routines based on learning from direct experience -- by 
doing. Simultaneously, the telling and re-telling of Marquand’s “discovery” of Tieton 
while on a bike ride supports organizational memory and creates a mythic frame that 
will influence future learning. 
Value Creation: Why Firms Form in Incubators 
 Looking across the four cases, we begin to see the actualization to greater or 
lesser degrees of the various theories of firm formation discussed in Chapter 3 as 
small enterprises and individual artists behaving like small enterprises enter and 
develop within the incubator programs. Reduction in transaction costs, per Coase 
(e.g., 1937), and Grant’s (1996) knowledge-based theory of the firm are most 
obviously evidenced across the various ways that value is created by the incubators 
for their clients.  
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Lowering barriers 
 Barriers to both market entry and market sustainability are lowered most 
obviously and directly by the granting or re-granting of financial resources, space, 
and services.  The services provided by Intersection’s bookkeeping or Arlington’s 
production support are at costs to the client organizations that are significantly 
reduced by the incubator, costs that would be insurmountable to a new organization 
entering the market independently. A client sums it up: “we couldn’t have made it 
without Arlington’s support . . .	  the idea that a young organization looking to get up 
and running doesn’t have to commit to a rent for performance space is utterly 
revolutionary ” (Arlington Client 2). 
 Reducing the transaction costs of doing business is another important means by 
which barriers are lowered. One of Intersection’s clients, for example, noted that the 
fiscal sponsorship program, which eliminates the cost of having to incorporate as an 
independent 501c3 organization, provides the client organizations with time at the 
beginning of their development to find out what organizational structures and 
programming will work or not work for the organization at the time of market entry. 
Another of their clients also puts a high value on the elimination of the cost of 
incorporating: “every time I think about getting our own 501c3, which we certainly 
are in line to probably be doing, I’m like…—it’s worth 8 percent to me” (Intersection 
Client 1). An Arlington client has a similar appreciation, “there’s this whole level of 
bureaucracy that they help facilitate” (Arlington Client 2). 
 For individual artists, a client of CCI explained that the Creative Capacity Grant 
he received is what enabled him to attend a professional development workshop on 
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learning skills to become an entrepreneurial artist, lowering the barrier to a workshop 
that will in turn provide the knowledge needed to enter the market effectively as a 
sole proprietor. Such dissemination of knowledge to the incubator clients is another 
way in which barriers to entry are lowered. This is particularly true for CCI’s 
individual artist clients working as sole proprietors. A client explained, “their goal is 
to really provide knowledge to artists, on how they can be more successful on the 
business side of things” (CCI Client 1). By gaining both explicit and tacit knowledge 
from CCI’s programs, the artists overcome the barrier of unawareness to move from 
being an artist to being an artist/entrepreneur.  
“Seal of approval” 
 Although there is a body of research showing that public support may have both a 
crowding in and a crowding out effect on other funding (e.g., Brooks 2000; LeClair 
and Watts, 2013), incubator clients perceive the echo affect of incubator support as 
positive, as another means to lower barriers. An Arlington client notes that the 
incubator affiliation provides a “seal of approval for foundation money and other 
corporate corporations” (Arlington Client 2). 
 The Mighty Tieton affiliation (or “seal of approval”) has reduced marketing 
transaction costs for affiliated organizations. One enterprise partner put it bluntly: 
“they send business to us” while a tenant notes, “we had a great response from people 
in Yakima. When we have workshops, people come from all over the place” (MT 
Tenant). 
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 The incubator “seal of approval” also facilitates knowledge sharing via the 
networking opportunities it provides: “They could learn from me, and I could learn 
from them [other incubator clients] in totally different ways” (Intersection Client 1). 
Risk “safety net” and organizational sustainability 
 Incubators cushion risk (financial or otherwise) at a specific point in time, often at 
the point of market entry. One client explains, “it really helps us focus more on 
building the organization [rather] than worrying about that part of it” (Intersection 
Client 2). However, in some cases (Arlington Arts and to a lesser extent Intersection) 
the incubator does not just reduce risk, but removes it, making the subsequent actions 
on the part of individuals or organizations less entrepreneurial and more managerial.  
 As noted earlier, by absorbing some of the financial risk, the incubator clients 
have greater capacity to take artistic risks. To put this in the theoretical framework 
delineated in Chapter 3, incubator affiliation enables client organizations to more 
efficiently convert their existing means into cultural capital and aesthetic products 
that form the basis for a sustainable culture. We see this phenomenon across all four 
incubators under study. In some cases, the incubator enables organizations not just to 
enact this process of converting means to ends more efficiently, but to do so at all.  
Self-sufficiency and sustainability 
 In the cases of both Intersection and CCI, knowledge is viewed as a means toward 
self-sufficiency and sustainability. Intersection’s ED explains, “we work with them 
on the underlying basic business principles that are needed to have a sustainable art 
practice.” In both the Arlington and Intersection incubators, the space and services 
provided have enabled the sustainability of its client organizations over time. While 
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this has been good for the individual clients, the space limitations of the ongoing 
relationship has limited program access for new arts organizations, most acutely in 
the Arlington program.  
 Enhanced knowledge has the potential to enable individual artists and arts 
organizations to make more productive decisions artistically and organizationally, 
realizing in part Cyert and March’s behavioral theory of firm formation.  One 
Intersection client explains, “he [the staff mentor] had some very helpful suggestions 
on what to do and how to make it a little more effective” (Intersection Client 2). Only 
one interviewee explicitly addressed organizational decision-making and she did so in 
a way that implied that the regulatory environment made decision-making a slow, if 
not ineffective, process. Incubators may be able to play a role in helping its member 
organizations navigate the regulatory landscape to help them make decisions. 
Although it does not meet the definition of an “arts incubator” used in this study, 
Revolve Detroit publishes a guidebook that does just that. Their resource provides 
“checklists, flow-charts, contact lists, permits. . . to help stakeholders work together 
and take action” (Revolve Detroit, 2015).  
 The CCI Program Director speaks about the impact of the program in terms that 
reflect both the knowledge and behavior theories of the firm: “based on the 
knowledge that they gained to then see the actual tangible consequences of their 
changed behaviors within their practice to support their careers.” In this case, 
knowledge leads to changed behaviors that support the advancement and 
sustainability of artist sole proprietors. She continues, “they can use that knowledge 
to leverage new opportunities; that’s theirs now.” 
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Evaluation  
 Business incubator evaluation tends to focus on the assessment of firms within 
incubators rather than on the incubators themselves (see Mian, 2014). The same 
appears to be true of arts incubators. In general, evaluation processes occur at the 
client level, where the success of the incubator is measured by the success of its 
clients rather than at the level of the incubator programs or in relation to their 
strategic goals. This aligns with the findings of the pilot study of university-based arts 
venture incubators, in which most study participants focused on evaluation as a 
process for admitting student clients into the program and assessing individual 
student learning rather than on broader outcomes (see Essig, 2014c). At least one 
incubator director recognizes that output evaluation without process evaluation is 
potentially problematic: “It’s tended just to be a machine that just is self-perpetuated, 
with never any analysis of the parts” (Intersection ED). 
Metrics 
 Business incubation evaluation tends to focus on performance outcome measures 
such as revenue earned and jobs created by client firms. Both of these metrics play 
some part in the evaluation of arts incubator clients as well. The business models of 
Arlington Arts and Intersection rely on a percentage of revenue earned by client 
organizations, so there is a very direct relationship between client revenue earned and 
incubator success. 
 Earned revenue is affected by the “numbers served,” one output measure that is 
employed at both the client and the incubator level. The three nonprofit incubators 
each look at the number of clients served as a measure of their reach, if not their 
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impact, and from there, both Arlington and Intersection look at the numbers of 
community members served by each of the clients as a measure of incubator impact, 
in a relationship illustrated in Figure 3. Given this relationship, the intention of the 
incoming Arlington Director of Cultural Affairs to foster a “growth mindset” may 
lead not only to a positive business trajectory for client firms, but also to greater 
community impact. 
 
Figure 3. Community members served is a function of number of incubator clients 
 Both CCI and, to a lesser extant, Mighty Tieton, look to client enterprise 
sustainability as evaluation metrics, whether measured informally as in the case of 
Mighty Tieton, or formally at CCI. In the latter case, client grant reports are the 
primary source of data used for evaluating the impact of programs on client 
sustainability. For Mighty Tieton, enterprise longevity, both of those enterprises 
Incubator	  1	  
Client	  1	   community	  member	  1	  commnity	  member...n	  
Client	  2	   community	  member	  1	  communit	  member...n	  
Client...n	   community	  member	  1	  community	  member...n	  
Incubator	  2	  
Client	  1	   community	  member	  1	  commnity	  member...n	  
Client	  2	   community	  member	  1	  communit	  member...n	  
Client...n	   community	  member	  1	  community	  member...n	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owned by the founders and those in the affiliation, are metrics for informal 
evaluation. 
Local versus global success 
 Each of the incubators seem to define success at different geographic or sector-
wide levels. Arlington Incubator, being a program of a county agency is 
understandably the most locally-focused of the four programs under study. One client 
explained the perspective: “I do see the value of creating an arts environment where 
small, interesting things happen. And that’s what I think should be the metric of 
success for the county” (Arlington Client 2). Even under the new agency director, the 
focus of the programs, even if they grow, is likely to remain geographically local, 
especially given the county-level economic development focus of the parent agency. 
Intersection likewise defines success locally via its clients: “you have to define 
success individually. The program as a whole is going to be made up of the sum of its 
parts, in terms of evaluating success” (Intersection ED). Although Intersection’s 
success is viewed through the lens of its clients, a few of those clients serve 
communities that are international, extending the influence of the work. 
 Mighty Tieton looks to regional or even national recognition as a measure of 
success, even for activities that occur at a local level:  “How many national groups are 
coming to visit us, like the Kresge Foundation or the Educational Foundation of 
America.” (MT Staff). Finally, CCI defines it success in terms of the arts sector as a 
whole: “Cora's reporting was always that output level but also framing it within a 
larger context of what's going on in the field, both in California, both in the region 
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and in California, as well as [to] contextualize it with what she knew nationally” (CCI 
Funder). 
Aligning evaluation with strategic goals  
  All four organizations of interest have articulated, to a greater or lesser degree, 
goals related to creating a supportive environment for artists and a vibrant community 
(cf. Table 3). In their evaluation processes, however, assessment occurs at the 
individual client level rather than at the community level or even, in most cases, the 
organizational level. Client interviews conducted as part of this research indicate that 
the incubator programs do have a positive effect on the climate for artist or artist-
owned business, often through some version of “we wouldn’t be here without them,” 
or “they make it possible to….” However, the incubators themselves are not assessing 
that outcome directly.  
 “Community vibrancy” is likewise under-measured, but the difficulty of 
measuring the effects of art organizations on community vibrancy is a challenge 
across the entire sector in this age of creative placemaking as it is an outcome that is 
malleable and open to interpretation (Gadwa Nicodemus, 2013, p. 214). Thus, the 
measurement of community vibrancy – or even the development of methodology to 
measure it -- may be better undertaken by funders or other stakeholders in the larger 
arts ecology, such as the Urban Institute, rather than individual organizations. Despite 
the sector’s inability to show a causal link between arts incubators and community 
vibrancy, in recommending that Washington County, MD develop an arts incubator 
in downtown Hagerstown, Sage Policy Group asserts “Sage found that arts incubators 
are often very successful at attracting and assisting artists. The presence of artists not 
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only attracts visitors, but also leads to business formation, greater demand for real 
estate and a general sense of community vibrancy” (2012, p. 34). They base their 
recommendations on ten-year-old materials published by the two examples they cite, 
one of which is Arlington Arts Incubator, rather than any causal evidence. Ironically, 
perhaps, it is the staff of Mighty Tieton, the only commercial incubator and the only 
one not to avow a community development goal, that articulated evidence of an 
incubator’s impact on community vibrancy, in their case via media interest and 
growing attendance at community-wide events, that is, not the numbers served but 
rather the change in participation over time. 
Situating evaluation in a policy framework 
 In Chapter 3, Schneider and Ingram’s (1997) model of the social construction of 
policy targets was used to show how artists had been viewed as potentially “deviant” 
in the years following the culture wars. By constructing artists as creative 
entrepreneurs – as individuals forming firms in order to produce their work, they 
move into the positively constructed area between the powerful and the powerless, as 
indicated in Figure 4.  
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Table 4. Social construction of creative entrepreneurs as policy targets 
Schneider and Ingram assert that policies that focus on targets in this group are designed 
to build capacity or provide inducement to action. The capacity building tools they cite as 
commonly used include “free information, training, and technical assistance” (p. 129), 
the very services most frequently provided by arts incubators, including the four 
incubators considered here. Interestingly, they note “Evaluations to determine the actual 
effectiveness of providing beneficial policy to advantaged groups are almost never 
stipulated” in the authorization. Thus, there is little external motivation for undertaking 
evaluation of the effectiveness of these policy tools; such motivations are generated 
internally, if at all. 
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Using evaluation for organizational learning 
 David Grant asserts, “The primary purpose of assessment is to improve 
performance” (2015, p. 27). I would add, “to improve performance in relation to 
strategic goals.” CCI seems to be the only incubator in the sample that uses formative 
assessment to support organizational learning and improve decision-making. Describing 
the formative comments she receives, the CCI Program Director noted, “it’s great 
feedback for us, and it really helps us make better decisions.” She also thoughtfully 
described how they implement evaluative recommendations from their clients into their 
programs. None of the other three have been implementing either formative evaluations 
or process evaluations. However, given Intersection’s recent restructuring and 
commitment to change and the new leadership at Arlington Cultural Affairs – combined 
with staff dedication to strategic planning and organizational improvement – such 
evaluation and assessment processes may be implemented in the near future. In the 
concluding chapter, I offer some recommendations for how to do just that.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 When this research began as the financial crisis was waning in 2012, it appeared 
as though arts incubators were on the verge of becoming a national phenomenon that 
could meet both artistic and economic development goals simultaneously. Policymakers 
expressed strong interest in the phenomenon: during those years I presented on the topic 
to the Western State Arts Federation and twice briefed senior staff of the National 
Endowment for the Arts on it. However, the post-recession surge in incubator activity 
appears to have plateaued as new programs face the same challenges of revenue 
generation faced by their clients and, perhaps, because arts incubator impacts, especially 
indirect community development impacts, are as yet unproven.  
 The questions that drive the research (Given observed differences across 
organizational forms and foci, how do arts incubators of various types create value for 
their stakeholder communities? How do arts incubators evaluate their success at creating 
that value? What is the relationship between their evaluation methods and their strategic 
priorities?) have been answered by talking with the very people who create, consume, 
and support the process of value creation in and by incubators. This research has opened 
the black box of incubator operations by peering deeply into four arts incubators of 
different types.   
 By surveying 27 arts incubators and subsequently interviewing multiple 
stakeholders and analyzing both published materials and internal reports of four of these, 
I have shown that arts incubators create value for client artists and arts organizations both 
through direct service provision and indirect echo effects but that the provision of value 
to communities or systems is attenuated and largely undocumented.  
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 Previous research purports arts incubators to be modeled after and function 
similarly to small business incubators. This does not hold true for most of the incubators 
surveyed and all four more closely examined in this study. Center for Cultural 
Innovation, for example, discovered early in the life of the organization that the 
incubation practices of the Small Business Administration do not translate directly to the 
arts context and have adapted their practices accordingly. Others, such as Arlington Arts 
Incubator, have not focused on producing the output of most business incubators, 
graduated firms. These examples evidence the unique character of the US arts and culture 
sector as differentiated from other sectors of the entrepreneurial economy in that the 
motivation for artists to undertake entrepreneurial action by entering an arts incubation 
program may be extra-economic. Arts incubators facilitate connections between artist or 
arts organization means and their ends, the creation of aesthetic products.  
 Arts incubators, like many small arts organizations, tend to look retrospectively at 
outputs rather than at the processes that convert inputs to tangible impacts, or means into 
ends. This is not an issue relegated only to the arts and culture sector; business incubators 
share some of these tendencies. Only one organization studied (Center for Cultural 
Innovation) has a formal and ongoing program of evaluation of its incubator and it does 
not address process specifically. Forty percent of the incubators surveyed (11 of 27) do 
not have a formal evaluation plan in place at all. Overall, there is less alignment between 
organizational priorities and evaluation of either processes or outcomes than is ideal. 
Often working in an external environment of economic scarcity and internal environment 
of organizational strain, evaluation may be pushed aside in favor of artistic production 
and direct client services. 
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 Despite their inconsistently documented results, arts incubators remain a 
potentially impactful tool of cultural policy if their processes and activities align with 
their strategic goals and those processes and activities are assessed formatively and 
summatively. The recommendations that follow are designed to support arts incubator 
development in the future. 
General Recommendations 
Leadership and planning 
 Looking across the four incubators in this study, it becomes obvious that strong 
leadership is an important asset. Mighty Tieton and CCI, with strong leaders providing 
strategic direction, have been consistently innovating and adapting to changing 
circumstances in order to advance their missions. One observation of interest is that there 
is not one particular leadership style that seems to benefit these organizations. Instead, 
what is important for furthering the organization’s trajectory is the leader’s ability to 
think strategically, communicate effectively with both staff and external constituencies, 
and synthesize feedback (internal and external, formal and informal) into the planning or 
change process. The need for such strategic leadership was clearly articulated by an 
Arlington Arts staff member: 
I just feel as though Arlington County’s kind of all over the place. We need to 
have some central plan.  And I’m hoping that with a new director coming in that 
we will do short-term [and] long-range planning and strategic planning on exactly 
where we’re going to go. And that’s what we’ve lacked for a long time. 
(Arlington Staff 1) 
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 The appointment of new leadership to both Intersection for the Arts and Arlington 
Arts positions those organizations to stabilize in the former case or grow in the latter. 
Interviews with the new leaders indicate that they have both the willingness and capacity 
to undertake the change management necessary. In order to empower these leaders to, 
paraphrasing Kotter (1996), set a change direction and align and motivate people, their 
boards should nurture their leadership capacity and support their efforts to move their 
organizations in potentially new directions that will better enable them to meet 
organizational goals. Unfortunately, there is an observed entrenchment at Arlington Arts 
on the part of resident companies and the commissioners who advocate for them that may 
be an obstacle to advancement, at least in the short term. Conversely, Intersection for the 
Arts has undertaken a period of self-study, the results of which are already being 
synthesized into new structures for the incubator program and its parent organization. 
Graduation 
 If we are to understand arts incubators to be organizations or programs that 
provide developmental assistance to artists, arts organizations, or creative enterprises in 
early stages of development or change, then that assistance, by definition, is time-bound. 
Clients should graduate from the incubator when they have progressed beyond early stage 
development or change. “Graduation,” as the term implies, can be gradual; support need 
not be cut off abruptly. Rather, support can be delivered on a timeline that enables 
organizations or individual artists to develop according to pre-established and 
periodically modified benchmarks culminating in sustainable independent operation. 
Establishing a system that increases and then gradually decreases support provides an on-
ramp for the new (or changing) organization while also alleviating the problem identified 
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by Grodach (2011) of companies becoming “residents” rather than incubator “clients.” 
Overall impact decreases when space in a facility does not turn over periodically as firms 
graduate and move into their own spaces.  
Formative and summative assessment12  
 My primary recommendation is that arts incubators adopt an ongoing program of 
formative and summative assessment that can be used to foster organizational learning 
and lead to evidence-based decision-making. Adapting the families of variables 
advocated by Mian (2011) for the evaluation of university technology incubators, I 
suggest that arts incubators evaluate their processes, their output performance, and the 
impact of the value created in the context of their strategic priorities and organizational 
goals. Table 4 following suggests the variables that could be evaluated at the process 
level, output level, and value-added level across the strategic priorities articulated by the 
incubator stakeholders (see Table 3 in the preceding chapter). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  An excerpt of this subsection was published on creativeinfrastructure.org on September 
4, 2015 
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Community 
development 
Sustainable 
arts ecology 
(geographically 
defined) 
Artistic 
production 
Client 
independent 
sustainability 
Economic 
development 
Process 
variables 
Entry criteria 
include client 
focus on 
community 
development; 
training and 
support 
provided for 
community 
engaged 
activities 
Learning 
outcomes from 
training 
provided to 
artists and 
organizational 
leaders; 
partnerships 
with other 
organizations 
Barriers to 
artistic 
production are 
lowered by 
provision of 
facilities, 
services, and 
funding 
Training to 
support 
independent 
operation; 
benchmarks set 
for clients 
Opportunities 
provided to 
link clients 
with 
investors 
Output 
performa
nce 
variables 
Growth in 
community 
participation;  
Number of 
artists or arts 
organizations 
receiving 
capacity 
building support 
Art is created 
and/or 
presented;  
Revenue earned 
and/or granted; 
capital attracted 
by clients Jobs created 
Value -
added 
variables 
Increased foot 
traffic; 
reduction in 
vacancies 
Number of 
artists remains 
stable or grows; 
artists build 
tangible assets 
over time 
Media coverage 
and other public 
recognition of 
art produced 
within program;  
Client sustains 
operations over 
1, 3- and 5-year 
periods 
Enterprises 
launched and 
self-
sustaining 
Table 5. Alignment of evaluation variables with incubator strategic priorities 
 Process evaluation is not formally undertaken by any of the arts incubators in the 
study sample. By doing so, the organizations can assess if and how well their processes 
reflect their values in a way that will lead to desirable strategic outcomes. For example, 
CCI may want to evaluate their application processes to assess if they are equally open to 
artists of all genres, ethnicities, and California geographies. Arlington Arts can (and 
should) evaluate not only its application processes, but also the efficacy of its training for 
financial independence and sustainability, a prerequisite to a desirable outcome of 
graduating self-sustaining non-profit enterprises. All of the incubator programs can look 
to the ways in which their processes may encourage or inhibit artistic production.  
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 The output variables are the easiest to measure. Several of the arts incubators in 
the sample currently measure output variables formally and all do informally. As these 
organizations and the incubator types they represent advance, setting achievable strategic 
benchmarks for these variables will support the sustainability of both the incubators and 
their client artists and organizations.    
 Finally, the only way to really know if the incubator is creating lasting value is to 
track the value-added (or “impact”) variables over time. This requires commitment on the 
part of the organization to build evaluation processes into their operations, to gather data 
on a regular basis, subsequently analyze that data, and synthesize results. CCI’s success 
in this regard is due in part to the strong partnerships they have built with their funder 
stakeholders to support evidence-based decision making. My recommendation is that 
incubator programs – and arts services programs more generally – partner with one 
another and with funding stakeholders to track system level impacts over time. Doing so 
will most efficiently deploy the sector’s scarce resources and most effectively surface the 
impact of arts incubators on the wider arts ecology. 
Limitations of the Research 
 As is the case with all qualitative research, this study relies significantly on the 
researcher’s interpretation of the stories told to her. Although there are “facts” in each 
case derived from triangulating these stories with each other and with other documents, 
their telling is influenced not only by the teller but also by the researcher. In some cases, 
access to interview subjects also presented a limitation. For example, despite repeated 
requests and the support of the executive director, I was not able to gain access to 
interview a supporter of Intersection for the Arts. This may have been because of the 
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period of organizational turmoil that was occurring contemporaneously with my research 
or may have been due to factors completely unrelated to the organization. Fortunately, 
media coverage of the situation, which included material from such supporters, provided 
some perspective from that stakeholder group, albeit mediated.  
 The four arts incubators discussed here were purposively sampled from the self-
selected group of incubators whose directors responded to the survey of all known 
incubators to represent incubators of different types. While I endeavored to identify case 
study subjects that exemplify a range of stakeholder groups, organizational forms, and 
geographic settings, I cannot assert with certainty that the findings here are generalizable 
to the universe of arts incubators nationally. Yet, given their diversity, there are likely to 
be at least some commonalities to be found in each of the cases with other similar arts 
incubation programs.  
Future Research 
 Given that this research concludes with recommendations, future research can 
focus on the implementation of the recommendations and their efficacy in improving arts 
incubator outputs and impacts. Another question of interest that arises from a scan of 
changes to the arts incubator universe over the last several years is, “Why did these 
organizations fail?” or “Why did this organization become something other than an ‘arts 
incubator?’” In essence, “What are the internal and external forces that prevent an arts 
incubator from achieving the mission it set for itself at its founding?” 
 These questions are of interest to me as someone who has been looking deeply 
into arts incubators as organizations. However, the research surfaces some themes that 
are of broader interest, most especially the role of arts service organizations in 
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community and economic development. While direct impacts of incubators on these 
areas may as yet be unproven, I hope to have offered a window on how such 
organizations may do so, now and in the future. 
 
	  
137	  
 References 
 
Abbing, H. (2002) Why are artists poor? The exceptional economy of the arts. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.  
 
Allen, D. N., & Weinberg, M. L. (1988). State investment in business incubators. Public 
Administration Quarterly,196-215.  
 
Arlington County (1990). Appendix B. Arts 2030. Internal document.  
 
Arlington Cultural Affairs (1996). Arts incubator: Arlington, Virginia’s award winning 
model to create a vital arts presence in your community. Arlington: Arlington 
Cultural Affairs Division.  
 
Arlington Cultural Affairs (2014). About. Webpage retrieved December 30, 2014 from 
http://www.arlingtonarts.org/cultural-affairs/about.aspx 
 
Baker, T., & Nelson, R. E. (2005). Creating something from nothing: Resource 
construction through entrepreneurial bricolage. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
50(3), 329-366.  
 
Bearse, P. (1998). A question of evaluation: NBIA's impact assessment of business 
incubators. Economic Development Quarterly, 12(4), 322-333.  
 
Beckman, G. and Essig, L. (2012). Arts entrepreneurship: A conversation. Artivate: A 
Journal of Entrepreneurship in the Arts, 1(1), 1-8. 
 
Bergek, A., & Norrman, C. (2008). Incubator best practice: A framework. Technovation, 
28(1), 20-28.  
 
Bilton, C., & Leary, R. (2002). What can managers do for creativity? Brokering creativity 
in the creative industries. International journal of cultural policy, 8(1), 49-64. 
 
Blank, S. G., & Dorf, B. (2012). The startup owner's manual: The step-by-step guide for 
building a great company. Palo Alto, CA: K&S Ranch 
 
Bonin-Rodriguez, P. (2014). Performing policy: How contemporary politics and cultural 
programs redefined US artists for the twenty-first century. London:  Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Bonnafous-Boucher, M., Cuir, R, and Partouche, M. (2011). The new and the challenge 
of the market or the non-instrumental function of creation. In M. Scherdin and I. 
Zander (eds.) Art entrepreneurship (23-49). Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar. 
	  
138	  
Brooks, A. C. (2000). Is there a dark side to government support for nonprofits?. Public 
Administration Review, 211-218. 
 
Bull, I. and Willard, G.E. (1993). Towards a theory of entrepreneurship. Journal of 
Business Venturing 8, 183-195.  
 
Carayannis, E. G., & Von Zedtwitz, M. (2005). Architecting gloCal (global–local), real-
virtual incubator networks (G-RVINs) as catalysts and accelerators of 
entrepreneurship in transitioning and developing economies: Lessons learned and 
best practices from current development and business incubation practices. 
Technovation, 25(2), 95-110.  
 
Caves, R. E. (2000). Creative industries: Contracts between art and commerce. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
CCI (2007). CCI Project Incubator: Overview. Internal document. 
 
CCI (2013a). Next Gen Arts Grant Program. Accessed July 29, 2015 from 
http://www.cciarts.org/_Library/docs/NextGen_Guidelines_and_Appl_Prompts_-
October_2013.pdf 
CCI (2013b). The Center for Cultural Innovation Annual Report 2013. 
 
CCI (2015a). Angie Kim. Webpage accessed July 20, 2015 from 
http://www.cciarts.org/Angie_Kim.html 
 
CCI (2015b). Mission and History. Webpage accessed July 20, 2015 from 
http://www.cciarts.org/mission_history.html 
 
Cherbo, J. M., Vogel, H. L., & Wyszomirski, M. J. (2008). Toward an arts and creative 
sector. In Cherbo, Stewart, and Wyszomirski (eds), Understanding the Arts and 
Creative Sector in the United States, 9-27.  
 
Chong, D. (2009). Arts management. London: Routledge. 
 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386-405.  
 
Coase, R. H. (1988). The nature of the firm: Influence. Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization, 4(1), 33-47.  
 
Cobb, C. (2006). From fiasco to social change: The evolution of a collective for teaching 
artists. Teaching Artist Journal, 4(2), 84-91.  
 
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall. 
	  
139	  
Dees, J. G. (1996). Social enterprise spectrum: Philanthropy to commerce.Boston: 
Harvard Business School, Publishing Division. 
 
Dees, J.G. (1998) The meaning of "Social Entrepreneurship." Comments and suggestions 
contributed from the Social Entrepreneurship Funders Working Group, 6.  Ewing 
Marion Kauffman Foundation.  
 
DeGrazia, E. E. (1994). In search of artistic excellence: Structural reform of the national 
endowment for the arts. Cardozo Arts & Ent.LJ, 12, 133.  
Denhardt, R. (2008). Theories of public organization, 5e. Belmont, CA: Thomson 
Wadsworth. 
 
Di Dominico, M., Haugh, H. and Tracey, P. (2010). Social bricolage: Theorizing social 
value creation in social enterprises. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 34(4), 
681-703.  
 
DiMaggio, Paul. (1982). Cultural entrepreneurship in nineteenth-century Boston. Media, 
Culture and Society, 4, 33-50 
 
Dower, D. and Carl, P. (2011). Introduction. In D. Ragsdale In the intersection: 
Partnerships in the new play sector. A report on a meeting of US nonprofit and 
commercial theatre producers (1-2). Center for the Theater Commons, Washington 
DC. 
 
Emerging Arts Leaders, San Francisco Bay Area (2014). “in.cu.bate.” Unpublished 
transcript of focus group of arts incubator directors. 
 
Essig, L. (2014a). Arts incubators: A typology. The Journal of Arts Management, Law, 
and Society, 44(3), 169-180.  
 
Essig, L. (2014b). Ownership, failure, and experience: Goals and evaluation metrics of 
university-based arts venture incubators. Entrepreneurship Research Journal, 4(1), 
117-135.  
 
Essig, L. (2014c). Arts incubators as tools of public policy: Outputs, outcomes, and 
impact. Paper presented at the Social Theory, Politics, and Arts conference, Ottawa. 
 
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 288-307.  
Fichandler, Z. (1959) A permanent classical repertory theatre in the nation's capital. 
Unpublished report. 
	  
140	  
Fisher, G. (2012). Effectuation, causation, and bricolage: A behavioral comparison of 
emerging theories in entrepreneurship research. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 36(5), 1019-1051.  
 
Frumkin, P. (2002). On being nonprofit: A conceptual and policy primer. Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Gadwa Nicodemus, A. (2013). Fuzzy vibrancy: Creative placemaking as ascendant US 
cultural policy. Cultural Trends, 22 (3-4), 213-222. 
 
Galloway, S., & Dunlop, S. (2007). A critique of definitions of the cultural and creative 
industries in public policy. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 13(1), 17-31.  
 
Gartner, W. B. (1990). What are we talking about when we talk about entrepreneurship? 
Journal of Business Venturing, 5(1), 15-28.  
 
Garud, R., & Karnøe, P. (2003). Bricolage versus breakthrough: Distributed and 
embedded agency in technology entrepreneurship. Research Policy, 32(2), 277-300.  
 
Gerl, E. (2000) Incubating the arts: Establishing a program to help artists and arts 
organizations become viable businesses. Athens, OH: NBIA Publications. 
 
Grant, D. (2015). The social profit handbook. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishers. 
 
Grant, R. M. (1996). Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17, 109-122.  
 
Grimaldi, R., & Grandi, A. (2005). Business incubators and new venture creation: An 
assessment of incubating models. Technovation, 25(2), 111-121.  
Grodach, C. (2011). Art spaces in community and economic development: Connections 
to neighborhoods, artists, and the cultural economy. Journal of Planning Education 
and Research, 31(1), 74-85.  
 
Hackett, S. M., & Dilts, D. M. (2004). A systematic review of business incubation 
research. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 29(1), 55-82.  
 
Hansen, M. T., Chesbrough, H. W., Nohria, N., & Sull, D. N. (2000). Networked 
incubators. Harvard Business Review, 78(5), 74-84.  
 
HKU (2010). The entrepreneurial dimension of the cultural and creative industries. 
Utrecht: Hogeschool voor de Kunsten Utrecht, 
 
	  
141	  
Howkins, J. (2002). The creative economy: How people make money from ideas Penguin 
UK. 
 
Hurwitt, B. (2015, February 15). S.F.’s Intersection for the Arts sets out on new road. SF 
Gate. Accessed July 10, 2015 from http://www.sfgate.com/performance/article/S-F-
s-Intersection-for-the-Arts-sets-out-on-a-6082987.php 
 
Intersection (2014a). About Intersection for the Arts. Webpage accessed October 13, 
2014 from http://theintersection.org/about-intersection 
 
Intersection (2014b). This is Intersection. Webpage accessed October 13, 2014 from 
http://theintersection.org/about-intersection/vision-statement/ 
 
Intersection (2015a). Intersection for the Arts 50/50 Campaign. Webpage accessed July 
14, 2015 from http://theintersection.org/2015/05/intersection-for-the-arts-5050-
campaign/ 
 
Intersection (2015b). Intersection for the Arts Unveils Plans to Strengthen its Ability to 
Support Bay Area Arts. Webpage accessed July 20, 2015 from 
http://theintersection.org/2015/02/intersection-for-the-arts-unveils-plans-to-
strengthen-its-ability-to-support-bay-area-arts/ 
 
Jackson, R-M., et al. (2015). Investing in Creativity: A Study of the Support Structure for 
U.S. Artists. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
 
Kahn, M. (1995). An introduction to arts incubators. National Assembly of Local Arts 
Agencies Monographs, (4) 3, 1-15. 
 
Kaler, J. (2002). Morality and strategy in stakeholder identification. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 39(1-2), 91-100.  
 
Kirzner, I.M. (1969). Entrepreneurship and the market approach to development. 
Reprinted in Kirzner, Perception, opportunity, and profit. Chicago IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Kirzner, I.M. (1973). Competition and entrepreneurship.  Chicago IL: University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
Kirzner, I.M. (1979). Perception, opportunity, and profit. Chicago IL: University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
Kirzner, I.M. (1982). Uncertainty, discovery, and human action: A study of the 
entrepreneurial profile in the Misesian system. In I.M. Kirzner (ed) Method, 
process, and Austrian economics (139-160). Lexington MA: Lexington Books.  
	  
142	  
Kirzner, I.M. (1997). Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An 
Austrian Approach. Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1), 60-85. 
 
Kirzner, I.M. (1999) Creativity and/or alertness: A reconsideration of the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur. Journal of Austrian Economics, 11, 5-17.  
 
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1996). What firms do? Coordination, identity, and learning. 
Organization Science, 7(5), 502-518.  
 
Koppl, R. and Minniti, M. (2008). Entrepreneurship and human action. In G.E. Shockley 
and P.M. Frank (eds) Non-market entrepreneurship: Interdisciplinary approaches 
(10-27). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
Kotter, J.(1996). Leading change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press 
 
Lang Jones, J. (2012). Brown Paper Tickets gains popularity around world by taking on 
events of almost any size. Puget Sound Business Journal October 12, 2012. 
accessed November 22, 2013 from http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/print-
edition/2012/10/12/brown-paper-tickets-gains-popularity.html 
 
LeClair, M. S., & Watts, A. (2013). Charitable Contributions, Government Spending, and 
Crowding Out: A Cross-National Analysis. Proceedings of the Northeast Business 
& Economics Association. 
 
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1969). The savage mind.  Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Levitt, B., & March, J. G. (1988a). Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology, 
14, 319-340. 
  
Martin, C. (2004) Defining culture and communication for the purpose of national and 
international statistics program. Paper presented to the third international 
conference on Cultural Policy Research, 25–28 August, HEC Montreal, Montreal, 
Canada, accessed from http://neumann.hec.ca/iccpr/PDF_Texts/Martin_Claude.pdf 
 
Maticic, S. (2014). Is it worth doing? Retrieved from 
https://thp552.wordpress.com/2014/09/30/is-it-worth-doing/ 
 
McCarthy, K.F., Ondaatje, E.H., and Novak, J.L. (2007) Arts and culture in the 
metropolis: Strategies for sustainability. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
 
McMullen, J. S., & Shepherd, D. A. (2006). Entrepreneurial action and the role of 
uncertainty in the theory of the entrepreneur. Academy of Management Review, 
31(1), 132-152. 
  
	  
143	  
Mian, S. (2014). 15 business incubation and incubator mechanisms. Handbook of 
Research on Entrepreneurship: What we Know and what we Need to Know, 335. 
  
Mian, S. A. (2011). University's involvement in technology business incubation: What 
theory and practice tell us? International Journal of Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation Management, 13(2), 113-121.  
 
Montgomery, J. (2007). Creative industry business incubators and managed workspaces: 
A review of best practice. Planning, Practice & Research, 22(4), 601-617.  
 
National Business Incubator Association (2009). What is business incubation. Webpage 
accessed December 3, 2013 from https://www.nbia.org/resource_library/what_is/ 
 
National Endowment for the Arts (2013). Tieton Arts and Humanities. Accessed June 4, 
2105 from http://arts.gov/national/our-town/grantee/2013/tieton-arts-humanities. 
 
Nowick, R. (2011). Please don't start a theatre company! In E.P. Clapp (ed) 20 Under 40: 
Reinventing the arts and arts education for the 21st century (65-80). Bloomington 
IN: AuthorHouse.  
 
Nytch, J. (2012) The case of the pittsburgh new music ensemble: An illustration of 
entrepreneurial theory in an artistic setting. Artivate: A Journal of Entrepreneurship 
in the Arts 1,(1) 25-34. 
  
Oddey, A. (2013). Devising theatre: A practical and theoretical handbook Routledge. 
 
Perdomo, G., Alvarez, C., & Urbano, D. (2014). Analyzing a successful incubator 
business model: The case of barcelona activa. Strategies in E-business (pp. 39-54) 
Springer. 
 
Peters, L., Rice, M., & Sundararajan, M. (2004). The role of incubators in the 
entrepreneurial process. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 29(1), 83-91.  
 
Phillips, R. (2004). Artful business: Using the arts for community economic 
development. Community Development Journal, 39(2), 112.  
 
Phillips, R., & Shockley, G. (2010). Linking cultural capital conceptions to asset-based 
community development. Mobilizing Communities: Asset Building as a Community 
Development Strategy, , 92-111.  
 
Phillips, R. J. (2010). Arts entrepreneurship and economic development: Can every city 
be" austintatious"? towards a psychology of entrepreneurship: An action theory 
perspective. Foundations and Trends® in Entrepreneurship, 6(4), 239-313.  
 
	  
144	  
Potts, J., & Cunningham, S. (2008). Four models of the creative industries. International 
Journal of Cultural Policy, 14(3), 233-247.  
 
Preece, S.B. (2011). Performing arts entrepreneurship: Toward a research agenda. 
Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society 41, 103-120.  
 
Preece, S.B. (2013). Social bricolage in arts entrepreneurship: Building a jazz society 
from scratch. Artivate: A Journal of Entrepreneurship in the Arts, 3 (1), 23-34. 
 
Pressley, N. (September 9, 2001). Among Theaters, a Building Interest; Lost Leases 
Prompt Local Companies to Pursue Permanent Homes. Washington Post. 
 
Raffo, C., O'Connor, J., Lovatt, A., & Banks, M. (2000). Attitudes to formal business 
training and learning amongst entrepreneurs in the cultural industries: Situated 
business learning through'doing with others'. Journal of Education and Work, 13(2), 
215-230.  
 
Revolve Detroit (2015). Revolve Guidebook. Webpage. Retrieved August 16, 2015 from 
http://revolvedetroit.com/resources 
 
Sage Policy Group (2012). Developing an arts, entertainment and education cluster in 
Washington County, Maryland. Retrieved from 
http://hagerstownedc.org/sites/default/files/SAGE%20Policy%20Group%20%20FI
NAL.pdf 
 
Sarasvathy, S. D. (2001). Causation and effectuation: Toward a theoretical shift from 
economic inevitability to entrepreneurial contingency. Academy of Management 
Review, 26(2), 243-263.  
 
Sarasvathy, S. D. (2008). Effectuation: Elements of entrepreneurial expertise Edward 
Elgar Publishing. 
 
Scherdin, M. and Zander, I. (2011). Art entrepreneurship: An introduction. In M. 
Scherdin and I. Zander (eds) Art entrepreneurship (1-9). Cheltenham UK: Edward 
Elgar.  
 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1934). The theory of economic development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1942/1950). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy, 3e. New York, 
NY: Harper Perennial.  
 
Scillitoe, J. L., & Chakrabarti, A. K. (2010). The role of incubator interactions in 
assisting new ventures. Technovation, 30(3), 155-167.  
	  
145	  
Shane, S., & Venkataraman, S. (2000). The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of 
research. Academy of Management Review, 25(1), 217-226.  
 
Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative behavior; a study of decision-making processes in 
administrative organization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Spaner, W. (2015, January 27). Intersection for the arts board to vote on new direction. 
SF Gate. Accessed July 10, 2015 from  
http://www.sfgate.com/entertainment/article/Intersection-for-the-Arts-board-to-
vote-on-new-6043763.php 
 
Stern, M. J. & Siefert S.C. (2008). From creative economy to creative society. Creativity 
& Change. 
 
Swedberg, R. (2006). The cultural entrepreneur and the creative industries: Beginning in 
Vienna. Journal of Cultural Economics, 30, 243-261. 
 
Stevens, E.H. (2013). Make art make money: Lessons from Jim Henson on fueling your 
creative career. Seattle, WA: Lake Union Publishing.  
 
Tavoletti, E. (2012). Business incubators: Effective infrastructures or waste of public 
money? looking for a theoretical framework, guidelines and criteria. Journal of the 
Knowledge Economy, , 1-21.  
 
Thom, M. (2014). Incubating the fine arts: An option for fine artists to become prepared 
for success? Paper presented at IDC 2014, University of Pécs, Hungary, At Pécs, 
Hungary. 
 
Throsby, D. (2010). The economics of cultural policy Cambridge University Press. 
 
US Department of Agriculture (2014). City of Tieton Report of Community 
Revitalization Effort. 
 
Vanderstraeten, J., Matthyssens, P., & Van Witteloostuijn, A. (2012). Measuring the 
Performance of Business Incubators,  
 
Voisey, P., Gornall, L., Jones, P., & Thomas, B. (2006). The measurement of success in a 
business incubation project. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, 13(3), 454-468.  
 
Wachhaus, T. A. (2011). Governance as a framework to support informatics. Innov J, 
16(1), 1-14.  
 
Williams, R. (1981). The sociology of culture. University of Chicago Press. 
	  
146	  
Wyszomirski, M. J. (2004). Defining and developing creative sector initiatives. Creative 
Industries, A Measure for Urban Development,  
 
Ziegler, J.W.  (1973). Regional theatre: The revolutionary stage. Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press 
 
 
	  
147	  
APPENDIX A 
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Value Creation and Assessment in Arts Incubators 
Survey questions 
 
1. What is the official name of the arts incubator or incubator program? 
2. When was the arts incubator founded (year)? 
3. Has it been in continuous operation? (If not, please provide a brief explanation) 
4. What is the organizational form of the arts incubator (choose only one)? 
• 501c3 corporation 
• 501c3 Community development or economic development corporation 
• Program of a larger 501c3 corporation 
• Program of a city, county, or state arts agency 
• LLC or other for-profit corporation 
• University extension program 
• University curricular program 
• Other (please specify) 
5. Which type of client do you serve most frequently (choose the one that most 
accurately reflects the majority of your incubator service recipients): 
• Individual artists 
• Arts organizations (nonprofit) 
• Both individual artists and nonprofit arts organizations 
• Creative sector entrepreneurs  
• Community groups 
• Students or youth 
• Other (please specify) 
6. The incubator provides the following services (check all that apply) 
• Space for the development and production of artistic/creative products 
• Space for the exhibition, performance, or sale of artistic products 
• Cooperative marketing 
• Centralized business services (eg. shipping, reception, billing, accounting) 
• Business classes or business training for artists, arts organizations, or creative 
sector entrepreneurs 
• Arts business informational resources 
• Grant funding 
• Loan funding 
• Equity investment funding 
• Fiscal sponsorship 
• Other (please specify) 
7. Please indicate the percentage of incubator revenue from each of the following 
sources: 
• Grants and gifts 
a. Foundations 
b. Individual gifts 
c. Government: local 
	  
149	  
d. Government: state 
e. Government: federal 
• Earned Income 
a. Earned income from mission-based programming 
b. Earned income from auxiliary enterprises 
c. Earned income from space rental not included in the previous 
• Private investment 
8. What is the arts incubator’s value proposition? (You can understand “value 
proposition” in this context to mean the ways in which the incubator serves the 
needs of its clients, community, and other stakeholders.) 
9. How does the arts incubator evaluate its success? 
10. Are you willing to be contacted for a follow-up interview? 	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Value	  Creation	  and	  Assessment	  in	  Arts	  Incubators Semi-­‐structured	  Interview	  Questions	  	   1. How	  did	  this	  incubator	  start?	  2. From	  your	  perspective,	  what	  is	  the	  incubator’s	  value	  proposition?	  3. What	  is	  the	  governance	  structure	  of	  the	  incubator?	  4. What	  are	  the	  primary	  activities	  of	  the	  incubator?	  5. Whom	  does	  the	  incubator	  serve?	  6. How	  is	  the	  incubator	  financed?	  7. From	  your	  perspective,	  what	  are	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  incubator?	  8. How	  is	  the	  incubator	  meeting	  those	  goals?	  9. What	  effect	  has	  the	  incubator	  had	  on	  your	  work	  as	  an	  artist,	  administrator	  and/or	  community	  member?	  10. How	  does	  the	  incubator	  evaluate	  its	  programs	  and	  services?	  11. Have	  you	  participated	  in	  that	  evaluation	  and	  if	  so,	  how?	  12. 	  Have	  the	  results	  of	  that	  evaluation	  been	  shared	  with	  you?	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Needs identification 
Value Proposition 
  Business planning 
  Political alignment 
  Fiscal sponsorship 
  Empowerment 
  Opportunity 
  Seal of approval 
  Grants 
  Marketing 
  Safe place to take risks 
  Research 
  Environment for innovation 
  Financial independence 
  Investment or funding 
  Organizational development 
  Services 
  Training 
  Networking 
  Facility 
  Sustainability 
  Community 
    Cultural development 
    Belongingness 
    Community enrichment 
    Community education 
    Economic development 
    Community events 
    Customers 
  Producing art 
  Arts programming 
  Information resource 
Background info 
Eco-system 
Stakeholders 
  Arts workers/leaders 
  Government 
  Advisory committee 
  Creative entrepreneurs 
  Community 
    Arts community 
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  Funders 
  Staff 
  Arts organizations 
  Artists 
Organizational form 
  Incubator funding 
Organizational values 
Partnerships 
Strategic priorities 
Evaluation  
  Failure and success 
  Evaluation Metrics 
    Uniqueness 
    Jobs created 
    Increased capacity 
    Media mentions 
    Increased confidence 
    Tangible impacts 
    Awards 
    Numbers served 
    Community involvement 
    Artistic excellence 
    Diversity 
    Launches 
    Learning outcomes 
    Productivity 
    Client goals met 
    Profitability 
    Sustainability 
    Growth 
  Evaluation methods 
    Financial review 
    Consultant 
    Media content 
    No formal methods 
    Client self-reflection 
    Stakeholder feedback 
    Client reports 
    Participant surveys 
LABOVIAN NARRATIVE CODES 
  ABSTRACT 
  ORIENTATION 
  COMPLICATING ACTION 
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  EVALUATION 
  RESULT/CODA 
 
